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General Summary
The first chapter of this paper discusses the reasons for heavy
government involvement in agricultural production and trade
throughout the world and concludes that the answer is basically
related to what farmers produce -- food. Food is a basic primalT
want and rightly or wrongly there seems to be an innate feat" that
without market inteK’ventlon supplies will be en’atic and so
sometimes scarce.
Other reasons put forward for agricultural support in h’eland
are
(a) protection of employment in the industries dependent on
farming and in the smaller towns where famlers spend
their money
(b) balance of payments considerations because agrieuhural
exports usually have a very low import content
(c) prevention of the rural exodus. Average incomes in agri-
cuhure are usually much lower than in other sector’s.
Hence, unless fatal incomes can be maintained, the so
called "flight fi’om the land" will be hastened and pressure
placed on urban amenities. Off" farm.lobs will also have to
be produced for those leaving the land.
Most economists wotdd agree that some level ofagricuhural
support is necessary but a majority would probalgly claim that
the levels in common use both in the EEC and in many other
developed countries are excessive; that the high levels ofsupport
have brought about unsaleable surpluses and that more
emphasis should in future be placed on supply/demand con-
siderations. The current debate relating to the EEC Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) hinges x,et’y much on this argument.
(xi)
CA P Mechanisms
Since its inception the CAP has endeavoured to adhere to
three basic principles:
(I) Common prices achieved by common organisation of the
market across member states:
(2) Community preference achieved among member states
behind a tariffwa[l of protection against imports from non-
member states:
(3) Common financing involving sharing the costs oftbe CAP
on a Community basis.
The Community attempted to give these principles practical
expression in the market regulations which now cover most of
the major agricultural commodities. The basic philosophy
underlying the Community arrangements is that the market
itself should provide the producers’ return. The means to
achieve this are:-
(a) support buying aimed at guaranteeing a minimum level of
prices at wholesale level,
(b) the regulation of imports from non-membercountries, and
(c) export subsidies on produce in excess of EEC market
requirements.
The CAP price support system and the various other EEC
policies require considerable sums ofmoney which are provided
from three sources:
(I) Receipts from import levies under the CAP and from co-
responsibility levies. These accounted for about 12.5 per
cent of revenue in 1980.
(2) Receipts from the common external tariff on non-CAP
goods from third countries. These made up about 34.5 per
cent of revenue in 1980.
(3) A contribution not exceeding one per cent of an imputed
VAT levy in each member state. This yielded the balance
ofrevenue (i.e., 53 percent in 1980). To date the total VAT
revenue has not been used up in any year but it is expected
that it will all be needed in 1983. After that, further
(xii)
revenue will be required or expenditure will have to
curtailed.
Of the total EEC expenditure in [980, the FEOGA guarantee
section (the price support system) accounted for 7L per cent,
while the guidance section, which deals with structural reform,
made up only 2.4 per cent of the budget. Social and regional
policy accounted for about 9.3 per cent of payments;I while the
remaining 16 per cent went for administration, research and
development co-operation and certain repayments to member
states.
The largest contributors to the budget in 1980 were Germany
(29.6 per cent), the UK (20.8 per cent), France (19.2 pet" ~:ent)
and Italy (12.6 pet" cent). Ireland (0.9 per cent) was the smallest
contributor except for Luxembourg. With regard to receipts
from the budget, France (28.1 per cent) was the largest bene-
ficiary followed by Germany (20.1 per cent), Italy (17.9 per
cent), the UK (12.4 per cent) and The Netherlands (11.4 per
cent). Despite our very small contribution, Ireland received 5.7
per cent of the budgetary payments in 1980. When receipts are
deducted fi’om contributions Germany and the UK are seen the
be the main net contributors, all the other countries except
.Belgium and Luxembourg being net recipients. The UK subse-
quently received a rebate of ~860 million sterling which signifi-
cantly altered the balance between contributions and receipts.
It continued io receive rebates of a smaller magnitude in the
following years.
Development of h-ish Agriculture since Entry to the EEC
The period 1970 to 1978 was the most prosperous in the
history of Irish farming. Real agricultural prices had been rising
since 1970 in anticipation of EEC entry and they continued to
rise thereafter until 1978. The volume of agricultural output
tin 1981 and 1982 guarantee paymt’nts ll:ll to about 60 i~r cent of the budget while
sc~_ial and regional policy exl~ndlture increased to about 15 per cent.
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also increased in this period, growing by almost 36 per cent or
3.9 per cent per annum. This is the highest measured growth
ever achieved lay Irish agriculture over such a prolonged period.
In 1979, however, the tide turned. The rise in agricultural
prices in that year was only 5.8 pet" cent compared with a rise in
input prices of 12.5 percent. As a result, income per agricuhural
worker at current prices fell by 9 per cent or by 20 per cent in
real terms. The 1979 decline was followed by a more severe drop
in 1980 as a resuh of a further fall in real prices ofabout 18 per
cent. Over the two years 1979 and 1980 the drop in real income
per worker was about 34 per cent and when interest payments
are deducted the overall decline over the two ),ears was about 48
per cent. Since then incomes have improved somewhat as a
result of improved real prices and a number ofspecial EEC pay-
ments, but nevertheless conditions in agriculture are still
depressed, compared with the mid-1970s.
The reason for the decline i~a farm incomes is easy to under-
stand. Up to 1978 prices for farm products more than kept pace
with inflation as a result of transitional increases and Green £
devaluations. In 1979, 1980 and 1981 no further transitional
increases were available and the prices fixed in Brussels, which
are related to average European inflation, did not keep pace
with Irish inflation rates. As a resuh Irish farm incomesdeclined
seriously. This is a peculiar situation. Normally high inflation is
associated with currency devaluation but in this case, because of
our high borrowing rate, the IR£ held steady within the EMS.
The result has been that farmers were not able to obtain relief
through Green .£ devaluations. Nor are conditions likely to
improve greatly in future years. Because ofbudgetm3, pressures
the EEC has been adopting what is called a prudent price policy
in recent years (declining real price levels) and this policy is
likely to continue.
Contrary to popular opinion, Irish food prices are not very
much out of line with other prices. In 1976 Irish real retail food
priceswere less than they had been in 1960 or indeed in any of
the intervening years. Food prices rose above the general retail
(xiv)
price level in 1977, 1978 and 1979 but declined again in 1980,
1981 and 1982 when the), were 12 per cent below the 1960 level.
A4onetary Benefits from the CAP
Though Irish farm incomcs declined seriously between 1978
and 1982, nevertheless Ireland gained considerably fi’om the
CAP even in those years. In the absence of EEC membership,
conditions would probably have been much worse than they
were. The efl~:cts of the CAP on our economy have been con-
sidered under two headings:-
(I) the budgetary effect which is the net transfer of resources
from Brussels to h’eland and
(2) the trade transfereffect which arises~because, on trade with
other Community members, prices for commodities pro-
tected by the CAP are higher than on world markets.
The direct budgetary transfers are easily measured fi’om pub-
lished statistics. Transfers (in current prices) grew from .£86m in
1975 to .£37hn in 1979 before declining to .£’282m ifi 1981.
Estimation of the trade transfer effect is more complex since an
appropriate standard must be found against which to measure
the gain from EEC prices. World prices, although the), are far
from being a completely satisfactory benchmark, are used in this
study. Net Irish exports are muhiplied by the difference between
irish and world prices to give the estimated trade transfers. The
results show a gain from trade of IR£1’t5m in 1975 rising to
IR£405 m in 1979 and declining to IR£276 m in 1981. When the
budgetary and trade figures are aggregatedz the benefits rise
from IRff226m in 1975 to IR£703m in 1979 but decline to
IR£558m in 1981.
The CAP also involves large domestic transfers: producers
gain and consumers lose from high agricultural prices while tax-
payers lose by having to contribute to the EEC budget. The
’In aggregating the two figures ACt, s and MCAs have to be netted out (~:e Chapler 4,
Appendix C),
magnitudes of these transfers during the period 1975 to 1981
show that consumer losses have been substantial, around
IR.£205 m in current prices in 1978 and 1979, but producer
gains amounted to about IR£950 m in the same years.
Criticisms of the CA P
Since its inception, the CAP has been subjected to continuous
and heavy criticisms. These include the following: (1) the high
prices have led to surpluses which are expensive to dispose of, (2)
the surpluses and their disposal costs are growing alarmingly,
while consumption is almost static, (3) the CAP favours better-
off" fanners and thus fails to satisfy the objective of income
equity, (4) surplus disposal disrupts international trade, and (5)
the CAP takes so much of the total EEC budget that there are
not sufficient funds for the proper development of social and
regional policies.
Counter-arguments have, of course, been advanced against
these criticisms. Although there have been surpluses, the
Commission maintains that prices are not out of line with those
in industrialised countries like the USA and Canada. It admits,
however, that the problem of surplus disposal has now got out of
hand and represents rises in expenditure which can no longer be
justified. This applies in particular to milk, processed fruit and
vegetables, and even beef. Many of the difficulties with surpluses
arise from concessionary imports of beef, lamb, sugar, maize
gluten and soya beans as well as cereal substitutes such as
manioc. Indeed, some commentators argue that if these imports
were reduced the problem of surplus disposal would be eased
considerably.
It is very difficult, however, to change the treatment of
concessionary imports without breaking GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regulations and having
countervailing powers applied against industrial exports. It may
(xvl)
be possible to obtain some reductions but, in general, the surplus
problem cannot be solved by curtailing concessionary imports.
An increase in VAT payments would help considerably to ease
the EEC budget problem but the French, British and Germans
say they will not increase their payments unless changes are
made in the CAP. Unfortunately they, all want different changes
and it is almost impossible to obtain agreement.
Among the changes proposed are tile following:-
( 1 )Income supportsfnanced wholly or partly by nationalgouernments.
This was not taken seriously by the Commission up to nov,,
but opinions are changing, particularly in relation to
income supports for small farmers.
(2) Prudent price policies: this policy has been in operation in
recent years and as a resuh real prices have declined ever3,
year since 1976, except for 1982. It is likely, that this policy
will continue in an effort to control output and keep
expenditure within present budget limits. It seems to be the
most important instrument of the Commission in CAP
re[’olTrl.
(3) Co-responsibility: this is the payment of a levy by producers
on production of certain commodities so as to defray the
cost of surplus disposal. Currently there is a levy on milk of
1.5 to 2.0 per cent of the target price and also a levy, on
sugar sales. These levies cost Ireland about IR~r20 million
fiper annnm in recent years. In 1979, when the EEC budget
was under considerable strain, the Commission decided
that the uniform levy, on all milk was insull]eient and’that a
supplementary or "super-levy" should be introduced to
fund the disposal of additional milk beyond a certain basic
quantity for the Community as a whole. Each farm or
creamer3, was to be given a quota and the "super-levy" at
tile rate of about 50p per gallon was to be charged on all
production in excess of quota. This meant that extra
production would have been worthless. Tile recommenda-
tion for a super-levy was rejected by tile Council of
Ministers at the time but the idea has recently been
(xvii)
proposed again and there is nov,, strong pressure for its
introduction.
(4) Quotas: the idea of quotas has been mentioned by num-
erous writers as the only sane method of controlling surplus
production and, indeed, the super-levy applied at farm
level would in fact be a quota. In some past documents the
Commission has said that it does not favour quotas and cer-
tainly most member governments are opposed to them on
the grounds that they would freeze production at existing
levels. Nevertheless, if surpluses continue to pile up and
opposition from third countries to dumping continues,
there may be little option except to introduce quotas on
certain products, particularly milk.
The effect on Irish farm incomes of the above policies com-
pared to a policy of "no restraint" (maintenance of 1982 real
prices) has recently been examined by Professor S. J. Sheehy of
University College, Dublin. He concludes that in order to main-
tain real prices at their 1982 level, the EEC budget would have
to increase almost three-fold in real terms by 1990. This would
be out of the question and, therefore, whether we like it or not,
some other regime will have to be adopted. When the other
options were examined Sheehy found that if the budget is to
remain at more or less its present level, farm incomes would be
reduced less by a quota system than by either price reductions or
across-the-board co-responsibility levies. On the basis of his
assumptions, massive price reductions would be required to con-
trol production. Hence, prudent price policies alone will not be
sufficient and it looks as if some form of production curtailment
will be necessary in the coming years.
As a result of exceptionally high surplus disposal costs, it is
expected that the budget will be exhausted by the end of 1983.
The Council has therefore asked the Commission to suggest a
package of realistic proposals for the curtailment of agricultural
expenditure. The proposals which were recommended by the
Commission to the Council on the 28thJuly 1983 advocate the
introduction of a milk super-levy on deliveries to dairies in excess
(xviii)
of 1981 amounts. The introduction of this system would have
very serious implications for Ireland. We are more dependent on
dairying than any of the other member states. This enterprise
has a greater growth potential than any other and it is still very
underdeveloped relative to that in oth~er countries. The Agricul-
tural Institute has pointed out that expansion of milk produc-
tion in Europe is due more to increased yields than to increased
cow numbers. These yields in turn a~ due to the availability of
low priced imported cereal substitutes from third countries,
positive MCAs (which give farmers in Germany, The Nether-
lands and the UK very high prices for milk) and high national
aids which, in many cases, are illegal. It argues, therefore, that
these anomalies should be rectified before artificial barriers on
production are introduced.
We agree entirely with these views but we are also aware that
it will not be easy to do much quickly about the various
anomalies which have arisen. Some concessions will, therefore,
have to be made. However, because of our high dependence on
farming and on our low level of development we should argue
for special conditions for Ireland and, if necessary, use our veto
powers to obtain a higher threshold than the 1981 level which
was exceptionally low.
(xix)
Introduction
This paper describes the evolution of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP) and the various policy instruments used
in its implementation. It discusses the benefits to the Irish
economy from the CAP and attempts to quantify these benefits
using methodologies developed by a number of other research
workers. The paper goes on to describe the attacks which have
been made on the CAP over the years and the changes made in
response to these criticisms. It considers in detail the pressures on
the EEC budget at the present time and the suggestions which
have been proposed for dealing with these. The most important
of these proposals are outlined and those which might best suit
the Irish economy are examined in more detail.
The paper is divided into six chapters. The first headed
"Public Policy and Agriculture" describes the agricuhural
problem and its causes, and outlines the policies which have
been used in developed countries for dealing with this problem,
i.e., price and income supports, deficiency payments, etc. The
second chapter deals with the evolution of the CAP from the
foundation of the EEC. It describes its structure, the policy
instruments employed in its administration, the advent of
floating exchange rates, and the introduction of MCAs and
green money changes. The chapter concludes with a short
discussion of the MCA system.
Chapter 3, entitled "Developments in Irish Agriculture since
EEC Membership" outlines the projections made by the
government prior to entry and the outcome of these projections
both in the early years up to 1978 and in more recent times when
agricultural incomes went into decline. The causes of the
(xx)
current agricultural depression are also discussed. Continuing
with the Irish situation Chapter 4 attempts to estimate the
moneta~, benefits from the CAP for the Irish economy as a
whole. An estimate is made of (a) the budgetary effect of the
CAP, i.e., the net transfer of resources from FEOGA to Ireland
and (b) the net trade transfer effect resulting from trade at rela-
tively high prices with other Community members. An estimate
is also made of the gains and losses as between producers, con-
sumers and taxpayers.
Chapter 5 outlines the criticisms which have been advanced
against the CAP in recent years. These include the generation of
surpluses as a result of high prices, the disruptive effect of
surpluses on world markets and the use of an undue amount of
funds for surplus disposal leaving very little available for social
and regional policies. This chapter also shows the amounts spent
on the support ofd lfferent products and the contributions of the
different member states towards the EEC budget. The chapter
ends with a short discussion of the enlargement of the com-
munity from 9 to 12 members by the admission of Greece, Spain
and Portugal.
Chapter 6 examines the various solutions which have been
put forward for solving the problems of the CAP and selects the
options which are considered feasible. It then reports the results
of other researchers concerning the effects ofeach option on the
EEC budget and on lrish producer and consumer surpluses.
The options examined are ( 1 ) a continuation of present policies;
(2) a lowering of prices in order to curb production; (3) an
increase in co-responsibility levies and (4) the introduction of a
quota system.
(xxi)
Chapter 1
Public Policy. in Agriculture
Among different academic disciplines, as well as in urban and
rural areas, considerable conflict surrounds discussion of
agricultural prices and farmers’ incomes. Where such a conflict
exists it is usually a good idea to return to first principles so as to
put the subject in context.
In doing this we must ask the basic question as to why there is
such high government involvement in agricultural production
and trade throughout the world. Ultimately, of course, the
prime reason is a political one but that is not a complete answer.
What is it that drives the politicians to intervene? It cannot be
entirely due to the magnitude of the farm vote or to the strength
of the farmers’ lobby. If these were the reasons we would expect
a declining intere~;t as farm population declines, yet this is not
the case. If anything the level of interest tends to grow.
In our opinion the answer is basically related to the nature of
the demand for, and the supply of, farm produce. Farmers pro-
duce food which is a basic human want and rightly or wrongly
there seems to be an innate fear that without market inter-
vention supplies of this commodity could become erratic and so
at times scarce. This is not an entirely far fetched idea when we
consider the nature of the demand for food which is both income
and price inelastic. As people get richer they do not consume
much more farm produce than heretofore, nor do they place a
higher value on it. They will probably eat more meat and less
bread but overall quantities remain fairly stable. Hence,
demand for food increases at little more than the rate ofpopula-
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tion growth in developed countries and large shifts in the price of
foods relative to other goods are unable to alter this tendency to
any appreciable extent. Though a change in food prices will not
affect consumption very much, a change in the quantity pro-
duced will affect prices considerably. If an agricultural com-
modity is scarce its price can rise considerably; if it is very plenti-
ful the price can fall very low. Unfortunately, because of
weather and .other conditions there are large changes in the
production o]" agricultural products and, hence, large price
swings. For example, the average price of potatoes in Ireland
rose from £27 per tonne in 1973 to £104 per tonne in 1976,
dropped to £41 per tonne in 1978 and rose to£124 per tonne in
1979. And even though cattle prices are protected by the CAP,
average calf prices at Bandon mart in Cork dropped from £47
per head in April 1972 to £10 per head in 1975 and rose again to
;~"30 in 1976 and to £45 in 1977 while prices of9-10 cwt. bullocks
at marts fell from £160 per head in October 1973 to £122 per
head in October 1974 and rose again to £195 per head in
October 1975.
Over the years the application of improved technology has
led to a steady increase in the volume of food produced in
developed economies. Paradoxically, this has led to a lowering
of farm incomes from the market, because farmers as a whole are
penalised for output increases. As a result of the nature of the
demand for food they usually receive less total revenue for a
large than for a small crop and are thus victims of the progress
they have helped to create. In the past some groups have tried to
circumvent this by organised curtailment of production but in
all cases they have been singularly unsuccessful. Generally it was
not possible to enforce sufficient control of production to force
up market prices except for short periods. Suggestions are some-
times made that if general quotas were introduced high prices
could be maintained. The difficulty with this suggestion is the
problem of administering quotas on a sufficiently widescale
basis and of getting people to obey the rules. There would no
doubt also be strong opposition from consumer groups.
Reasons for Intervention
Under the classical assumption of perfect competition, the
effects of increased productivity facing an inelastic demand
should lead to a rapid fall in the return to resources employed in
agriculture and to an equally rapid shift of these resources out of
farming. Though this may be an economically optimum situa-
tion governments seem to have been unwilling to permit this
laissezfaire solution for various reasons. Some of these are listed
below:
(1) There is the self sufficiency consideration which even in
peace time is by no means trivial. Few countries, and with
good reason, like to be over dependent on other countries
for many of their basic foods.3
(2) There are a number of food industries using agricultural
raw materials which give considerable employment.
Hence, maintenance of a reasonable level of growth in the
volume of agricultural output is necessary if the level of
employment in a number of such industries is to be main-
tained. In turn these industries provide further employ-
ment through multiplier effects.
(3) Balance of payments considerations can be put forward as
another reason for supporting agriculture, either because
of import saving or because agricultural exports have
usually a low import content.
(4) Traditionally, average income per worker in agriculture
has been considerably lower than that in other sectors.
Hence, for reasons of social policy as well as for equity
considerations governments everywhere have intervened ’
in agriculture so as to support farm incomes and stem the
rural exodus.
It must be kept in mind, of course, that the cost ofsupporting
people in farming and in rural areas generally is not trivial. In
1972, the year before Ireland entered, the EEC, the cost of state
3For a discussion of this point see Ritson (1980).
expenditure in relation to agriculture was about £113 million or
6..5 per cent of the national income in that year. In 1979 the net
subvention from FEOGA,4 most of which goes in one way or
another to rural areas, was estimated at about ff371 million (see
Table 4.1) while there were further payments of£224 million
from the national exchequer. The latter accounted for about 3.0
per cent of the national income in that year.
The above discussion indicates why special policies have to be
introduced for agriculture in developed countries and how
expensive these policies are. Economists would, ofcourse, argue
that every policy introduced should be appraised in some way to
determine its costs in relation to the benefits expected and to
consider alternatives if the benefit/cost ratio is unfavourable.
Few could argue against this procedure and, indeed, if it were
carried out in all cases, there are many schemes which would
never have been initiated.
In practice, however, it is difficult to make realistic benefit/
cost analyses of all projects. The ramifications of the benefits are
so diverse that it is impossible to appraise them with any reason-
able degree of accuracy. Also, there are social costs and benefits
which it is impossible to appraise in financial terms. At the end
of the day, therefore, there is always a judgement to be made,
essentially a political judgement. The decision to pay heavy
state aids to agriculture in pre-EEC days was not always easy to
justify and was indeed questioned on many occasions. (See
Report of State Expenditure in Relation to Agriculture (1970)
and O’Connor (1969/70).) Still, successive governments rightly
or wrongly persevered with the subsidisation policies, both for
agriculture and manufacturing industry. Other policies could
have been adopted and possibly justified on one ground or
another, but even today no one can prove conclusively whether
it was right or wrong to support agriculture or protect industry
to the extent undertaken.
4"l’hese are the French initials of the European Agrlcuiiural Guarantee and Guidance
Ftmd.
Criteria for Public Policy in Agriculture
In the previous section we indicated that, at the end of the
day, policies for agriculture are based on political judgements.
These judgements should not, however, be ill informed. Thepros
and cons should be researched and presented to the decision-
maker, as well as the likely consequences of any action taken.
In considering the criteria for agricultural policy,, the first
point to be made is that policies for the sector make little sense in
isolation. The aim must be to relate development in agriculture
and the allocation of resources in agriculture to development
and resource allocation in the rest of the economy. In line with
this objective, the first aim should be to maximise, subject to
various constraints, growth in employment and in real national
income per head of the whole population. This implies allocat-
ing resources to agriculture and to other sectors in such a way as
to achieve this. More specifically, it entails the encouragement
of efficiency in the use of resources and the avoidance of under-
utilisation or unemployment of resources.
The second aim, which can be considered a constraint on the
first, is the desire to achieve a greater equality of income on
equity grounds. The presence, side by side, of a small number of
very rich people and a large number of vet3, poor people is not
generally acceptable in modern times. But it must also be kept in
mind that the problems of redistributing income from the rich to
the poor are amongst the most difficult that can be encountered,
and if such policies are enforced to extreme lengths, violent
social upheavals will ensue. In this area, therefore, as indeed in
many others, moderation must be the kcyword.
Thirdly, there appears to be a consensus that some degree of
stability, in general price levels and hence, in food production, is
desirable and should be an aim of any economic policy. We have
shown above the huge variations which occur in agricultural
prices. Such variations could lead to great instability in food
production and could cause grave hardship to consumers.
Policy must aim, therefore, to minimise such instability ifat all
possible by stabilising prices. In this connection Ritson (1980)
says "The aim of stabilising domestic markets is perhaps the
most popular and least contentious of all agricultural policy
objectives. Everyone seems to agree that overcoming the
’problem’ of instability is a prize worth fighting for, and few
seem to detect many costs involved in achieving it."
Summary of Policy Goals
In deriving policy goals for agricultural programmes, there
appear to be four broad aims, namely, growth, efficiency, equity
and stability. It must be reallsed, however, that to some extent
these goals are in conflict with one another and that some
reasonable balance needs to be struck between them.
For example, income distribution and efficiency are not
always consistent aims. Large farmers with plenty of resources
are usually the most efficient, whereas small farmers are gener-
ally less so. Conway (1976) has shown that reasonable progress
has been achieved in Ireland by the larger and more commer-
cialised farmers. At the other end of the scale, farms with less
than 50 acres, having fewer than one labour unit, have made
little contribution to overall expansion in agricultural output in
recent years. If, therefore, we go for efficiency we must concen-
trate on the larger and better-off farmers whereas if we go for
income distribution we may have to neglect the efficient in order
to help the inefficient and in the process obtain little or no
increase in output. In practice, of course, governments must
arrive at a compromise between the conflicting goals.
With regard to stability, a few points need to be made also.
Though stability of employment for all workers in the national
labour force is a very important goal, we concentrate here on
price stability because it is of most relevance for farmers; the
latter do not worry too much about unemployment per se since
they themselves can at least exist during periods of depression.
As has been shown above, prices are the main problem and price
stability is strongly favoured by farmers since it contributes
greatly to stability of income. Moderate price stability is also
favoured by economists on the grounds that it leads to al[ocative
efficiency which in turn leads to economic growth. Kaldor
(I 963) says that guaranteed prices announced prior to the time
farmers make production decisions can greatly reduce uncer-
tainty and this red uction can contribute to a more efficient use of
agricultural resources.
While a generalised system of administered prices may, in
theory, offer a superior alternative to free market pricing this
may not be true in practice. Pricing to establish allocative
efficiency requires that the prices be established on the basis of
supply/demand criteria. This means that prices must be set at
market clearing levels taking one year with another. In practice,
however, prices for some products tend to be set at higher than
market clearing levels, resulting in resources being channelled
into production of commodities for which there is no effective
demand. Inefficiency in resource allocation and product mix
may thus become widespread.
Farm Income Support Policies
Considerable variations exist between the type ofagricuhural
policies in operation in different countries and between those for
different commodities within countries. Some of the more
important of these policies are discussed below.
Price Supports
The most common method of supporting farm incomes in all
countries, and the one most favoured by farmers, is some form of
price support system.
The criteria used in fixing support prices are never clearly
defined, nor are any of the people concerned in price fixing
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negotiations too anxious to have clear principles enunciated.
The economist would probably argue that the price should be
fixed at a level which will bring forth the required supply and
not at such a level as to bring forth an unsaleable surplus. The
farmers’ representatives would probably argue that the price for
an important commodity should be such as to give average
farmers a reasonable level of income and if this is greater than
the market clearing level then the government should subsidise
exports of surpluses. The government will probably also be con-
cerned with the level of farmers’ income but it will also have to
think in terms of food prices to consumers and of the cost of
surplus disposal. With such diverse interests involved, the price-
fixing process becomes a matter of haggling until eventually a
bargain is struck which usually depends on a number of factors.
Price support systems have, of course, their advantages and
their disadvantages, with the advantages usually stressed by the
farm lobby and the disadvantages by consumers and econo-
mists. The main disadvantage is that the prices fixed are seldom
related to supply/demand considerations and are usually well
above market clearing levels. As a result, there are practically
always unsaleable surpluses which cost further money to dispose
of. Also, fixed prices are very inefficient instruments for
redistributing income and in many cases the effect may be
perverse, i.e., they may increase income inequality. If the price
fixed is aimed at adequately compensating the average sized
farmer, then the small farmer is not getting sufficient, while the
large farmer is over-compensated. This can be avoided by using
a tiered price system (i.e., by giving higher prices for the firsttx
units of produce delivered and lower prices for subsequent
units). This type of system is difficuh to administer for many pro-
ducts, but even for products like milk where it can be adminis-
tered easily, there are usually fierce objections to its imple-
mentation by large farmers. The latter claim that it is a bar to
efficiency and that if the government wish to give extra
compensation to small farmers it should do so through direct
income supports rather than by reducing the prices paid to the
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most efficient producers. This was the argument used against a
multi-tiered milk price system introduced in Ireland in the late
1960s which was later abandoned.
Among the advantages of price support systems, particularly
from the farmers’ point of view (and apart from the obvious one
of raising farm incomes) are:-
(1) The amount of subsidy obtained through a given price
support system is difficult to determine with an), degree of
accuracy because no one can be certain what the price
level would be in the absence of the support. So called
"world" prices are a very imperfect guide. These are
usually the prices ruling for surplus produce resulting from
high domestic prices in various countries. The level of
support in a price system is, therefore, not visible. On the
other hand, support systems which involve direct subsidies
are visible. The amount involved can be readily computed
and govemme.nts can be criticised for giving subsidies to
large farmers when there are great numbers of very poor
non-farmers on, or near, the poverty line.
(2) A farmer being compensated through the price system can
say that he is not in receipt of any government hand-outs,
that he is being paid by consumers for his produce and that
if the price were lower he would not produce, or would be
unable to produce.
(3) Finally, if there are guaranteed prices, a good deal of the
risk and uncertainty involved in farming is eliminated.
This, in turn, enables more efficient use of farm resources.
As Johnson (1947) says
If expectations are uncertain a farmer may be influenced in
his decision in man), ways but most particularly through
his liquidity system. Capital rationing may thus play a
significani, role in influencing choice of factors either
directly (some factors may Ize considered too risky, by
lending agents to serve as collateral) or indirectly through
the imposition of certain types of risk sharing contractual
relationships or through inefficient diversification.
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On the basis of these effects, he argues that "the great
degree of instability in the general price level must be
reduced to a minimum".
With regard to the management of price fixing methods,
various arrangements are in operation depending on circum-
stances and on the commodity involved.
In Ireland since the 1930s, the home market for important
products like milk products, pigmeat, sugar beet, etc., was con-
fined to home producers with small subsidies being paid on
exports. Under the Anglo Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in
1966 the UK government paid a subsidy on certain quantities of
Irish beef and lamb exported to the UK. The Irish Government
decided to support from the Exchequer at the same level any
elegible quantities in excess of these amounts.
Under the EEC system, prices are supported in various ways:
through variable import levies which can be raised or lowered
depending on internal market prices, through advalorem customs
duties, through intervention buying, or grants for private
storage so as to take products off the market in periods of glut,
through export refunds to enable surplus disposal abroad,
through subsidies to manufacturers, through consumer subsi-
dies, denaturing premiums, withdrawal subsidies, etc.
Constraints on PHce Policies
The above discussion applies to largely open-ended commit-
ments, whereby governments or the EEC support whatever
price levels are agreed, regardless of how the market goes. This
can often be a very costly undertaking and for many com-
modities, particularly those in permanent oversupply, the com-
mitment has to be constrained in some way. The most common
constraint where appllcab[e, is a quota or contract system for
some given level of output.
The advantage of quotas or contracts is that they are for
specific quantities to supply a given demand. Large surpluses
are thus avoided. Their disadvantages lie in the method of
allocation. Who makes the allocation? Who gets a quota and
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how are decisions made about the magnitude of each farmer’s
quota? Normally those in production, before the quota is intro-
duced, are given an allocation on the basis of previous produc-
tion but new entrants cause problems and it is diflqcult to devise
satisfactory methods of dealing with them.
Deficiency Payments System
Under this system, which operated in the UK up to 1973 (and
which is also a price support system) guaranteed prices were
fixed for home production of major products of a certain stan-
dard sold at specified markets. There was no intervention in
these markets, however, and imports of comparable products
were allowed free of duty or at very low rates. In the case of
cattle, average prices for the guaranteed commodities were cal-
culated for each market each week and the average from all the
markets was taken as the average national market price for that
week. The difference between this price and the guaranteed
price was the deficiency payment per unit sold for the week con-
cerned and farmers selling standard produce in that week were
paid this amount per unit on presentation ofsale dockets. It paid
a fa~wner to get the best price possible at the market because the
deficiency payment was a constant for all farmers. Somewhat
different methods applied for milk, cereals, pigs, etc., depending
on the way the market operated for these commodities but essen-
tially the objective was the same for all produce, i.e., a free
market with guaranteed prices for home producers. The scheme
as it operated in the UK was fairly open-ended up to 1964 but as
a result of the Agricuhure and Horticulture Act of 1964 a system
of voluntary control of imports was introduced, while guaran-
teed payments were related to specific or standard quantities.
A scheme such as this is very suitable for a food importing
country, like the UK, with a small farming sector. Its free
market is supplied with food from all over tile world at low prices
while its own farmers are paid out of general taxation on the
basis of their sales. In addition, normal marketing and distribu-
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tion is not interfered with and the problems of storing and
disposing of surplus produce are avoided. As a consequence,
produce may be sold in a more orderly manner in a difficult
marketing situation while the overall return to home producers
is assured for a period ahead.
The major disadvantage of a deficiency payments scheme is
that it is not very suitable for countries with large agricultural
sectors and small food import requirements. In such countries
the budgetary costs would be exceptionally high unless severe
restrictions were imposed on the level of the deficiency pay-
ments. These payments would also be visible and would thus be
subject to debate and criticism by consumer groups. The
Review Body which reported in 1976 on the beef intervention
scheme in Ireland (Prl. 5769) compared the costs for the EEC as
a whole of the intervention system, with a deficiency payments
arrangement for cattle and beef, and concluded that the
budgetary cost of the latter could be up to four times greater
than the former to achieve a similar degree of price and income
support for producers. Furthermore, if the intervention system
were changed to a deficiency system, the burden of payments
would probably be shifted also. Under the intervention or price
support system, food consumers in the EEC pay the biggest
share of the farm price supports. Under a deficiency payment
scheme, the burden would be shifted to taxpayers. Some would
argue that this is as it should be, that taxpayers should help to
reduce food prices for the poorer non-taxpayers. But if the sums
involved are very large, as they would be within the EEC as a
whole, the taxation bill would become oppressive and some
states might find it impossible to collect them, particularly ifa
high proportion were going to subsidise well-to-do farmers and
consumers in other countries.
Direct Income Support
Economists usually favour direct income payments from the
government as being the most equitable method ofsupporting
farmers’ incomes.
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As might be expected, farmers dislike such supports as they
can be branded as hand-outs or doles. These are unflattering
terms for large farmers who are often local leaders. And if the
supports are paid at the local labour exchange they may be
unacceptable to many. Also, like all government payments, they
are visible and thus become sources ofconfiict between urban
and rm’al people.
The advantage of direct income payments is that they do not
interfere with the market or with the allocation ofresources and
also do not increase food prices to consumers. Indeed, if any-
thing, they may tend to rednce prices. With income available
from the state, farmers can afford to increase investments, thus
increasing production and lowering prices.
Headage Payments
In recent years, within the EEC, cattle headage payments as a
fon’n of income support have become popular. These have
certain advantages for the Community in addition to support-
ing incomes. If such payments are in operation, prices at the
annual review can be kept lower than they otherwise might be;
food is thus made cheaper to consnmers and the cost ofdisposing
of surpluses is reduced since the subvention for the latter is the
difference between EEC intervention and so-called "world"
prices. Also the headage payments bypass the interactions of
support for joint products such as milk and beef. However, these
payments, tmless they are constrained in some way, have the dis-
advantage that the biggest farmers get the greatest benefit. Also,
while in theory they can be used to shift production from
products in surplus to those which are more scarce, it is difficult
to prove or disprove their having had such substitution or
incentive effects in Ireland. There is, however, scope for using
headage payments to increase the equity of the farm support
system, by paying them in disadvantaged areas, or confining
them to the smaller farms.
Llnforttmately if used on a very wide scale, headage payments.
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can be as expensive for governments as deficiency payments,
and for the EEC, at any rate, they must be used selectively. A
means of reducing headage grants is to pay them on extra
animals in a herd such as calved heifers or calves of certain
breeds. This will succeed in producing extra animals of the type
supported for a short time, but unless the payment system is
linked with some scheme covering the whole farm, the exercise
may be of doubtful value. In order to reap short-term gains,
some farmers will increase livestock numbers beyond their
means of supporting such animals, particularly in winter.
Markets, therefone, become glutted with unfinished cattle in
autumn, prices drop and there is.general dissatisfaction. Hence,
when a payment scheme for extra livestock is introduced, it
should be linked in some way to a winter feed production pro-
gramme. An animal quality standard might also be introduced
though this may be difficuh to administer and some would argue
that, in general, the market will take care of quality.
Price Equalisation Schemes
Policies which were considered to have merit in past years in
many countries were price equa[isation schemes organised by
the producers themselves, the objective of which was to equalise
prices over the business cycle. To operate the schemes, funds
were created through the payment of levies by farmers when
prices were good, with disbursements made out of the fund’, in
times of poor prices. Unfortunately, all such schemes seem to
have been unsuccessful. The funds collected in good times were
never sufficient to meet the outgoings in bad times so that the
payments to farmers dried up long before the need for them
ceased.
The discussion in this chapter indicates the options and diffi-
culties facing governments and supranational institutions, like
the EEC, in designing policies for agriculture. In the next
chapter we indicate how the European Community is coping
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with these problems through the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). This chapter traces the evolution of the CAP, the
mechanics of its operation, its financing and the problems which
have arisen as a result of varying inflation rates in the different
member states.
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Chapter 2
Evolution of the (.A P and its Mechanisms
Introduction
The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic
Community, was signed in 1957. The original six signatories
were West Germany, France, haly, Belgium, The Netherlands
and Luxembourg. The first enlargement of the Community
took place on 1 January 1973 when the United Kingdom,
Ireland and Denmark became members after a long negotiation
period during which France was initially reluctant to allow UK
entry. It was expected that Norway would have joined along
with theother three in 1973 but its application was withdrawn as
a resuh of a national referendunl. It seems that the majority of
Norwegian people were unwilling to accept the proposed Com-
mon Fisheries Policy which would allow fishermen from any
member state free access to the waters of all other memberstates
(Beach to Beach Policy).5
The second enlargement of the Community to e~abrace
Greece, Spain and Portugal is currently under way. Greece
joined on 1 January 1981 and it was expected that the other two
countries would join in January 1984. France, however, is now
blocking Spanish entry and there will, therefore, be some delay
about further enlargement.
The Evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy
Throughout the post-war period, European agriculture has
been undergoing an enormous structural transformation from
~This policy has since I~en modified to the extent that each member state is allowed
an exclusive coastal band extending 6 to 12 miles from national base lines.
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basically a traditional activity towards a modern, capital inten-
sive, high technology industry. When the European Economic
Community was formed, farming still played an important role
in the Community’s economy, employing over 16 million people
and producing 2[ per cent of its aggregate GDP. However, as
Table 2.1 shows, the agricultural labour force was in very rapid
decline in all Community countries and because of the sheer size
of the sector this decline posed problems of adjustment for the
economies concerned. In those years it was possible to employ
those leaving agriculture in other sectors and so the unemploy-
ment rates did not increase, except slightly in France where the
rate went from 0.9 per cent in 1958 to 2.1 percent in 1971. In all
the other EEC countries there was a decline over the 1958-71
period. In haly the unemployment rate went from 6. l to 3.1 per
cent. In West Germany from 3.0 to 0.7 per cent. In Belgium
from 3.3 to 1.7 per cent and in The Netherlands from 2.4 to 1.4
per cent. Compared with present day rates these are very low
figures.
Table 2. h LSnployment and GDP arising in agriculture in the
EEC for selected years
Em[~loI,naent % of labour Agriculture as
in Agriculture J’orce a % of GDP at
current prices
1958 197[ 1958 1971 1958 1971
(000) (000) % % % %
West Germany 3,978 2,144 15.5 8.2 7.1 3.2
France 4,455 2,750 23.7 13.4 10.6 6+2
ha[y 6,800 3,588 34.9 19.4 20.0 7.7
Belgium 310 162 8.9 4.3 7.3 3.5
The Netherlands 495 320 12.7 6.9 22.2 5.4
Luxembourg 22 11 16.8 8.1 8.7 3.7
"Total EEC 16,060 8,975 22.5 12.2 20.7 5.02
Sources: Eurostat: Population a+~d E:~lploytnent 1950-1976, National t"~zcounts various
issuq:$.
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Prior to the establishment of the Community, all the countries
concerned were faced with basically the same set of problems;
low agricultural incomes and a rapidly declining agricultural
labour force. All had widespread agricultural support policies
though of different kinds depending on their farm structures and
the economic conditions which they faced.
Table 2.2 examines the degree ofself-sufllciency for the major
agricultural products in the Community countries in the period
1956-1960. Only France and The Netherlands were major agri-
cultural exporters.
Table 2.2: The degree of self supply for major agricultural products
1956-1960
West The
Ger- Belgium Nether- Total
many France Italy    Lux.    lands EEC
per cent
Total Wheat 70 109 95 68 32 90
Husked Rice -- 52 143 -- -- 83
Barley 65 123 48 47 39 84
Maize 2 105 79 1 -- 64
Sugar 92 118 163 113 100 104
BeefandVeal 87 102 75 96 106 92
Pigmeat 94 101 94 106 146 100 ,
Eggs 58 96 84 103 222 90
Butter 94 106 81 96 180 101
Source: Eurostat: The Agricultural Situation in the Community (1975).
In Table 2.3 data are presented on the size distribution of
agricultural holdings within the Community in 1960. Farms
generally were very small. However, the aggregate figures
conceal large differences between countries. West Germany,
Belgium and Italy in particular, had very small farms, a
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problem worsened by considerable fragmentation of holdings.
French farms, on the other hand, were much larger. Because of ’
the widely differing conditions in European agriculture, it is not
surprising that the agricultural policies adopted by Community
members in the pre-EEC period varied a great deal. As a broad
generalisation, countries can be fitted into one of two groups.
Table 2.3: Farm structure: the proportion of agricultural holdings
1 hectare and over by size group in 1960
West TheGer- Bel- aVether-
Luxem- Total
Hectares man),    France Italy glum lands bourg EEC
per Cenl
1 under 5      45 26 68 48.5 38 32 46
5 under 10 25 21 19 26.5 27 18 21
10 under 20 21 27 8.5 18.0 23 26 18
20 under 50 8 21 3 6.0 11 22 11
50 and over 1 5 1.5 1.0 1 2 4
Source: Marsh and Swanney (1980).
The agricultural importing countries, i.e., West Germany,
Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg had adopted policies of import
substitution, maintaining farm prices through various import
controls, while at the same time encouraging increased domestic
production through input subsidies, etc. In contrast the export-
ing countries, France and The Netherlands, were forced to
evolve explicit price support systems through export subsidies
accompanied by production controls (Tracy, 1964). While
differing in detail both sets of policies were fundamentally
protectionist and interventionist in nature. In an important
sense, the agricultural policies that the EEC was to adopt repre-
sented a continuation at the Community level of these national
policies.
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In the industrial sector, the creation of a European common
market involved the phased removal of all tariffs and quotas on
intra-Community trade, and the imposition of a common
external tariffon trade with third countries. The process, which
began in 1958 when all tariffs were cut by 10 percent, wascom-
pleted successfully by mid-1968. Industrial trade liberalisation
was accompanied by some easing of restrictions on the move-
ment of labour, and the first steps were made towards the dis-
mantling of non-tariffbarriers. These successes were achieved in
an international climate generally conducive to trade liberalisa-
tion. Due to GATT regulations, tariff and quota levels were
quite low and the high rates of economic growth within the
Community combined with the rapid expansion in world trade
meant that few serious problems of adjustment arose.
The difficuhies faced by the Community in easing the restric-
tions on agricultural trade were more daunting. Multilateral
attempts at tariff reductions in this field through GATT had
achieved very little. The reasons for this failure are complex. To
begin with, as stated above, agriculture was protected almost
universally, not only by the usual apparatus of tariffs and quotas
but by a wide diversity of government aids such as support
prices, input subsidies, etc. Once such support is given, it can be
extremely difficult to withdraw, as interest groups become
entrenched. This problem was exacerbated by the continuing
low levels of income in agriculture even with high levels of
protection. Governments were accordingly loath to take
measures which would reduce farm living standards even
further.
Agriculture, in fact, was excluded from the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) which was set up in 1959. This, how-
ever, was never a realistic option for the EEC. The Community
was intended to be much more than a customs union and was
seen as the first step towards eventual European political and
economic union. The omission of agriculture, or indeed of any
sector, would have made nonsense of such an ideal. Any
arrangement which excluded agriculture, then a large sector in
20
the Community, would have prevented union status. At the
political level, France and The Netherlands saw the formation
of a common market in agricultural goods as providing them
with some measure of compensation for the dismantling of
industrial protection. The other countries gave concessions on
the agricultural front in exchange for export markets for their
industrial products. Indeed, the creation of the CAP has been
seen as virtually a precondition for any move towards European
unity.
The Treaty of Ronve
The Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was signed in 1957.
In Article 38 of the Treaty, provision was made for a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The objectives of the CAP were set
out in Article 39 as follows:
(a) To increase agricultural productivity by promoting
technological progress and by ensuring the rational
development of agricultural production and the optimal
utilisation of the factors of production, in particular,
labour.
(b) To ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural com-
munity.
(c) To stabilise markets.
(d) To ensure the stability of supplies.
(e) To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable
prices.
In Paragraph 2 of Article 39 it was further stressed that due
account should be taken of the social structure ofagricuhure
and the disparities between the various regions. The aims are
expressed in a very general manner which leave the articles open
to very wide interpretations, i.e., what constitutes a "fair"
standard of living or a "reasonable price" is very much a matter
of opinion. Also there are possibilities for conflict between the
objectives.
The Treaty directed that the commission organist: a con-
ference of member states to "compare their existing agricultural
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policies and to formulate a statement of their resources and
needs". The conference of agricultural experts from govern-
ment and other quarters met at Stresa in 1958 and laid down a
set of more specific objectives. These have been summarised by
Butterwick and Rolfe (quoted in Marsh and Ritson (1971)) as
(1) To increase trade in agricultural produce between
member countries and with third countries, and to
eliminate all quantitative restrictions.
(2) To maintain a close correlation between structures and
market policies.
(3) To achieve a balance between supply and demand, avoid-
ing the encouragement of surpluses and giving scope to the
comparative advantage of each region.
(4) To eliminate all subsidies tending to distort competition
between one country or region and another.
(5) To improve the rate of return on capital and labour.
(6) To preserve the family structure of farming.
(7) To encourage rural industrialisation to drawawaysurplus
labour, eliminate marginal farms and to give special aid to
geographically disadvantaged areas.
The EEC Commission undertook to devise a policy which
would give effect to these resolutions. The Commission’s pro-
posals appeared in 1960 and were adopted with some modifica-
tion to form the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). There are three principles which underlie the CAP,
namely:
Market Unity: that there should be a single market for any
commodity coming under the CAP and a common system
of marketing and pricing used throughout the Com-
munity.
Community Preference: that producers inside the Community
should be always more favourably placed than competing
ove~eas suppliers.
Financial Solidarity: the commitment of the Community to
finance jointly the operation of the CAP.
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The origins of these principles are somewhat obscure as they
are contained neither in the Treaty of Rome nor in the Stresa
conference rcsolutions, hut Fennell (1979) has recently traced
their source to a 1960 resolution of the Council of Ministei’s.
The CAP covered two areas:
(a) The market and prices policy was concerned with
supporting markets for agricultural products, The Com-
munity adopted a price support system for nearly all agri-
cultural products. The products currently supported
(1983) and the mechanisms by which the), are supported
. are listed in Appendix 2A. (For further details see l~’ennell,
1979).
(b) The structural policy attempted to improve the structure
of agriculture.
The A4arket Policy
By the end of 1960 the Council of Ministers had agreed in
principle the mechanism through which agricultural markets
would be supported. Starting with the common policy for
cereals which was initiated on 1 January 1962, the price levels
for the main agricultural products were harmonised stage by
stage. By 1968 the process was completed for most commodities
and there was almost completely fi’ee agricultural trade within
the Community. The details of support systems vary greatly
from market to market but all the systems share some common
features. Heidhues et al (1978) propose a very simple schema to
illustrate the salient features of the Community’s support
mechanisms.
The Community first sets a target price for each prodoct
coming under the policy. This is intended to act as a guide price
for producers. In markets where the EEC does not prodoce
enough to meet its own needs (Market A in diagram) the price is
maintained by a variable import levy. A threshold price is estab-
lished below the target price level. Importers are then charged a
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levy equal to the difference between the threshold and the world
price level. The levy will vat3, inversely with the world price, but
the result is that imports can only enter the Community at or
above the threshold price.
Target price
Threshold price
World price
Lc%,y
Export Refund I
MARKET A MARKET B
Target price
Intervention
price
World prlce
Figure 2.1: Community systems of price support
If the Community is self-sufficient in a commodity (Market B)
import levies cannot be used to maintain its price. The Com-
munity establishes an intervention price at which it supports
prices by removing some supplies from the Market. The EEC
has to bear the costs of storage and disposing of these supplies.
Surpluses are disposed of in a number of ways. They are sold
on the world market which requires a unit export subsidy equal
to the difference betwe~en the intervention and the world price,
the}, can be stored until market conditions improve, or they can
be transformed into a non-competing food product (termed
denaturing) and then sold on the EEC Market.
In one respect the system of variable import levies and export
subsidies is very different from the national systems of tariffs and
quotas which it replaced, in that it allows the Community to
maintain a constant agricultural price level irrespective of
developments on the world market. The EEC plays little part in
adjusting supply and demand on the world market even when
the disturbances originate in the Community. Indeed, some
authors, Johnson (1979) and Swinbank (1980) have suggested
that the CAP is responsible for aggravating the instability of
world markets.
It is important to note that there is a substantial EEC trade in
products which escape the variable levy system, for example,
oilseeds (soya bean, etc.) and manioc (Harris, 1975). The
implications for" the EEC ofthis trade is explored in more detail
in Chapter 5.
The CAP apparatus established a marketing fi~mework
which, in principle, could have been quite liberal when com-
pared with the national systems of largely quantitative controls
which it replaced. The formation of the CAP allowed fi’ee trade
in agricuhural products within the Community, potentially
allowing regions to specialise according to their comparative
advantages (as determined by weather, soil, etc.) and resulting
eventually in increased productive efficiency and expanded
consumer choice.
Choosing the Common Price Level
Prior to the introduction of the CAP European farmers faced
what was, in effect, six different national price levels. Table 2.4
presents the prices received by EEC farmers for selected pro-
ducts in 1961/62 and after the transition to common prices in
1968/69. Prices were, on average, highest in "*,’,rest Germany and
lowest in France in 1961/62. Differences in price levels were
quite large for some products, i.e., 50 per cent in the case ofsugar
a~d 29 per cent for wheat.
Choosing the common price levels for agricultural products
was probably one of the most difficuh tasks faced by the Com-
munity during its formation. The process posed a particular
dilemma for the major food importers (i.e., West German), and
Italy) as high common prices would have involved them making
large transfers to the net agricultural exporting countries. On
the other hand, any reduction in farm price levels .,,.,as bound to
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Table 2.4: The harmonisation of European agricultural prices
1961/62-1968/69: Unit prices received by producers for selected
commodities.
The
Target    West .Arether- Luxem-
Prices Germany France Italy Belgium lands bourg
UA / Tonne
[,l~eat
1961/62
1968/69
Sugar beet*
1961/62
1968/69
A4ilk
1961/62
1968/69
Beef
1961/62
1968/69
--    104.3 80.8 107.5 92.0 83.2 99.8
106.25     96.5     93.3 106.6     95.6     98.9    96.0
-- 17.3 11.5 14.8 11.9 14.1 --
17.0 16.7 16.2 18.8 17.0 17.5 --
-- n.a.    71.1 74.8 66.2 71.3 91.0
103.0 96.3 84.3 104.7 83.6 95.2 102.6
-- 506.0 423.3 519.7
680.0 628.8 658.5 704.8
466.6 486.2 476.2
667.0 726.5 612.2
Source: EEC Comrni~ion -- Agricuhural Markets, July 1978.
°Suffar beet corrected to standard 16% yield of sugar.
be strongly resisted by their farmers. The prices which
eventually emerged were inevitably a political compromise
between the member states.
Cereal prices were fixed at roughly an average of the existing
price levels, but the common price levels for the other main
products were set towards the upper end of the spectrum. As
Table 2.4 indicates, most-Community farmers appeared to
receive quite a large increase in price as well as having all
quantitative restrictions removed. However, over the seven year
period inflation meant that the nominal price increases were in
fact real price decreases in many instances.
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It is also apparent from the table that quite large divergences
in prices between countries existed in 1968/69, as they do to this
day. Reasons for this are complex but they include differences in
product qu~.lity, transport, storage and processing costs and
after 1969 monetary factors (i.e., differences between central
and "green" rates of exchange) as explait’ked later (pp. 33 et seq.).
Not only were prices higher under the CAP than they had
been under most national regimes but as Table 2.5 indicates, the
average EEC price level was well above that prevailing on the
world market. Another feature of the table is the large swings in
the price ratio between the two periods shown, an indication of
the volatility of world prices.
Table 2.5: European Community prices as a percentage of world
prices for selected produtts, 1968/69 and 1971/72
1968/69 1971/72
per cent per cent
Common Wheat 195 209
Durum Wheat 214 254
Husked Rice 138 205
Barley 197 185
Maize 178 176
Sugar 355 186
Beef and Veal 169 133
Pigmeat 134 131
Eggs 137 162
Butter 504 171
Olive Oil 173 153
Oilseeds 203 1’t-7
.~urce: Commi~ion of the European Communities. Agricultural Situation in the Community
1975 Reporl, (page 17’1).
The high price levels within the Community combined with
the continuing rapid pace of technological progress had the
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largely foreseeable effect of stimulating production within the
Community, (see Table 2.6) and resulted in changing the Com-
munity from a net importer of many foods into an important
surplus producer. Particularly troublesome were the large
surpluses of butter, wheat and barley, which from the inception
of common pricing placed large demands on the agricultural
budget.
Table 2.6 Degree of self-sufficiency for selected agricultural products
of the European Community 1956-1960 and 1970-1971
1956-1960 1970-1971
Total Wheat 90 112
Barley 84 110
Grain Maize 64 68
Rice 83 112
Sugar 104 122
Butter 102 124
Eggs 90 99
Beef and Veal 92 81
Pigmeat 100 99
Vegetable Fats and Oils 19 31
Source: Commi~ion of the European Communities. Ag~uhural Situation in the Community
1979 Report.
Financing the CAP
Since the costs of the CAP account for a very high proportion
of the EEC budget it is best to discuss CAP financing in the
context of total Community expenditure. Prior to 1971 the
activities of the EEC were financed from three sources (see
Fennell, 1979):
(1) The pro~c:eeds of a levy on certain agricultural products
imported from third countries,
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(2) proceeds from an internal levy on sugar production in the
Community in excess of stated quotas and
(3) payments made by member states based on a series of fixed
keys or percentages based on GNP in the different states.
The third item in this group was considered to be an interim
source of funds because the Treaty of Rome had made provision
fox" the replacement of the fixed key cont~’ibutions by the
development of what it called the Community’s "Own
Resources" which should accrue to the Community as of right.
Under a decision of the Council in 1970 (Council decision
70/243) "On the replacement of financial contributions from
member states by the Community’s Own Resource," agreement
was reached that as from 1971 the Community would move to a
new financial base over the coming years. This decision pro-
vided for three main sources of revenue namely:
(a) agricultural levies, made up of 90 per cents of the charges
arising from trade with non-member (third) countries
within the framework of the CAP, together with the
internal sugar levy, i.e., items (1) and (2) above,
(b) ninety per cents of the proceeds of the common customs
duties which are applied to imports from third countriesof
industrial goods and agricultural commodities not
included in tile CAP and
(c) a given percentage ofan imputed VAT revenue ofmember
states (not exceeding l per cent). An imputed rather than
an actual assessment is used so that the basis of payment is
uniform for each country.
It took a number of),ears for the complete "Own Resources"
budget to become effective. The agricultural levies accrued to
the Community as from the start of 1971. A proportion of the
Customs Duties accrued the same year and the remainder were
added over the following four years. But it was not until 1979
that the VAT contributions were operative in all countries and
the system of "Own Resources" was complete.
~’rhe ~malnlng l0 per cenl was relalned by Ihe member slates Io cover the
admlnlstralive cosls oF collectlol~,
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FEOGA
The European Agricuhural Guarantee and Guidance Fund
commonly known as FEOGA after its French name (Fonds
Europ~en d’Orientation et de Garantie Agricole) was set up in
1962 to finance the CAP. The fund was divided into two
branches, the Guarantee and Guidance sections. The Guar-
antee section was responsible for the market and price support
systems, while the funds from the Guidance section were avail-
able to support structural improvement in agricuhnre. Total
Community expenditure under both headings increased very
rapidly throughout the 1960s (Table 2.7) from 38 million U A in
1962/1963 to 2,433 million UA six years later. Nearly all of the
growth was accounted for by the Guarantee section. Most of the
rise up to 1968 can be attributed to the cominginto operation of
common prices whereby expenditures which had been pre-
viously borne by the member governments were now paid by
FEOGA. Increases in expenditure were concentrated in the
final years of transition 1967-69. But even after the latter date
with common prices achieved, the rapid growth in Guarantee
expenditure continued. These further increases were a conse-
quence of the growing Community surpluses at high support
prices. In 1968-69 expenditure on three commodities, sugar,
cereals and dairy products absorbed over 65 per cent of the total
agricultural budget.
Structural Policy
Structural policy has been defined by Marsh and Swanney
(1980) as any attempt by a government to influence directly
farm employment, farm size or the distribution and quality of
the capital employed in agricuhure. In practice this covers a
very wide variety of policies which perhaps can be best classified
under two headings, measures designed to improve farm struc-
ture in a narrow sense, through increasing farm size and with-
drawing labour, and measures to increase agricultural output
3O
Table 2.7: FEOGA expenditure for selected years 1962/1963 to
1968/1969
1962/19631964/1965 1966/1967 1968/1969
Guarantee Section UA A4illions
Grains 28.0 126.8 136.5 666.0
Rice
-- 0.8 0.7 18.2
Vegetable Fats and
Oils
-- 8.0 79.3 260.8
Pouhry 0.2 1.3 2.9 5.7
Eggs 0.6 1.2 0.7 1.8
Beef and Veal
-- -- -- 22.0
Pigmeat 0. I 7.7 15.3 42.2
Dairy Products
-- 25.2 131.7 624.0
Fruits and Vegetables -- -- 0.1 47.0
Sugar -- -- 3.4 302.0
Processed Products
-- -- -- 20.0
Total Guarantee " 28.9 171.0 370.6 2,009.7
Guidance ,Section
Total 9.1 54.6 123.5 285.0
Special Section 138.3
Total FEOGA 38.0 225.6    494. I 2,433.0
Source: Rickard (1970).
through input subsidies (on fuels, fertilisers, etc.) capital grants
and interest subsidies.
In pre-CAP days member countries had followed different
national policies in these fields and a large amount of attention
was paid in the discussions setting up the CAP to the serious
problems of European agricultural structures. Despite these
difficulties, agreement on a genuine structural policy did not
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emerge. Provision was, however, made for a Guidance section in
the agricultural budget, and from 1964 onwards, funds were to
be made available from this source to help finance projects
designed to improve farming or marketing structures. Between
1964 and 1966 a limit was fixed on expenditure from thissource
to one-third of that of the Guarantee section. With the rapid
growth in the agricultural budget this should have translated
into a large increase in the funds for the Guidance section. How-
ever, this was forestalled when in 1967 a ceiling of 285 million
UA was placed on the latter.
From the creation of the CAP, structural policy was the poor
relation of market and price policy. The principle of common
financing was never extended to cover it, as only a small propor-
tion of expenditure (usually 25 per cent, though more in the case
of ha[y) was financed by the Community; the balance coming
from national budgets. While the fund may have been ostensibly
designed to aid the areas within the EEC with severe problems,
Table 2.8 indicates that the amounts actually paid out seem to
have been more closely related to the budgetary contribut ions of
Table 2.8: Assistance provided by the guidance section 1964-1971
Total received Per cent of total
UA (million)
West Germany 167.8 18.3
France 219.0 23.9
Italy 407.0 44.4
Belgium 58.5 6.4
The Netherlands 52.2 5.7
Luxembourg 12.0 1.3
Total 916.6 100.0
.goute: Official Journal of the I’~’uropcan Comnmnltlts.
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member states. Italy may have benefited the most but it was also
a large net contributor to the agricultural budget.
The attempts made to upgrade structural policy during the
1960s (notably the Mansholt Plan) largely ended in failure. This
is perhaps not all that surprising. Given the large divergences in
structure the countries were bound to find it rather difficult to
agree on a common policy, and to this must be added the reluc-
tance of many countries to countenance the large transfers of
resources across national boundaries that a Community polie~J
would have entailed.
In the absence of a common structural policy national aids to
agriculture continued. From 1962 to 1967 the total expenditure
on agriculture in the Community more than doubled (Table
2.9). Most of the market supports in the latter year were
financed by FEOGA while expenditure under the other head-
ings was borne by the national governments.
The continuance of high levels of national aids was probably
inevitable given the failure to design a structural policy at the
Community level. The CAP could not lessen demands for
national aids to agriculture given that low income problems
persisted. In addition, so long as national contributions to the
Community budget were based on factors which are different
from those which determined expenditure on the CAP, it was
perceived by member governments to be in their national
interests to encourage increased production through structural
measures, though for the Community as a whole such a process
was bound to be self-defeating.
The A4CA System and the Departure from Common Prices
The CAP was designed in the context of a world monetary
order where exchange rates were stable and expectations were
that they would remain so. Farm product prices were fixed in
terms of a common currency or unit of account (inltially equal to
the US dollar) and these prices were translated into national
currencies at the relevant exchange rates.
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Table 2.9: Estimated total public expenditures on agriculture in the EEC in 1960 and in 1967
Social Market Structural Other
measures support policy measures Total
1960 1967 1960 1967 1960 1967 1960 1967 1960 1967
.Million US" dollars
West Germany 42.2 340.6 224.2 455.9 313.4 623.4 150.9 100.6 730.7 1,520.5
France 284.4 679.9 154.2 612.2 143.5 586.1 111.3 179.0 693.4 2,057.2
Italy 32.8 52.5 11.3 156.1 347.5 585.6 89.9 129.0 481.5 923.2
Belgium 15.6 29.7 21.0 60.5 2.8 15.2 14.5 7.4 53.9 112.8
The Netherlands 2.5 4.1 78.2 230.0 49.9 81.9 3.0 6.9 133.6 322.9
Luxembourg 0.6 2.8 7.0 4.3 1.2 4.5 0.6 0.6 9.4 12.2
TotaI’EEC 378.1 1,109.6 495.9 1,519.0 858.3 1,896.7 370.2 423.5 2,102.54,948.8
Source: Rickard (1970).
Towards the end of the 1960s increasing divergences ill
economic performance appeared between EEC membe~. One
early consequence of this was the decision of France to devalue
the franc by 11.1 per cent in August 1969 which was followed by
a German revaluation of 9 per cent ill September. Tile French
devaluation lowered the value of the fi’anc against the unit of
account (giving more francs per UA) and should have had tile
immediate effect of raising French intervention and hence
French food prices. This situation, however, was not acceptable
to the French government at the time because of the inflationary
effects.
The French, therefore, asked for a derogation to leave the rate
of exchange for agricultural purposes between the UA and the
franc at the pre-August 1969 level and so leave agricuhural
prices unchanged. This meant that there would now be two
exchange rates between the fi’anc and the unit of account, a
market or central rate which applied to all non-CAP products
and an agricultural or "green rate" which applied to CAP
products. This concession was agreed to by the Council of Agri-
cultural Ministers on the condition that French prices would
be restored to Community levels in two years.
Under this arrangement France continued to set intervention
prices at the levels prevailing before the devaluation, i.e., below
the common prices expressed in francs at the devalued rate. This
option was exercised in full for man}, of the major commodities,
though for some products prices were aligned immediately with
the full common levels. The commodities whet’e French prices
were now lower than common prices posed difficulties for the
intervention system and threatened to create distortions in
Community agricultural trade. Irving and Fearn (1975) use
sugar to illustrate the difficulties which arose.
After the French devaluation the intervention price of sugar
in Germany was 849.2 DM per tonne while the intervention
price in France remained at the pre-devaloation level of
1,048.1’1- frs per tonne. If a French trader exported sugar to
German}, and sold it there at the German intervention price, he
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would receive 849.2 DM per tonne which could be changed into
1,179.15 frs at the new exchange rate of 1 DM = 1.3885 frs, i.e., a
profit of 131 frs to the exporter. To equalise prices within the
Community, therefore, and particularly to prevent speculators
from selling French products into intervention in’other member
states, it was necessary to levy a charge on French exports. The
amount of this levy, known as a monetary compensatory
amount (MCA), was equal to the difference between the inter-
vention price in France and the Community intervention price.
This levy was paid by the exporter not alone on CAP products
exported from France to other member states but also on these
products exported to third countries. Such levies paid on exports
are referred to as negative MCAs.
The opposite situation faced West German agricultural
exports to France. As French prices were effectively lower than
West German prices, the West German exports would become
uneompetitlve, hence to preserve the position of exporters, a
subsidy was received on exports to France equal to the difference
between French and EEC intervention prices. This subsidy was
paid to the West German exporter by the importer.7 Similarly
for other EEC exporters to France at the time.
When the West German Mark was revalued upwards against
the dollar in October 1969, the West German Govel:nment was
reluctant to allow its farm prices to decline to the full extent of
revaluation. The arrangements that had been made for France
were applied in reverse and West Germany was allowed to
gradually adjust its farm prices downwards. In this case,,West
German MCAs took the form of a levy paid on all West German
imports and subsidies received on all West German exports of
CAP products. These became known as positive MCAs.
Initially the MCA system was seen as a purely temporary
expedient. However, international economic developments
were to intervene and the next decade saw the MCA system
7Prior lo Ih¢ I July 1972 MCAs were nalional paymenls. Since that lime Lhe payments
are made into and out of EEC funds, Lhough special arrangements lbr collection and off-
sets can be made between countries wiLh negaLiVe ),ICAs.
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extended to the rest of the Community. MCAs were a complex
addition to an already intricate CAP, placing further financial
burdens on the Community’s agricultural budget. Perhaps most
importantly, they allowed an end to be put to common pricing
which had been only a briefinterlude lastingfi’om 1967 to 1969.
Throughout the 1970s, therefore, the Community was to return
to a system of separate national price levels with counter-
balancing MCAs paid into and out of Community funds.
The formation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1979 was an attempt at returning to common prices. On the
introduction of the system, MCAs were reduced in most
member states and their levels were fixed so long as exchange
rates remained fixed within the EMS. Though the UK did not
join the system a combination of green exchange rate devalua-
tions and a strengthening currency turned substantial negative
MCAs into positive ones between 1979 and 1982. But with a
weakening of the £ sterling a zero rate emerged in FebruaKy
1983 and a negative rate in mid-March of that year.
The figures in Table 2.10 show that positive MCAs have been
maintained since 1978 in West Germany and The Netherlands,
the countries with strong currencies in the EMS. MCAs have
been abolished in Ireland since 1979 and in Denmark for all
dates shown except 1982. In France MCAs were negative at all
the dates except 1981 and 1982 when they were zero. MCAs
were positive in Belgium up to 1981 but they have been negative
since then. Italy has had negative MCAs on all the dates shown
while a negative rate has now emerged in Greece.
Though the EEC Commission does not favour the MCA
system and would like to see it phased out entirely, there are
many who would argue that the system has saved the CAP on
numerous occasions in the past through its effects on prices,
particularly negative MCAs, Which enable a country to keep its
food prices below the Community level. There are times when it
may not be politically feasible for a country to have very high
food prices and the ,MCA.s, by allowing for different green and
central rates ofexchange, can be used to prevent this happening.
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Table 2.10: Monetary compensatory amounts for main products*
payable as at I A4arch 1978-1983 (percentages)
Country 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Ireland -4.2 -3.0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 O 0 -1.8 0
France
-21.5 -10.6 -3.7 0 0 -5.3
West Germany +7.5 +10.8 +9.8 +8.8 +8.0 +8.4
Belgium +1.4 +3.3 +1.9 +2.2 -8.1 -3.1
The Netherlands +1.4 +3.3 +1.9 +2.2 +4.0 +5.4
United Kingdom -25.1 -28.2 0 +18.2 +8.1 0
haly -16.5 -17.7 -6.7 -I.0 -4.9
-2.3
Greece- 0 0 -10.5
°The same rote decks not applr for all products within ¢erlain states. [n recent yea~
parlicularly, Ihere are cliff’even( rates wilhln some countries for mi~k, ~qne, pork and
pouhry producls. The variation in tales within countries is usually small.
,%urce: Official .7ournal of the European Communities, different issues.
They accomplished this in France in 1969 and on many occa-
sions in the UK since then.
Indeed at one stage, when the £ sterling was devaluing, the
difference between the central and the green exchange rate in
the UK was as high as 36 per cent. Had the government been
forced to bring the two rates into llne at the time the resulting
increase in food prices could hardly have been tolerated. In the
opposite situation, positive MCAs in West Germany (because of
a very strong currency) enable the government to pay higher
prices to farmers than would otherwise be the case.
A disadvantage of MCAs is that they are paid only on pro-
ducts covered by the CAP. They do not apply to farm inputs like
fertilisers, oil, machinery
, 
certain feeds and various other farm
materials. Thus, though farmers in weak currency countries
may be paying heavy MCAs on exports ofagricuhural products
they receive no compensatory rebates on the imports of their
production materials. Similarly in countries with positive
MCAs farmers receive subsidies on their agricuhura[ exports
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but do not have to pay levies on the imports of their agricuhural
inputs.
A further disadvantage of MCAs as far as h’eland is concerned
is their effect on smuggling. When the UK had lower prices than
those obtaining in the Republic a tax was payable on exports
from the UK to Ireland so as to equallse prices in the two coun-
tries. Traders, however, thwarted this objective to a consider-
able extent by smuggling produce fi’om Northern h’eland
without paying the MCA tax. Norton (1983) has established
that in 1977, 1978 and 1979, when the UK had higher negative
MCAs than the Republic, the unrecorded movements of live
pigs into the Republic were 299,000, 285,000 and 198,000,
respectively.
In more recent ),ears when the UK had higher prices than the
Republic and an MCA tax was payable on exports to the UK,
smuggling was in the opposite direction. In these years there
were reports of heavy unrecorded movements ofcattle fi’om the
Republic into Northern h’eland resulting in scarce supplies at
meat factories in the Republic and boom conditions in Northern
h’eland plants. This large scale smuggling leads to great business
instability, particularly in the case of livestock. When the move-
ments are fi’om South to North, meat plants in the South are
hard hit and some have to close down. When the movements are
in the opposite direction Northern pl~tnts have scarce supplies.
If the same agricuhural price levels obtained in the two parts
of the island (as indeed was envisaged when the Common
Market was fou~aded) smuggling would cease. In spite of the
practical and political problems of achieving this ohjective the
aim must always be to move in that direction.
Certain anomalies arise from time to time in regard to the
application of the MCA system, whereby countries deliberately
apply the rides in such a way as to make illegal gains on trade
with other cotmtries. These and many other similar anomalies
eventually become ironed out (very often through litigation)
and for that reason they are not a fundamental threat to the
future of the CAP. ~,’Ve refi’ain therefore fi’om discussing them
here.
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Appendix 2: Commodities according to t~ main measures applied
under the price and market regimes
Aleasure
Common wheal X x x x x x
Durum wheat x x ga x x x
Barley x X x x x
Rye x x x x x
g~Lalze X X x X X
Rice x x x x x
Sugar:
white X X X X X
bccl x x
Oit~eds:
colza x x x
rape x x x
sunNower x x x
so)~ beans x x x
llrLseecl x x
castor X X X
cotton X X X
Peas and field beans g
e
x x
Dried fodder x x x
Fibre flax and hemp x
Milk preducU:
milk x
butter x x x x
skim milk powder x x x x
cheese© X x x x
B,,f:
live x
meat g x4 x x x
~hcepmeat X X X X x
Pigrneat X X x x x
Egg* x x x
Poultry x x x
Fish x x x x x x
Silkworms x
Fresh fruit & reg. x X X x x
Live plants x
Olive oil x x x x* x x x
Wine x xt x x x x
Hops x x
Seeds for sowing x X
Tobacco x x x x x
(a) certain t~glons only: (b) activating price: (c) Italy only: (d) sardines and tw.ehovlea
only: (e) olive oil comumer subsidy: (0 wine storage contracts and dildllation: (g) hybrid
maize only.
,~r~: FcnnelL 1979. brought up to date from G,e~ bZur¢#¢ 1981; Nos. 188 and 189,
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Chapter 3
Developments in Irish Agriculture since EEC Membership
After a prolonged period of negotiation three new members
-- the UK, Ireland and Denmark --joined the European
Economic Community on the 1st Januat3, 1973 bringing the
number of members fi’om six to nine. This new alliance was
probably the most important event in Irish history since
independence. As Sheehy (1980a) has said:
The agricultural industry had struggled through the 1960s in tile
adverse circumstances familial" to all food exporters in that
period of over supply. Between 40 and 50 per cent of hish Agri-
cultural Output was exported and four-fifths of this went to the
UK, one of the lowest priced food markets in the world. Though
certain preferential treatment was available on thatmarket,
particularly since the Anglo Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in
1966, nevertheless returns were not very attractive. Farmers’
incomes were under constant pressure and successive Irish
Governments were obliged to help by increasing State aid to the
industry. Between 1960 and 1970 Government expenditure on
farm price supports grew from 3.6 to 19.5 per cent ofaggregate
farm income and in the latter year the price support bill
accounted for 2.6 per cent of GDP at factor cost. But even this
considerable increase in State support was insufficient to main-
tain the relative income position of farmers: the ratio ofaverage
per capita income in farming to average industrial earnings fell
by 7.3 per cent over the decade (p. 297).
With this background it is not surprising that EEC member-
ship was warmly welcomed. In a country where one-fifth of the
labour force was employed in agriculture and a further large
proportion was engaged in industries and services dependent on
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agriculture the prospects within the high priced community
market were exciting.
In a referendum on the issue in 1972 four-fifths of the Irish
electorate voted in favour of EEC entry even though it was
realised that some non-agricultural industries would be very
hard hit by fi’ee trade.
The prospects for agriculture within tile EEC presented in a
government White Paper in 1972 (Stationery Office, 1972) pro-
jected a doubling of aggregate income fi’om farming between
1970 and 19788 arising fi’om
(1) an increase ofone-third in the volume of Gross Agriculture
Output;
(2) an increase of one-third in the real prices received by
farmers, as a result of adjusting h’ish prices to tile higher
EEC support levels;
(3) an improved output/inlz, Ut price ratio because of a lesser
impact on input than on output prices;
(4) a fall of 22 pet" cent in the farm labour force so that real
income pet" capita was projected to increase by about 156
pet" cent or by about 12.5 pet" cent per annum between
1970 and 1978.
The Outcome
Developments in Irish agricuhure since 1970 are given in
Table 3.[. This table shows that the volume of gross output
increased by about 36 per cent between 1970 and 1978. This was
in line with the projections. Real agricuhural prices (output
prices deflated by the consumer price index) rose by about ’1-3
per cent which was higher than the projection ofone-thii’d. Not
all of this increase was due to tile EEC price alignment. A high
proportion was due to further common price increases over the
period and to Green £ adjustments. However, regardless of its
make-up the overall increase in the real price index was ver5,
impressive, at least from the farmers’ point of view.
mPrlces had i’isen considerably after 1970 in antlciF~alion of entry, hence the period
since 1970 is usually associated with EEC mend~rship in Ireland.
Table 3.1: .Selected data relating to output, incomes and prices
Total Real Income Volume
intome ,,\~os.Income Earnings Agrit. Con- Per IVorker of Agric. Agric. Output/ Real
arising employed per per as % sumer gross output input input agricul-
in in agric, industrial of ind. price Indus- agric, price price price uml
~’ear agric,
agric, worker worker* earnings index Agric. trial output index index ratio prices
1970 100 100 IO0 IO0 0.85 I00 IO0 100 IO0 100 IO0 IO0 100
1971 110.3 96.6 114.2 116.5 0.84 109.0 104.8 106.9 106.4 107.1 108.5 98.7 98.3
1972 151.9 94.3 161.0 133.9 1.03 118.4 135.9 113.1 111.9 130.0 116.2 Ill.9 109.8
1973 191.2 91.6 195.9 161.1 1.04 131.9 148.5 122.1 112.8 170.0 142.7 119.1 128.9
1974 177.4 89.4 198.4 191.9 0.88 154.3 128.7 124.3 114.7 172.4 200.0 86.2 111.7
1975 250.7 88.2 284.2 249.7 0.97 186.5 152.3 133.8 121.5 220.8 235.2 93.9 118.4
1976 281.8 85.9 328.1 2"39.3 0.93 220.1 148.5 136.0 116.3 277.5 272.2 101.9 126.1
1977 382.6 84.4 453.3 351.2 1.10 250.1 181.2 140.3 127.3 339.8 330.9 102.7 135.9
1978 429.6 83.7 513.3 402.4 1.09 269.1 190.5 149.5 135.5 384.2 344.9 111.4 142.8
1979 383.3 82.1 466.6 464.0 0.86 304.8 153.0 152.2 134.4 406.7 388.1 104.8 133.4
1980 358.3 78.7 455.0 548.3 0.71 360.3 126.1 152.2 133.5 395.9 443.6 89.2 109.9
19814- 407.5 74.5 546.6 638.4 0.73 433.8 125.9 147.1 1.30.6 470.5 509.2 92.4 108.4
"All workers in transportable goods induslries (from quarterly inquiry of Induslrial Earnings employment and hours worked).
l’Preliminaq’
?;0urc~ C~nlral Slatislics Office, l)ublin.
The output/input price ratio improved by about 11 per cent
between 1970 and 1978 but during two of the years since 1972
(1974 and 1975) it was tess than in 1970. The declines in these
years were due to the increase in crude oil and rock phosphate
prices in 1973 and to the cattle crisis in 1974.
The improvement in real per capita incomes projected in the
White Paper did not materialise. Though the nominal rise was
about 413 per cent the real rise was only about 91 percent com-
pared with the 156 per cent projected. This result can be
attributed to the less than expected movement in the
output/input price ratio and to a labour force decline much less
than expected (i.e., 16 percent as against the White Paper figure
of 22 per cent).
Taking everything into consideration, however, the period
1970 to 1978 was the most prosperous in the history of Irish agri-
culture. In addition to the substantial absolute increases which
occurred in farmers’ incomes, these incomes also rose relative to
incomes of other workers. In 1970 income arising per person
engaged in agriculture was only about 85 per cent of the
earnings of persons employed in transportable goods industries
whereas in 1978 it had risen to 109 per cent of average industrial
earnings.9 The volume of agricuhural output increased also
during this period. Gross output increased by 35.5 per cent
between 1970 and 1978 or by 3.9 percent per annum. This is the
highest measured growth rate ever achieved by Irish agriculture
over such a sustained period.
In 1979, however, the tide turned. The rise in agricultural
output prices in that year was only 5.8 per cent compared with a
rise in input prices of 12.6 per cent and of 13.3 per cent in tile
consumer price index. The terms of trade had started to move
against farmers. But this was not the only problem. A very late
Spring necessitated increased supplementary feeding of grazing
stock and hence heavy extra costs. Acceleration of the disease
eradication programme caused a reduction in milk output in
9Comparisons of this kind relate only to persons at work in industry. The industrial
unemployed are excluded.
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some of the main dairying coutaties. There ".’,,as a substantial fall
in cattle prices in Autunm and this coupled with poor harvest
weather heralded the beginning of the recession in agriculture.
Income per agricultural worker at current prices fell by 9 pet"
cent, or.by 20 per cent in real terms. In the same year earnings of
industrial workers rose by about 15 percent in nominal terms or
by about 1.5 pet" cent in real terms.
The 1979 decline was followed by a more severe recession in
1980. In that year output prices declined by 2.7 per cent despite
a price rise granted in Brussels for out main products of about 3
per cent. In the same period input prices rose by 14.3 per cent
and inflation by about 18 per cent. Along with these unfavour-
able trends the weather again proved inhospitable. Milk intake +
at creameries declined by 2.6 per cent. Heavy Summer rainfall
affected hay making thus leading to increased meal feeding in
Autumn and Winter. Harvest weather was again poor and there
were heavy grain losses.
The effect of these factors was a decline in 1980 in real income
pet" worker of 18 percent and over the two years 1979 and 1980
of 34 per cent. In compiling the figures no account is taken of
interest on capital borrowed for farm purposes. This borrowing
has increased substantially in recent years, as have interest rates,
so that if interest charges were taken into account the decline in
famaers’ incomes would be much greater than the above figures
indicated. Sheehy (1980b) has put the decline in real per capita
family farm income (i.e., income fi’om self employment less
interest charges and depreciation of buildings, deflated by the
consumer price index) over the two years 1979 and 1980 at
about 50 per cent. Recent revisions to the employment figures
which declined more than estimated earlier would reduce
Sheey’s figure to about 48 pet" cent.
The downward slide was halted in 1981. Agricuhural output
prices increased by almost 19 per cent which was slightly higher
than the increase in the consumer price index (18.4 per cent)
while input prices rose by only 14.8 percent. Despite these price
effects the volume of gross output declined, even though the
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amounts of inputs used increased, and the overall resuh has been
hardly any change in real per capita income arising in agri-
culture over the two years. Thus, over the three years 1979 to
1981 there hac’t been no real recovery in the farm income situa-
tion. In 1982, however, as a result of favourable weather and a
price rise of 10 per cent the volume ofgross output is estimated to
have risen by 3.5 per cent hut real per capita income was only
slightly higher than in 1981.
The process by which farm incomes have become eroded in
recent years is easily explained. Up to 1978 (as the figures in
Table 3.1 show) prices for farm produce more than kept pace
with cost prices and general inflation, because of transitional
price increases and Green £ devaluations. As a result farm
incomes increased. With the ending of the EEC transitional
period in 1978 and Ireland’s joining the EMS in 1979 further
high output price rises were not available whereas cost prices
continued to increase hecause of high inflation rates. Price rises
agreed in Brussels, which are based to some extent on European
inflation rates and on pressures from memher states which are
net food importers, were not sufficient to counteract inflation
rates in Ireland and so the results were inevitahle. This is a very
peculiar situation. Normally high inflation is associated with
currency devaluation but in this case the IR£ had held steady
within the EMS.I° The result was that farmers had been unahle
to obtain relief through Green £ devaluations as these are only
available when the central currency devalues. Farmers had, of
course, been demanding currency devaluations to compensate
them for non-agricultural price rises but the financial authori-
ties were unwilling to devalue the IR£ so long as it was able to
hold within the EMS. The argument against devaluation was
that it would do no more than give temporary relief to farmers.
Inflation would increase as a result of high import prices and
pressures would mount for increased non-agricultural wages to
counteract this effect. This would fuel the inflation further and
t°An alignment of the EMS took place in March 1983 when the [R£was devalued by
about 4 per cent.
46
there would be demands by farmers for further devaluations to
compensate for this, and so on until the country slid into an era
of hyper-inflation.
Despite the arguments against devaluation, Irish farmers
when compared with their European counterparts, feel that
they have been unfairly treated since Ireland joined the EMS,
(Lucey, 1982). Table 3.2 which gives the changes in prices
received by farmers compared with inflation rates shows that in
the 9 Community states average real farm prices declined by 8.7
per cent between 1978 and 1982. When we look at the
individual countries we find that rea[ prices declined in all
except Belgium where they rose by less than 1 per cent. The
decline was much greater in Ireland than in any of the others.
The last column of the table shows that over the four years real
farm prices in Ireland declined by 27.1 per cent. Italy fared
poorly also, the Italian real farm price drop over the period
being 15.1 per cent. The decline in France was 11.4 per cent and
in UK 10.3 per cent.
Commenting on the problems facing EEC farmers since 1978
Murphy (1983) states that the differential national inflation rate
theory is too simplistic. He says that under normal exchange
rate developments, the divergences arising from differing infla-
tion rates should be more or less neutralised. What has been sur-
prising about the period since 1978 is the great extent to which
this failed to apply. Devalued currencies, in terms of own
country inflation relative to the Community average, gave very
sizeable benefits to farmers in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg
and Denmark. The opposite applied in the Irish case. He says
that because the exchange rates did not reflect the inflation rates
the MCAs distorted the position at national level.
He concludes that the experiences of the past four years have
been abnormal and that the most likely outcome for the future is
a return to normality. If this happens the development of real
support prices in Ireland could be given a significant boost
through green rate devaluations while the position in Germany
and perhaps its neighbouring countries would deteriorate. This
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would constitute a reversal of the pattern obtaining since 1978.
Because of the different price requirements of member states
due to different inflation levels the EEC Heads of State in
November 1981, requested the Commission to study "the
particular problems of farm income arising from differential
rates of inflation". The Commission’s report on the subject
(Corn (82) 98) showed that in the period 1979 to 1981 Ireland
had the worst record, as regards farm income of the nine Com-
munity states and it concluded that "difficulties for agriculture
may arise ira member state with a relatively high rate of infla-
tion does not devalue its currency and so is unable to obtain an
additional increase in agricultural prices through a green
devaluation".
Table 3.2: Average increase in prices received by farmers compared
with inflation rates in different EEC states 1978-1982
/978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1978/82
Country AP CP AP CP AP CP AP CP    RP
Percentage increase
Germany FR 1.4 4.1 2.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5 5.3 -5.9
France 6.7 10.7 5.613.6 11.1 ll.0 13 12.0 -11.4
Italy 9.4 15.7 13.4 21.3 12.1 19.0 18 16.4 -15.1
The Nether[ands 1.7 4.2 4.1 7.0 8.5 6.0 9 5.9 -0.9
Belgium 1.2 4.5 3.1 6.7 9.5 6.5 15 8.7 +0.8
Luxembourg 2.2 4.5 4.5 6.2 5.6 8.1 14 9.3 -1.9
UK 10.4 13.3 5.6 17.9 10.7 II.0 13 8.6 -10.3
Ireland 5.1 13.2-2.3 18.2 18.6 18.0 13 17.1 -27.1
Denmark 1.7 7.6 11.0 12.4 11.3 10.0 14 10.1 -5.4
Eur9 6.2 10.6 6.9 13.8 10.5 12.3 13 10.5 -8.7
AP -- Prices received by farmerl. CP = Consumer prices. RP -- Real Prices, i.e., AP/CP.
Source: Agrigultural situation in th* Community 1982 and Eurostat CPI Monthly Bulletin,
various i~ues.
Because of the inherent risks associated with a unilateral
devaluation and of the difficulties involved in controlling infla-
48
tion, Irish farmers are now in a very vulnerable situation and
unless Murphy’s expectations turn out to be true, special
packages will continue to be needed at future price reviews in
order to tide Ireland over its current difficulties. However, given
the problems of obtaining EEC agreements on policy matters it
is not easy to get and maintain such special measures. A number
of short-term aids have been received in re’cent years both from
the national government and the EEC. These include increased
headage payments for beef cows, Winter fodder grants, rates
remission, remission of disease eradication payments, a beef
headage payment for the state as a whole, a calved heifer subsidy
scheme and interest subsidies on farm loans. These are helping
to counteract inflation of input prices but the ultimate solution
must be to bring inflation under control. If we can do this,
farmers will be in a better position to cope with current
problems and weather the proposed CAP changes which now
appear almost inevitable.
There is, however, one problem with which Irish farmers will
have to continue to live. Irish prices for several important com-
modities are lower than in other member states while input
prices tend to be higher. These price levels are attributable to
such factors as peripheral location, which increases transport
costs, and seasonality of supply due to our grassland economy
which in turn is related to weather conditions. There are, of
course, quality factors as well. Some of these are due to manage-
ment and can be improved but others are related to the nature of
the climate and are both difficult and expensive to change.
A recent Agricultural Institute study (Keane and Pitts 1981)
which quantified the differences in milk prices as between
member states, showed a gross difference of 16.5 pence per
gallon in the prices received by Dutch and Irish farmers. Ofthis
difference, quality accounted for 5.5p, collection and processing
2.9p, location, product mix and marketing 2.2p, and other
factors for the remaining 5.9p. For cattle there are wide price
differences also. Irish prices are consistently lower than all
others. The weekly reports issued by the Department of Agri-
culture and CBF (Irish Livestock and Meat Board) show differ-
ences of up to 20 per cent between Irish and Belgian ca ttle prices
and of about 10 percent between West German and Irish prices.
Irish prices arc usually about 5 per cent lower than those in the
UK. Again some of these differences arc due to location and
climatic factors which arc ditficult to counteract but others are
of our own making such as conformation and quality of animals,
and could be dealt with by better management practices
(O’Connell et al., 1979).
On the other hand, feed and many other input prices arc
higher in Ireland than elsewhere so that the cost price squeeze
operates to a greater extent here than abroad. Indeed, even if
there were common prices in all the EEC states, Irish output
prices would be lower than elsewhere and input prices would be
higher.
Intervention Buying
Because of the low market prices obtainable, Irish producers
have recourse to intervention selling for a high proportion of
their output. Since EEC entry the bulk of intervention buying
has been in the beef sector but there have also been significant
purchases of skim milk powder as well as some butter and
barley. The volume of intervention intake varies considerably
depending on market price movements, fluctuations in supplies,
and on ordinary commercial demand.
Figures for intervention purchases since 19i3 for beef, skim
milk powder, butter and barley arc given in Table 3.3.
This table shows that from the commencement of inter-
vention buying of beef in this country in late 1973 up to the end
of 1982, the Department of Agriculturc (which is the Irish inter-
vention agency) purchased a total of 807,000 tonnes (carcass
equivalent) of beef.
Figures for beef intervention purchases as a proportion of
total slaughterings and exports,H which are given in Table 3.4,
ltYhe exports include meat hold out of intervent.ion.
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Table 3.3: Irish intervention purchases 1973-1982
Skim milk
Beef powder Butter Barley
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
(’000 t) ~m.) (’000 t) (£m.) (’000 t) (£m.) (’000 t) (£m.)
1973 2 1.6 ......
1974 122 82.7 ......
1975 137 l I 1.2 59 28.7 ....
1976 71 69.7 56 29.5 ....
1977 91 112.4 23 16.3 ....
1978 86 120. I 29 21.5 ....
1979 89 132.3 9 6.8 3 5.3 -- --
1980 102 161.0 .... 0.4 0.04
1981 47 81.9 7 6.7 -- -- 8.0 1.00
1982 60 116.7 67 65.1 . 13 31.2 101.0 12.70
Total 807 250 16 109.4
Source: EEC Support for Agricultural Prices in Ireland Department of Agricuhure In format ion
Series No. 21. March 1983.
show that for the years 1974 and 1975 about 34 per cent of total
slaughterings were sold into intervention. Between 1976 and
1980 purchases averaged about 23 percent but in 1981 and 1982
when slaughterings were low the proportion going into inter-
vention fell below 20 percent of the total kill. In addition to sales
into intervention there were also direct sales to third countries
on which export refunds were paid.
The proportion of skim milk powder which went into inter-
vention varied from 44 percent in.1975 to zero in 1980, butrose
again to 48 per cent in 1982 when the world recession bit deeply
and the USA unloaded large quantities on world markets at
very low prices.
Butter sales into intervention were minima[ up to 1982 but
since then the British market for imported butter has contracted
as a result of increased home production, the availability of low
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Table 3.4: Carcass beef intervention purchases, total slaughterings
and exports 1974-1982
Intervention
purchases as
Total Inter- % of
slaughter- vention Slaughter-
Tear ing Exports purchases ings Exports
’000 t carcass weight % %
1974 343 249 122 35.6 49.0
1975 420 327 137 32.6 41.9
1976 328 221 71 21.6 32.1
1977 385 310 91 23.6 29.4
1978 389 301 86 22.1 28.6
1979 387 279 89 23.0 31.9
1980 446 379 102 22.9 26.9
1981 316 258 47 14.9 18.2
1982 345 234 60 17.4 25.6
Total 3,359 2,558 805 34.1 31.5
Sounce: Central Statistics Office, Dublin 4.
priced concessionats, imports from New Zealand and cross
subsidisation of manufacturing milk from the liquid milk
sector.~2 The loss of this market is very disturbing. It means that
in future we will be adding to intervention stocks or obtaining
export refunds, rather than selling on the EEC market.
The fact that butter was not sold into intervention in large
quantities up to 1982 does not mean that we had an EEC market
for all our production at the time. In those years butter and
other dairy products were sold to third countries with the aid of
tTThis tactic which has been disapproved of by I he EEC is now being challenged in the
British courts by An Bord hinn¢.
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export refunds. Now it is becoming difficult to obtain such
markets even with tile refunds, due to the world recession and
tile unloading of stocks by other countries.
Intervention purchasing of barley did not take place until
1980 but it has been growing since then and reached 101,000
tonnes in 1982. This was about 11 percent oftotal production in
that year. In previous years the market price had been higher
than the intervention price but in 1982 the market price
dropped as a result of high Community production and
increases in concessionary imports under GATI" regulations. A
scarcity, however, developed in h’eland in Spring 1983 and we
had to import grain from West Germany.
l’roblems with Intervention and the Food Industry
It is often claimed that the availability of intervention hinders
the development of the food processing industry, particularly for
beef and milk. This is true to some extent. In the case of beef,
factories tend to sell into intervention at guaranteed prices
rather than compete for EEC or third country markets. This is
especially true when the market price, after transport and other
costs, is not much higher than the intervention price. Of course if
intervention were not available, factories would have to find
markets, but it cannot be assumed that in such circumstances
there would be a greater amount of processing than at present;
probably less, as some of the beef going into intervention is
boned out whereas a very high proportion of direct exports are
in carcass form.
The Irish beef industry faces many problems which make
value-added processing difficult. The main one is a supply con-
straint caused by cyclical and seasonal variations, and competi-
tion from the live trade. Over the past decade the number of
cattle slaughtered at Irish factories rose fi’om 501,000 in 1972 to
1,355,000 in 1975, declined to 954,000 in 1976, rose to 1,309,000
in 1980 and dropped back again to 850,000 in 1981. It is difficuh
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to have a stable ~’ood processing operation with such variation.
The problem, however, is not due to the intervention system,
because the cyclical pattern pre-dates intervention.
Seasonal fluctuations in supply operate in addition to cyclical
variations and are probably ofgreater importance. The weekly
supply of cattle to meat plants in the peak period (usually late
October) can be up to four times the level in the period of low
supply in May, and this results in shut-downs and short-time
working in Spring. It is impossible to supply retail outlets on a
regular basis under these conditions and that is the hub of the
problem as far as a food processing industry is concerned --
irregular all-year round supplies.
The seasona[ity factor is not improved by the intervention
system (which guarantees the same prices throughout the year)
but neither is intervention entirely to blame. The bulk ofcattle
slaughtered at factories have always been prepared for sale off
grass in Autumn, with much smaller numbers being sold in
Spring and early Summer and the position has not changed very
much over time.
The most serious impediment to the beef processing industry
is, however, the live export trade. In recent years this accounts
for about one-third of total exports and in some years has been
greater than one half. The banning of these exports has often
been suggested, but has been resisted by the government for
several reasons; it is not allowed under the CAP, but even if it
were, the government would be unwilling to ban live exports
because of the effect it might have on cattle prices. The live
export trade is, therefore, going to stay. However, factories, if
they are so disposed, can make inroads into it by concluding
special arrangements with farm producer groups. So far very
little progress has been made in this direction. Farmers gain
when cattle are scarce and factories when they are plentiful and
nobody seems too anxious to change this situation.
If a good processing industry is to develop, the government
must pay close attention to the EEC export refund system to
ensure that there is equality in refunds as between five animals,
carcasses and processed beef. In the past this was not always the
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case and as a result the live exporters had an advantage over the
dead meat traders. This anomaly has nov,, been rectified but it
must be kept nnder continuous review so as to prevent a recur-
rence.
With regard to dairy products, the intervention system is very
often blamed for the failure to develop high value-added proces-
sing in Ireland and for the continued reliance on butter and skim
milk powder which give the lowest return of all milk producu.
Furthermore, since these products are the ones in continual
surplus it is becoming increasingly inadvisable to be too depen-
dent on them. It is very important, therefore, for the industry to
develop milk products which can be sold on their own merits
without recourse to intervention or export subsidies. As a resuh
of continuing research with new products such as certain
varieties of cheese, UHT13 products and a wide range of
powders and butter oil, some success has been achieved in ahcr-
ing the product mix away fi’om the main product, butter (fi’om
61% of milk output in 1979 to 57% in 1981 ). But in spite ofthis the
h’ish product mix remains more limited than that ofcontinental
Europe because of our seasonal production pattern, smaller
home market and distance from other markets.
Scasonality of milk production is the main problem since
many of the products not presently produced require fi’esh milk
on a year round basis. There are, therefore, difficulties in main-
taining continuous supply to export markets of liquid milk, soft
and fresh cheeses, flavoured milks, etc. Nevertheless, the trends
in consumer preference cannot be ignored and Ireland must
move towards a more even seasonal milk production pattern.
However, a change in the present pattern of production to
one more like that of continental Europe would impose fairly
heavy extra feeding costs at farm level. For that reason there is a
reluctance to make such changes even though creameries are
paying a good deal extra for out of season milk. But if milk
surpluses continue to build up, change will be forced upon Irish
agriculture and farmers should now think about making these
changes.
I~UIIr~ heat lestd, c*g., long keeping milk.
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Chapter 4
Estimation of the Monetary Benefits from the CAP for the Irish
Economy as a Whole
In earlier chapters we have outlined the basic mechanisms of
the CAP and its effects on prices, output and farm income in
Ireland. It was shown that the principal result of the Com-
munity’s farm policy has been to maintain European agri-
cultural prices at a level above those which prevail on world
markets. In general, for commodities in which the Community
is less than serf-sufficient (at Community prices) European
farmers are protected against lower priced imports from third
countires by means of a variable import levy which is collected
al point of entry and goes to make up the Community’s "Own
Resources" fund. For commodities in which the Community is
self-sufficient or in surplus (again at Community prices) prices
are maintained by the subsidisation of exports (export restitu-
tions) and by intervention (storage).
These, or indeed any other support price policy, result in a
transfer of resources from non-agricultural consumers and tax-
payers to agricultural producers. Under a domestically-
financed policy regime the transfer would be from consumers
and taxpayers to producers in the country concerned and there
might be no net gain to the state. Under an EEC policyeatering
for countries which differ in the relative importance of their
agricultural sectors, redistributions take place between agri-
cultural importing and exporting countries, generally from the
importers to the exporters.
Because of the high support prices, consumers in the import-
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ing countries pay higher prices than they, otherwise would for
their food, both imported and home produced. Consumers in
exporting countries also pay high prices for their food but this
loss is a gain to producers and so it is not a national loss except to
the extent that some home consumed food is imported. There is
also a welfare loss resulting from the higher food prices but this
loss, which is diffcuh to quantify accurately,, is ignored here.
In general then, there is a gain to the net exporting countries
as a result of the higher prices they receive for their exports and a
loss to the net importing countries as a result of the higher cost of
imports. The food importing countries may, of course, gain in
other ways through access to non-agrlcultural export markets
from which otherwise they might be debarred. It would be vet3,
difficuh to quantify the gains and losses to all sectors of an
economy resulting from EEC membership but it is possible to
estimate in a rough way the impact ofthe Common Agricultural
Policy, an exercise which is attempted in this chapter for h’eland
for the years 1975-1981. We have omitted the years 1973 and
1974 because of difficulty, with the data in those years, partic-
ularly cattle prices in 1974.
The effects of the CAP on an economy can be considered
under a number of headings depending on the purpose of the
exercise. These include budgetary effects, net trade effects,
social welfare and balance of payments effects as well as the
effects of transfers from consumers to producers. A number of
studies of these effects on the "Irish economy have been carried
out to date by, for example, Attwood (1979), Morris (1980),
Buckwell et al., (1982) and Sheehy (1982/83) to mention but a
few. The more sophisticated of these studies depend crucially on
assumptions made regarding elasticities of demand and supply
as well as on the differences between Irish and world prices for
different commodities and on what might have happened if we
had not joined the EEC. Because ofthis the results obtained by
different authors often differ vet"3, widely. Results therefore tend,
in many cases, to be confusing and for that reason we confine
ourselves narrowly here to presenting what we call the resource
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transfer effect which tends to be more straightforward than some
of the other measures. The resource transfer effect has two com-
ponents:
(I) The budgetary effect, which is the net transfer ofresources
from FEOGA to Ireland. These include export refunds on
sales to third countries, net MCA receipts, headage
payments, etc., and
(2) the net trade transfer effect which arises because, on trade
with other Community members, prices for commodities
protected by the CAP are higher than on world markets.
Popnlar cliscussion has tended to focus on the budgetary
asl~ct of EEC transfers to tile exclusion of the trade transfers.
Indeed the debate about the UK contribution to Community
finances has been conducted almost wholly at this level. In some
reSlZmCtS this is quite undet’standable since net budgetat’y
contributions are fairly cleat" (though not entirely so) whereas
trade transfers are disguised through market mechanisms and
are difficult to quantify.14
The important point which has to be made is that neither
budgetary contributions nor trade transfers are meaningful
when considered in isolation. Both must be combined to provide
the economic effects of the CAP. For example, take two EEC
countries, X and Y, who export an equal volume ofagricultural
produce and make the same contributions to the EEC agri-
cultural budget. Country X trades completely with non-Com-
munity countries while Y exports to EEC members only.
Country X would rccclve a large budgetary transfer (through
export restitution’is) while Y gets no such transfer. However, Y
would obtain much higher prices than X on the market and so
when budgetary and trade effects are combined both wou[d be
shown to receive approximately the same transfers. The sum of
these two effects therefore (after making allowance for any
double counting of ACAs and MCAs that may occur) gives the
total effect.
t4For mone detailed dlscu~ion on th~ poinls see R~ (1979 and J980).
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7-he Bttdgetaty Effect
The net budgetary effect of the CAP for any country is the
difference between tile gross receipts fi’om FEOGA and tile
country’s contributlons to the agricuhural budget. Figures for
payments under the Gua]’antee section are published ill tile
various Annual Reports of the Minister for Agricuhure. Details
of payments nnder the Guidance section have been published
since 1980 and are available from the Department of Agri-
culture for earlier years.
Calculating national contributions to the CAP fund poses
certain difficuhies as the Commission does not eal"mark revenue
from the various sources to any specific activity. National
contributions to tile CAP must, therefore, be imputed and we
adopt the convention which most earlier studies have used. We
include the total of the import levies on CAP products asa cost
against the CAP but we include only a proportion of the VAT
and customs duties. The proportions of the latter used to fund
FEOGA are set equal to FEC)GA’s share in total Community
expenditure. Thus, if the latter figure is say 60 per cent we
assume that 60 per cent of tile SUtTI of tile h’ish VAT payments
and customs duties paid to tile EEG go to the GAP fund together
with tile whole of tile import levies on CAP products.
Details of receipts and payments to FEOGA fi’om 1975 to
1981 are given in Table 4. I. In all cases the figures relate to tile
amounts actually paid and received in tile years in question.
Funds, even though due in a particular year, are not included
unless they are received in that year. The Guarantee section
includes Exl~rt Refunds, which now account for the bulk of
Irish receipts fi’om this source, Accession Compensatory
Amounts (ACAs) and Monetat’y Compensatory Receipts and
Payments (MCAs). As explained in a previous chapter and in
tile footnote to Table 4. I tile AGAs and MCAs are border taxes
paid within the Community, for the purposes of price regulation
in the case of ACAs, and currency equalisation in tile case of
MCAs. It will be noted that the aggregate ACA figures for each
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Table 4. I: Estimated Irish receipts from, and payments to, the EEC
guidance and guarantee funds 1975-1981
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Guarantee Section
1"7.xpor! refunds
ACAs (I)
MCA receipts
MCA payments
Other receipts
/R£ mill~n
16.91 41.93 89.60 119.41 181.C~ 227.71 210.30
17.24 8.98 5.66 3.86 0.03 0.01 0.00
5.27 32.94 135.10 141.59 78.93 27.03 0.20
-16.77 -39.46 -50.03 -21.76
-6.24 -0.23 -0.00
71.49 50.55 60.47 116.61 140.58 117.10 92.68
Total Guarantee
Sectio, 94.14 94.94 240.80 359.71 394.90 371.62 303.18
Guidance Section
Farm modernisation
scheme -- 0.28 0.87 1.60 2.67 3.87 8.60
Marketing and
processing
-- -- 0.05 4.17 12.20
Less favoured
areas
-- 0.28 4.13 5.06 9.00 9.97 14.00
Inshore fishing
conversion -- -- 2.66 2.70
.Maritime surveillance 7.88 4.46 5.60
Dairy het~[ con-
version scheme 0.28 0.63 2.30 2.40
Animal disease
eradication 1.01 2.61 --
Western drainage 2.56 2.50 6.40
Western package 5.25 2.70
Other 0.59 2.37 2.33 2.76 2.60 0.18 0.15
Total Guidance
Section 0.59 2.93 7.33 9.70 26A0 37.97 54.75
Total Guarantee
and Guidance
receipts 94.73 97.87 248.13 369.41 421.30 409.59 357.93
Estimated
contribution to
FEOGA (2) -8.29 - I I. 72 - 16.79 -38.03 -49, 72 -7 I. 16 -75.57
6O
"Fable 4-.1 contd.
1975 1076 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
IR~ million
Net tcansfet’$
from FEOGA 86.44 86.1S 231.34 331.38 371.58 338.43 282.36
Sources: Annual Report of the Minister for Agrlcuhure, Dublin StationerT Office,
various ISSIII:S anti in ft)ralta t ioix supplied by the ])eparlmelit ~Jf Agricuit ure alld the gl’:C
Commi~ion.
(I) These were ixaymelltS made during tile transition period which were used Io keep
Irish prices at their th~nsltlonal levels. Ireland reeei,’ed ACAs o11 eXlZOrts to the UK
because I rlsh prices were higher than tho~ in the O K. Ireland paid ACAs on exports
to the Ol’iglnal slx slates because Illeii" pt’iccs were hlghet’ thatt otws..’~el t~CAs wets2
positive I~a2catlsI2 our nxain t~tcie was wlti~ the UK.
(2) Includes proportions ofcustolns duties on imports of non-CAP products and VAT
payments as well as all import levies on CAP products. (See text p, $9.).
),eat" are positive. This is so because most of our trade was with
the UK which had lower transitional prices than Ireland during
the transitional period fi’om 1973 to 1978. Hence, when we sold
to the UK we received a lower price than we should and the
balance was made up by payments of an ACA from Brussels of
the difference between the h’ish and the UK price.
Other receipts under the Guarantee section include aids for
skim milk used in animal feed, certain intervention refunds, aids
for private storage, measures to reduce butter fat surplus, and
improve milk quality, less milk and sugar co-responsibility
levies.
Some of these items present certain conceptual difl]euhies
particularly the refunds in connection with intez~,,ention and
with private storage schemes. These refunds are of two kinds,
namely:
(a) Payment for costs of storage of products both inside and
outside the state and
(b) refunds of losses on intel"vention sales.
It could be argued that these are just refunds of expenses
ah’eady incurred by the government and that they should there-
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fore be omitted. Some of these, i.e.,’ reiimds for storage of
products outside the state belong to this category and have been
omitted in preparing Table 4.1.
Refunds of payment for storage within the country are more
difficult to classify. In the case of these it could be argued that if
the resources used would have been otherwise employed in the
absence of intervention or private storage, the refunds are not
necessarily an EEC benefit. It is our opinion, and so however,
that a storage industry (which otherwise would not have existed)
has been built up around the intervention and private storage
systems and we, therefore, consider that these refunds are pro-
perly included in Table 4.1.
Refunds of losses on inter,,ention sales fall into two groups:
(a) losses on sales to EEC states including Ireland anti
(b) losses on sales to third countries.
In theory the refunds of losses on sales to EEC states should be
excluded from Table 4.1. The amounts of these reftmds are
credited to producers in a later section and their inclusion here
involves double counting. The refunds of losses on sales to third
countries on the other hand, which are the major items, are akin
to export refunds and should be included in the Table 4.1.
Unfortunately no breakdown is available for sales out of inter-
ventlon on to EEC and third country markets and we cannot,
therefore, make a distinction between them. Furthermore, no
breakdown is given as between losses on sales out of intervention
and other intervention costs prior to 1980. These data problems
leave us little option except to treat all refunds of losses on inter-
vention sales in the same way, either leave them all in or take
them out; we have chosen the former course and included them
in Table 4.1. This treatment may overstate somewhat the
budgetary gains and lead to a certain amount of double
counting in later sectors. However, the errors involved are not
very large.
Table 4.1 shows that total Irish net receipts fi’om the
Guarantee section rose from IR£94 million in 1975 to IR.£395
million in !979 and declined to IR£’303 million in 1981. The
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declines in recent years have been mainly in MCA receipts
which have been off’set to some extent by increases in market
price receipts.
The receipts fi’om the Guidance section which were zero in
1973 and 1974 rose fi’om IR£0.6 million in 1975 to 1R.6"38
million in 1980 and IR£55 million in 1981 while total receipts
fi’om the Guarantee and Guidance sections went from IR£g5
million in 1975 to IR£421 million in 1979 and declined to
IR£358 million in 1981. Ireland’s estimated contributions to
FEOGA, including the imputed VAT payments and levies
collected on imports, rose from about IR£8 million in 1975 to
IR£76 l,nilllon in 1981 and when these are deducted from the
receipts, the net transfers from FEOGA to Ireland go from
IR£86 million in 1975 to IR£372 million in 1979 and decline to
IR£282 million in 1981.
Resource Transfers Through Trade
In assessing the resource transfers to Ireland resulting from
trade at CIAP prices v,,e assume that world prices are the correct
benchnmrk against which to measure the trade transfer effect,
since these are the prices we would receive for exports and pay
for imports in the absence of EEC membership or some arrange-
ment with the UK. 1,.Ve could, of course, assume certain levels of
administered prices but if we did this we would have toestimate
the amount ofexport subsidies necessary to maintain such levels.
This would force us back again to world prices, since inter-
national trade would take place at these prices. It is best, there-
fore, to work directly from world prices in an exercise of this
kind.
It should, however, be stated that the selection ofworld prices
has no normative significance whatsoever and in no sense
suggests that a regime of free trade is a realistic prospect; nor
does it in any way imply that world prices are in any sense the
"right" prices. Indeed, because of the widespread government
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intervention in agriculture everywhere, including the EEC, the
quantities of agricultural products entering international trade
are residual ones and their prices are likely to be much lower
than world prices would be under a regime of world free trade
with no national supports and no CAP. Despite this, the prices
obtaining on world markets outside the EEC represent the de
facto situation and are the ones which agricultural exporters
have to accept.
What must be determined, then, is the benefit which Ireland
has received from the CAP compared with the situaiion which
would have obtained if we had remained outside it, whether we
used national aids to support agriculture or otherwise. In
making these calculations an argument could be made for
taking account of the benefits received from the UK treasury
under the Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement and other
arrangements with the UK. This assumes that if we had not
joined the EEC our arrangements with the UK would have con-
tinued, which they might or might not. In any case because of
the difficulty of quantifying the value of our pre-EEC store
cattle and store sheep links with the UK we have not carried out
this exercise.
Choosing world prices as the benchmark involves the diffi-
culty of selecting these prices for each commodity as there is no
unique world price. There are also formidable problems posed
by quality differences, transport costs and in estimating v,,or[d
prices for commodities which Irish traders did not export out-
side the EEC. There are hundreds of different commodities and
it is almost impossible to get a consistent series ofworld prices for
all. The same problems would, of course, arise if we used some
other reference base.
Calculating Trade Effects
In calculating trade effects we ignore home produced pro-
ducts sold on the home market. If consumers pay higher than
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world prices for these, the extra cost is an internal transfer
between farmers and consumers and does not represent a net
gain or loss to the country, except to the extent (as stated above)
that there is some welfare loss resulting from the higher prices.
The value of exports to countries outside the EEC and
imports of products covered by the CAP from these countries
have already been dealt with. The gain to the nation from
exports to third countries is represented by the export refunds
given in Table 4.1, while the loss to the nation from the higher
prices paid for imports covered by the CAP (i.e., the value of
import levies on CAP products) is included in the estimated
contributions to FEOGA also given in Table 4.1.
The calculations in this section relate to trade with other EEC
states and the gains are the extra values of CAP goods exported
to these countries over and above what would have been
obtained for them (at world prices) if we were not members of
the EEC; the losses are the extra costs of CAP goods imported
from other EEC states valued at the difference between EEC
and world prices.
Omitted from these calculations, however, are explicit entries
for any extra farm costs incurred in producing the output at
higher prices. There is no doubt but that cost prices in Europe
and, hence, in Ireland increased as a result of.increased output
prices and some amount should by right be included for the
extra costs of imported inputs. The magnitude of these costs,
however, is not so great. Some of the extra payments by farmers
accrued to non-farmers in Ireland (e.g., suppliers of farm
materials and services and handlers of farm output) and are thus
an internal transfer within the state. Others such as the extra
costs of imported animal feeds covered by the CAP are taken
into account in calculating the trade transfer effects, others such
as high oil and rock phosphate prices would have occurred even
if Ireland did not join the EEC and finally we have omitted from
the trade transfers products exported for which the CAP give
little or no protection but which increased in price, nevertheless,
because of competition with CAP products, e.g., horses, wool,
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potatoes, etc.~S The omission of these is likely to balance to some
extent the extra costs omitted.
The values in Table 4.2 were obtained by multiplying net
quantities exported (i.e., exports less imports) to EEC countries
by the estimated difference between Irish and world prices. The
net export quantities which are given in the Food Balance
Sheets in Appendix 4A were obtained from the CSO. The
methods used to calculate the price differences used are
discussed below.
Table 4.2: Value~ ef net trade trnnsfers between Ireland and miter EEC state~ 1975-1981
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
II1£ millle~
Oommon wheal 0.45 -5.75
-6.39 -4.12 -4.73 -4.58 -I.79
Barley -0.02 0.17 10.22 15.45 5.43 3,31 0.16
Mai~
-3.01 -7.56 -12.67
-15.67 -14.32 -11.69
-4.15
Oih~r corals 0.00
-0,11 -0.36 -0.SS
-0.4S -0.29 -0.03
Sugar 3.19 2.70 6.99 6.62 3.18 -I.15 0.’19
Cheoe 16.28 18.97 19.76 24.49 40.43 22.95 24.36
Butler 1&12 37.28 ’14.27 85.34 90.50 36,89 27.52
Skim milk powder 16.83 34.14 30.95 22.91 32.29 6.55 8.26
O~hcr dslq’ (a} 5.93 0.33 35.97 31,53 21 .ftl 13.37 6.83
8~f includlng he( li~’e exl~rls 85.44 52.08 13S.20 210.60 216.66 282.24 199.54
Pigr~al
-0.12 0.84 6.80 I 1,92. 0,29 7.79 5.88
Sheepmesl (and goat*) 1.89 0,55 1,30 4.07 ~i.01 9,29 9.25
Egg~ 0.00 -0.IS 4).26
-0.12 -0,57 -I.32 -I.69
Pouhry 0.00 0.28 0.42 -0.22
-0.23 0.28 -1.20
Earlier studies by Attwood (1979) and Rollo and Warwick
(1979) relied on current rates of export restitutions and import
levies to value inter-Community trade at world prices. Neither
measure is wholly satisfactory, particularly for cereals. It has
often been suggested that for many of these commodities import
tSAn ~"st imate for sheepmeat has been incuded for all the years shown even though ~he
EEC sheep policy was nol introduct~l untll 1980. Prior to thal Ireland had a special
arrangemenl for lamb on (he Paris markel because of EE(~ memlz~rshlp.
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levies are pitched unrealistically high and export refunds
unrealistically low. For example, in 1981 the import levy on
barley was about IR£40 per tonne whereas the export refund on
this cereal was only about IR£10 per tonne. The position was
somewhat similar for wheat while for oats the levy was about
IR£18 and the refund zero. For these reasons we have supple*
mented information on levies and refunds on cereals with data
from other sources using the difference between Irish and world
prices where available. We used the same procedure for pigmeat
and sugar. For all these commodities world offer prices are avail-
able fi’om the EEC Commission (Eurostat, various isstles). These
have the considerable advantage of being adjusted to take
account of quality differences. For beef and dairy products we
used export refunds, where available, adjusted to take account
of MCAs and AGAs paid and received, i.e., net refimds. In all
cases where price differences were used the Irish prices were
assumed to be net of these payments so that the differences
between Irish and world prices were equivalent to net export
refunds. Net, rather than gross, refunds were used because the
net figures were more readily available. The price differences
used for the various commodities are given in Appendix 4B.
For all the estimates we were conscious of the errors which
could occur from using the highly aggregated data available.
Furthermore, the list of commodities is not exhaustive. A
number of smaller items had to be excluded because of diffi-
culties with the data. As far as we can ascertain the items
omitted covet" less than 5 pet" cent of exports and imports of pro-
ducts covered by the CAP. These omissions, which may tend to
be cotinterbalanced by the omission of exlx~rts and imports of
fal’m inputs not covered by the GAP, should not therefore
greatly affect the outcome.
Table 4.2 shows that total trade transfers increased from
IR£145 million in 1975 to IR£405 million in 1979 but declined
to about IR£273 million in 1981. The decline in the last year was
due mainly to a fall in the volume of beefexports and a narrow-
ing of the differentia[ between EEC and world pri?es. As might
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"Fable 4.3: ~*’tt rtJeu~ transfer tffKts eft~ CAP 1975-1981
197S 1976 1977 1978 1979 19~ 1981
Rad~ (~ of AC~J amd MCA0 fre*~.- IR£ raill~
Gtmrantee Sect ~on
F.xpoM refundt (’I’uble 4.1 ) 16.91 41.93 8~.60 1L9.41 18L.60 227.71 210.30
Oiler r~eiptt (Table 4A ) 71.49 50.55 60.t7 It6.61 14~.58 ttT.10 92.68
Guid,r~Sect~on (’Fable 4.1) 0.59 2.93 7.33 9.70 26.40 37.97 54.75
Tolal Aho~’~ 88.99 95.41 t57.40 245.72 348.58 382.78 337.?3
Trade transf©n (Table 4.2) 144.98 139.77 272.20 392.83 403.30 363.64 273.’13
Estlr~tled contrlbulloo~ to FEOG, A
(Tahle4A) -8.29 .11.72 -16.79 -38.03 -49.72 -7t.16 -7~,.57
Net ~.c~ou~¢ iranst’¢tl 2"25.68 223.46 412.81 ~0.54 704.16 ~75.26 333.$9
be expected the big gains in trade are from beef and dairy
products. In 1980 our net exports of beef to EEC countries were
worth IR~’282 million more than if we had sold them on non-
EEC markets without refunds. The trade gains on dairy
products in that year were about IR~80 million. In the previous
year, however, the gain on dairy product sales was about
IR~185 million compared with IR.~217 million from beef. In the
case of grain, the gain from exporting barley to member states in
recent years did not compensate for the extra costs of importing
wheat and maize from these states.
Combined Budgetary and Trade Effects
As stated above, neither the budgetary nor trade effects are
complete in themselves. They must be combined to give the
total effect, but in doing this both ACAs and MCAs must be
excluded to avoid double counting. The reason for this is
explained in Appendix 4.C. Table 4-.3 combines the results of the
two preceeding tables to give the total net resource transfer
effects on the Irish economy for the years 1975 to 1981. This
table shows that total net resource transfers increased from
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IR~C226 million in 1975 to IRff/04 million in 1979 but declined
to IR£556 million in 1981. In 1978 and 1979 these transfers
represented over 10 per cent of the Irish GNP at factor cost but
by 1981 the proportion had fallen to 6.3 per cent of GNP.
Results from Other Studies
A number of studies using a similar methodology, have been
carried out for other EEC states and for Ireland in recent years.
The two which are more nearly comparable are Attwood (1979)
and Rollo and Warwick (1979). Both these studies give results
very different from oues. Attwood found total net resource trans-
fees of IR.C228 million, IR.~305 million and IR£566 million for
the three yeal’s 1976-1978. These compare with IRff223 million,
IR£413 million and IR£600 million for the same years from this
study, very sizeable differences for 1977 and 1978.
Rollo and Warwick estimated resource transfers of ~’360
million and ,~506 million for 1977 and 1978, respectively com-
pared with our figures of£413 and £600 million. The dill~:rences
are mainly due to a wider coverage ofcommodities in our study
than in the others and to the use of different pricing systems
particularly for c:attle. There is also some difference in the
methods used in treating MCAs in the different studies when
aggregating budgetaz’y and trade effects.
The conclusion to be drawn from the resuhs of the different
studies is that figures for EEC trade transfer effects must be
taken with extreme caution. The user would need to study care-
fully the methodologies and prices used and the items included
and omitted before accepting any particular set of figures. But
even then he should be sceptical of the results. There is no single
world price for any commodity, and hence the results depend
very, much on the prices taken. Export refunds would appear to
be the best estimates of price differences for beef and dairy
products hut these refunds differ widely for the same commodity
as between different countries. Furthermore, there is not an
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exact correlation as between the refunds for live cattle, bone-in
and boneless beef or between butter, skim milk powder and
cheese. The best that can be said for trade transfer figures, there-
fore, is that they give rough orders of magnitude.
Distribution of Gains and Losses as between Producers, Consumers
and Taxpayers
In the previous sections of this chapter we have shown that the
CAP resulted in very large resource transfers to Ireland
throughout the 1970s. It also had an important effect on the
distribution of income within the country. Producers gained
from the high EEC prices, consumers lost because they had to
pay higher prices than before for food, while taxpayers lost by
having to pay customs duties and VAT contributions to the
EEC which before were retained at home. The import levies
(which were not collected prior to EEC entry) are neutral as far
as taxpayers are concerned but are a charge on either producers
or consumers depending on whether the imports on which they
are paid go for further production or consumption.
The figures given for net resource transfers in Table 4.3 repre-
sent very roughly the net gains to the state from the CAP. As
stated above, however, gains to producers from home consump-
tion have not been included since these are an internal transfer
within the state. In order, therefore, to obtain total producer
gain, we must add to the net resource transfers in Table 4.3 the
extra cost of home consumption of products covered by the CAP
which were consumed in the state by non-producers,~6 together
with the customs duties and VAT contributions which were
deducted in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. Import levies on CAP products
are assumed to be paid entirely by producers and are not
deducted.
re’Produce covered by the CAP consumed in farm households {either uny.old or
pu rcha_~ed ) is omitted entirely since the extra value of this food is neil her a consumer loss
nor a producer gain.
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The extra cost of home consumption in any year (i.e., con-
sumer loss) is obtained by muhlplylng tile estimated quantities
of the different CAP products purchased by non-farmers, I)y the
estimated price differences given in Apl)endix 4B. The
consumer loss obtained in this way is likely to overstate tile true
loss because even though we have excluded consuml)tion ill
farm households we have been unable (because of lack of data)
to do this for the households of mall), producers who are not
fal’mers (see below). Welfare economists would also argue that a
loss in welfare occurred due to high food prices which probably
reduced demand for some foods and left less inconae availahle for
expenditure oil other commodities. To estimate such a loss,
however, would recluire a number of uncertain assumptions
regarding elaslicities of demand and non-farm income effects.
Hence we have ignored this welfare aspect.
Tile figures for producer gain and constlmer and taxpayer
losses are given in Table 4.4.17 This table shows substantial con-
sumer losses at current prices of around IRff205 million pet"
annum in 1978 and 1979 and, ofcourse, much more substantial
producer gains reaching about IR~950 million in the same
years. Both gains and losses have, however, been declining in
recent ),ears due to a slowing down in price rises at the annual
EEC price reviews and to increases in world prices. These
declines are very marked when the values are given in constant
prices.
¯ In addition to these gains and losses there is an indirect gain to
the taxpayer which is not showfi. If we were not members of
EEC it is reasonable to assume that there would be a domestic
national price snpport policy and in this event export refunds
would have to be paid by the h’ish taxpayer. The magnitude of
these refunds would delzend on the level of the support prices
and we cannot, therefore, estimate what they would be, but can
assume that they would likely be much greater than current
payments to the EEC budget.
I ;As a check on the arithmetic it should be noted that the figures headed Nel Resource
Transfers in Table 4.4 are exactly the same as Ihe Net Resource Transfers in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.4: Distribution of resource transfers between producers, consumers and taxpayers
/It 1975 Prices
Consumer VAT and Net
Producer Loss customs resource Producer Consumer
)’ear gain (a) duties transfers gain loss
IR£ million (Current Prices) IR£ million
Net
resource
transfer
1975 281.04 48.86 6.50 225.68 281.04 48.86 225.68
1976 327.37 94.31 9.60 223.46 277.46 79.93 189.39
1977 586.75 161.84 12.10 412.81 437.54 120.68 307.83
1978 837.63 204.86 32.23 600.54 580.45 141.96 416.15
1979 954.79 206.41 44.22 704.16 584.26 126.31 430.89
1980 935.59 194.87 65.46 675.26 484.27 100.86 349.52
1981 826.51 197.45 69.47 555.59 355.28 84.88 238.83
{a) In some years there were small EEC food subsidlcs I)ut these have lzeen ignored.
*Current prices deflated by constxnmr price index.
Apart from any errors in the data, the figures for gains and
losses require careful interpretation. The first point to be made is
that (as stated above) producers in this context covez: many more
people than farmers. Because CAP prices are fixed at wholesale
levels, producers include food processors and their staffs and
suppliers of [arm materials of all kinds. Similarly, funds go to
building and machinery contractors, transport firms, cold stores
and so on. Thousands of people other than farmers, therefore,
gain from the CAP. There are, ofcourse, many losers as well
because of free trade in industrial goods, but this aspect of the
situation is outside the scope of the present study.
In the second place if Ireland were not a meml)er ofthe EEC,
producers’ incomes would not be reduced by the amounts given
for producer gains in Table 4.4. Food could not have been pro-
duced in Ireland at the world prices used in these calculations.
Neither would food at these prices be available to consumers. In
the absence of the CAP there would have had to be national
policies such as we had prior to 1973; in that case food prices
would be at. much higher levels than the so-called "world"
prices used in making these calculations.
hnplications for Consume~
As indicated above there is a certain amount of artificiality
about the ]eve[ of the transfers from consumers to producers.
Also the exercise gives maximum benefits to producers because
we have compared EEC with world food prices. In considering
the effect on consumers, however, we should really move away
from world prices and look at other standards. What must be
considered is -- are EEC prices vet3, much out of line with
reality and if so what should a reasonable level of food prices be?
One suggestion would be to compare food prices with con-
sumer prices generally or with certain sub-groups within the
consumer price index, such as clothing, housing, etc., which are
other basic human requirements. Economists would probably
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argue against such a comparison but the ordinary lay person
would see a certain logic in the exercise. If prices generally are
going up why should food prices not follow more or less the same
trend, particularly since the costs and living expenses ofthe food
producer are related to the other prices?
A comparison of food prices with the general consumer price
index and with some constituents of this index for the years 1960
to 1982 is given in Table 4.5. This table shows that over the
whole period the general index rose from 100 to 822.4 whereas
the price of food rose fi’om 100 to 726.7. When the latter figure is
divided by the former we find that the real price of food declined
by about 12 per cent over these years (see also Figure 4.1 ). When
we look at some of the individual constituents, however, we see
that the indices for clothing and footwear, housing and house-
hold durables rose at slower rates than that offood, but the index
for fuel and light rose at a much faster rate. The relationship
betweefi the individual indices is shown diagramatically in
Figure 4.2. It should be noted that the indices given include
indirect taxes and subsidies. If these were netted out, the magni-
tude of the indices would change somewhat but it should be
borne in mind that a tax on one commodity tends to be reflected
in the prices ofother items and it could beargued that the index
including the tax represents the de facto situation and is the one
which should be used.
The indices in Table 4.5 have been broken down into two sub-
periods 1960 to 1970 and 1970 to 1982. The rise in food prices
between 1960 and 1970 is less than that for the "all items" index.
In fact the real price of food declined over this decade by about 6
per cent. The rise in the prices of clothing, footwear and house-
hold durables was less than that of the food price index through-
out the 1960s but in that period prices of fuel and light and
housing rose faster than food prices.
The second period from 1970-1982 is ofmost interest for this
exercise since it covers the period during which Ireland came
under increasing EEC influence. Again this period can be
divided into two sub-periods of contrasting trends: 1970-1978
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and 1978 to 1982. During the first sub-period real food prices
rose by about 10 per cent (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1 ) but since
then they have declined by about 14 per cent so that over the
whole period 1970 to 1982 real.food prices have declined by
about 6 per cent.
Again food prices rose faster than those of clothing, footwear,
housing and household durables throughout the 1970s but by
much less than those of fuel and light (see Figure 4.2). The hous-
ing index rose at a slower rate tban any of the other indices over
Table 4.5: Consumer price index classified by commodity groups and
lime periods
Real
Clothing Furl l-louse- food
~i4id- foot- and hold All priu
August Food wear light Ho~ing durablts itemsI    index~
(a) 1960-1982 (1960 = 100)
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1961 103.2 101,1 105.5 103,3 100.9 102.8 100.4
1962 105.6 103.9 110.3 107.7 102.9 107.4 98.3
1963 105.7 105.6 113.8 112.5 103.7 108.6 97.3
1964 115.5 112.6 121.5 119.2 109.7 118.4 97.5
1965 120.2 115.2 121.5 126.6 112.0 123.5 97.3
1966 123.1 116.7 122.3 133.3 113.8 127.9 96.2
1967 125.1 118.4 127.4 141.9 119.6 130.8 95.6
1968 131.5 120.5 131.6 151.6 122.0 136.8 96.1
1969 140.3 124.8 139.2 171.l I31.8 148.3 94.6
t970 t50.6 136.7
~
t86.8 D.?,A ~607
1971 162.2 149.0 171.9 208.0 153.8 174.9 92.7
1972 184.4 163.5 189.9 230.0 165.8 190.4 96.8
1973 209.2 190.6 200.9 244.2 186.0 211.8 98.8
1974 243.9 229.9 318.6 267.3 225.7 249.7 97.7
1975 290.8 260.0 345.3 295.2 261.2 297.1 97.9
1976 338.5 289.7 402.5 346.5 293.1 353.1 95.8
1977 404.5 334.6 480.0 363.7 335.9 400.7 100.9
1978 447.0 372.8 490.7 316.2 367.9 433.7 103.1
1979 502.8 412.1 590.1 361.7 402.6 492.5 102.1
1980 560.1 471.9 835.7 437.8 467.9 585.4 95.7
1981 650.9 538.3 1046.8 494.9 543.5 703. I 92.6
1982 726.7 593. I I 173.9 584.9 599.9 822.4 88.4
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Table 4.5: contd.
Real
Clothin~ Fuel House- food
A4id- foot- and hold All price
August Food wear light Housing durables itemst indea~
(b) 1970-1982 (1970 = 100)
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1971 107.7 109.0 11[.8 111.3 108.2 108.8 99.0
1972 122.4 119.6 123.5 I23.1 116.7 118.5 103.3
1973 138.9 139.4 130.6 130.7 130.9 131.8 105.4
1974 161.9 167.6 207.1 t43.1 158.8 155.4 104.2
1975 193.1 190.2 224.5 158.0 183.8 184.9 104.4
1976 224.7 211.9 261.7 185.5 206.3 219.7 102.3
1977 268.6 244.8 312.1 19’t.7 236.4 249.3 107.7
1978 296.8 272.7 319.0 169.3 258.9 269.9 109.9
1979 333.9 301.5 383.7 193.6 283.3 306.5 108.9
1980 371.9 345.2 543.4 234.4 329.3 364.3 102.1
1981 432.2 393.8 680.6 264.9 382.5 437.5 98.8
1982 482.5 433.9 763.3 313. I 422.2 511.8 94.3
~’l’he weights attached to constitucnts of thc CPI, when calculating the overall price
index, arc as follows: food (30.5%), alcoholic drink (I 1.5%), tobacco (4.5%), clothing and
footwear 00.7%), fuel and light (5.8%), housing (6%), household durables (4.8~),
transport (13.2%), s~rvicc’s and related cxpcndltur¢ (8%), othcr (5%). Only some of these
constituents are given here.
~ke. ,,he food price indcx divided by the general consumer price index.
this period, in large part, because of the abolition of rates in
1977.
Different people will draw different conclusions from these
figures but in our opinion the surprising thing is the slower rate
of growth in food prices relative to "all items" since EEC entry.
Hence, despite what have been regarded as massive food price
increases within the EEC, the reality is that they have not kept
pace with general inflation. This is an unexpected development
as far as the ordinar3, person is concerned. We refrain from
making any comment as to what a reasonable level of real food
prices should be because we do not know. We would however
venture to say that if all agricultural aids and price supports
were withdrawn everywhere food prices might be higher and
supplies much more variable than they actually are.
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Figure 4.2: Consumer price index classified by certain commodity
groups and time periods
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Appendix 4A: Food balance sheet (’000 tonnes)
1975
hnports Exports Net exports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat 195 162 221 416 12 13 -150 -208 406
Barley 1019 63 71 1090 48 89 -15 +18 1034
Maize 0 275 419 419 1 1
-274 -’1-18 394
Other Cereals 165 5 5 169 2 2 -3 -3 177
Sugar (white) 187 21 56 243 75 112 +54 +56 147
Cheese 60 I 1 61 56 57 +55 +56 7
Butter 86 0 0 86 53 54 +53 +54 37
Skim milk powder 135 1 4 139 93 108 +92 +104 16
Beef 564 19 19 583 442 ’t88 +423 +469 90
Pigmeat 104 4 4 108 21 23 +17 +19 85
Sheepmeat 47 5 5 52 16 18 +11 +13 35
Eggs 39 3 3 41 0 0
-3 -3 41
Poultry 34 1 1 35 2 2 +1 +1 33
Milk’* 672 0 0 672 0 0 0 0 672
Slncludes buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1976
Imports Exports Net exports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
O~
Common Wheat 200 146 203
Barley 922 78 107
Maize 0 201 505
Other Cereals 130 5 20
Sugar (white) 174 41 93
Cheese 49 2 2
Butter 101 2 2
Skim milk powder 164 2 2
Beef 385 22 22
Pigmeat 126 4 4
Sheepmeat 37 5 5
Eggs 39 2 2
Poultry 42 2 2
Milk* 670 0 0
403 21 22 -125 -181 388
1029 84 122 +6 +15 909
505 2 2 -199 -503 515
149 1 I -4 -19 149
266 66 126 +25 +33 144
51 53 56 +51 +54 8
103 59 64 +57 +62 40
166 103 1~2 +101 +140 23
407 262 297 +240 +275 80
130 31 38 +27 +34 92
42 8 10 +3 +5 32
41 0 0 -2 -2 41
44 4 4 +2 +2 39
670 0 0 0 0 670
°Include3 buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1977
hnports Exports Net eaports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat 250 161 239 489 22 24 -139 -215 459
Barley 1452 19 21 1473 246 286 +227 +265 1197
Maize 0 201 272 272 3 3 -198 -269 299
Other Cereals 137 9 12 149 1 1 -8 -I I 148
Sugar (white) 168 27 58 226 73 78 +46 +20 147
Cheese .54 2 2 56 38 38 +36 +36 8
Butter 107 I 2 109 43 51 +42 +49 39
Skim milk powder 145 2 2 147 73 161 +71 +159 20
Beef 460 32 32 492 385 414 +353 +382 78
Pigmeat 132 4 4 136 44 49 +40 +45 89
Sheepmeat 37 5 5 42 9 9 +4 +4 33
Eggs 38 2 2 40 0 0 -2 -2 40
Poultry 43 3 3 46 5 5 +2 +2 41
Milk* 653 0 0 653 0 0 0 0 653
°Includes buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1978
Imports Exports Net exports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat 253 150 217 470 47 48 -103
-169 414
Barley 1396 15 15 1411 286 332 +271 +317 1093
Maize 0 213 247 247 4 4 -209 -243 242
Other Cereals 118 15 17 135 0 1 -15
-16 134
Sugar (white) 188 26 56 244 62 71 +36 +15 [58
Cheese 50 2 2 52 41 42 +39 +40 8
Butter 130 I I 131 72 83 +71 +82 40
Skim milk powder 169 I I 170 47 145 +46 +144 25
Beef 473 25 25 498 385 408 +360 +383 79
Pigmeat 137 0 0 137 44 4-6 +44 +46 98
Sheepmeat 40 7 7 47 17 17 +10 +10 30
Eggs 37 . 1 I 38 0 0 -1 -1 38
Poultry 44 4 4 48 3 3 -1 -I 44
Milk* 643 0 0 643 0 0 0 0 643
* [ncludes buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1979
Imports Exports aver exports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat 245 213 295 540 31 32 -182 -263 523
Barley 1438 16 17 1455 171 196 +155 +179 1255
Maize 0 250 271 271 3 4 -247 -267 279
Other C, ereals 105 13 14 119 0 0 -13 -14 120
Sugar (white) 175 26 57 232 69 98 +43 +4[ 149
Cheese 58 2 2 60 60 60 +58 +58 9
Butter 132 2 2 134 74. 119 +72 +[17 39
Skim milk powder 148 0 0 148 52 173 +52 +173 3
Beef 426 39 39 465 315 353 +276 +314 78
Pigmeat 155 5 5 160 48 52 +43 +47 108
Sheepmeat 35 5 5 40 14 14 +9 +9 26
Eggs 35 4 4 40 0 0 -4 -4 39
Poultry 47 5 5 52 4 4 -1 -I 47
Milk* 642 0 0 642 0 0 0 0 642
°Includes buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1980
Imports Exports Net exports
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity production EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat 239 314 387 626 73 75 -241 -312 557
Barley 1523 39 39 1562 131 154 +92 +ll5 1394
Maize 0 284 299 299 12 13 -272 -286 284
Other Cereals 100 8 12 112 0 0 -8 -12 110
Sugar (white) 148 32 63 210 55 69 +23 +6 145
Cheese 49 2 2 52 36 37 +34 +35 9
Butter 12’I, 3 3 127 46 90 +43 +87 42
Skim milk powder 136 0 0 136 24 130 +24 +130 0
Beef 539 20 20 559 " 356 489 +336 +469 82
Pigrneat 146 20 20 166 54 56 +34 +36 110
Sheepmeat 39 4 4 43 17 17 +13 +13 27
Eggs 33 10 10 42 0 0 -10 -10 42
Poultry 50 6 6 56 7 7 +1 +1 49
Milk* 637 0 0 637 0 0 0 0 637
*Include~ buttermilk.
Appendix 4A: Continued
1981
Imports Exports Net exports ,
Domestic Total Domestic
Commodity prodtu:tion EEC Total supply EEC Total EEC Total use
Common Wheat
Barley
Maize
Other Cereals
Sugar (white)
Cheese
Butter
Skim milk powder
Beef
Pigmeat
Sheepmeat
Eggs
Poultry
Milk*
N. m.
54 4 4 58 42
125 5 5 130 45
135 0 0 136 34
434 35 35 469 255
139 26 26 165 51
40 6 6 46 18
37 13 13 50 O
45 10 l0 55 6
634 0 0 634 0
44 +38 +40 11
81 +40 +76 47
123 +34 +123 0
401 +220 +366 90
53 +25 +27 112
18 +12 +12 28
0 -13 -13 49
6 -4 -4 49
0 0 0 634
*Includes buttermilk.
N.A. Not available from C-SO but estimated by the authors from Output and Trade Slatistics.
Source: Central Stalistics Office, Dublin.
I. Meat trade figures include live animals as well as meat itself.
2. The ligures do not always add up exacdy becatzse of stock changas which are not shown and which are sometimes very su~tantml becau~
producL~ put into intervention within the state are treated as stock.
3. Products put into intervention outside the state arc treated ~ exports.
4. "Sheepmeat" includes g~atsmeat.
5. Wheat includes soft and hard wheat; also, sorghum is added to maize.
6. "Other cereals" covers Meslin, Oats, Rye and Mixed Grains.
7. Domestic use include~ Human Consumption, Industrial Uses and Agricuhural Uses (Seeds and Animal Feed).
8. These balances do not contain data on "Other Dairy Products" which because of their diverse nature cannot be readily aggregated in
qu~ntltlve terms.
Appendix 4B: Difference* between Irish and world price levels 1975-1981~
~’ear
Commodity 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
In~ Ionlle
Common wheat
-3 46 46 40 26 19 8
Barley and other cereals 1" 28 45 57 35 36 6
Maize II 38 64 75 58 43 21 "
Sugar 59 108 152 184 7’t -50 22 :
Cheese 296 372 549 628 697 675 641
Butter 3’1-2 654 1054 1202 1257 858 688
Skim milk powder 183 338 436 498 621 273 243
Beef 202 217 383 585 785 840 907
Pigmeat -7 31 170 271 216 229 235
Sheepmeat (and goats) 172 184.5 325.5 497 668 715 771
Eggs 0 75 132 115 143 132.5 130
Pouhry 0 143 208 221 234 277 300
*Negative figure means that irish prices were lower than world prices.
1For oiler Dial, products the price differences for cheese, butter, and skim milk wece used as appropriate.
Appendix 4C: Effects of ACAs and MCAs on results when
aggregating budgetary and trade transfers
ACAs
let a = the EEC price per tonne of beef in, say, 1975
b = the Irish transitional price
c = the UK transitional price (lower than Irish price)
d = world price
(a - b) = the EEC/Irish ACA, i.e., the amount payable by
Ireland on every tonne of beef exported to existing
EEC full members (after allowing for MCAs)
(b - c) = the Irish/UK ACA, i.e., the ACA received on every
tonne of Irish beef exported to the UK
(b - d) = difference between Irish and world beef prices. It is
the net EEC refund, i.e., (a - d) - (a - b).
If we know b - d and multiply it by the amount ofbeefexported
to other EEC countries, including the UK, we have the correct
figure for the gain on beef exports as a result of our being
members of the EEC. If, however, we were to add to this the
ACAs on beef exported in 1975 included in Table 4.1 we would
obtain an inflated figure. Hence, in any aggregation of
budgetary and trade effects to obtain net resource transfer
effects the ACAs must be excluded. This applies to all ACAs,
not just to those on beef and applies in all cases where the
refund used is the difference between Irish and world prices.
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Appendix 4C: Continued
Assume transitional period is over but Ireland has not devalued he)"
green rate so that green and central rates of exchange are not the
samg
Let a = EEC price
Let b = Irish price lower than EEC price
Let c = world price
a - b= Irish negative MCA payable on all exports both to
EEC and third countries.
a - c = full export refund
b- c= net export refund, i.e., full export refund less
MCA=export refund to which Irish exporter is
entitled, i.e., Irish price less world price.
Ifx is the amount ofbeefexported from Ireland to another EEC
country then the gain on beefexports from being a member of
the EEC is
x(a-c)- x(a- b)=x(b-c)
i.e., the amount exported multiplied by the net export refund.
Since we have used net export refunds in calculating all our
trade effects we have included the correct figures for these
effects and ifwe were to add or deduct MCAs to, or from, these
we would obtain inflated or reduced figures as/he case may be.
Hence, MCAs must be omitted in any aggregation of
budgetary and trade effects to obtain net resource transfer
effects.
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Chapter 5
The CA P under Stress
Since the inauguration of the CAP in January 1962 there
have been widespread demands fi’om all quarters for its modi-
fication, but somehow it has managed to survive in more or less
its original form. This is amazing considering the varying
interests of the different members, and the trenchant attacks
made upon it fi’om time to time. As.Josling et al., (1981) say "it
[the CAP] stumbles from one crisis to the next rescued mainly
because of fear, well founded or not, that a collapse of the policy
would bring about the demise of the Common Market itseW’.
Attacks on the CAP have taken various forms but it would be
true to say that the maior problem stems fi’om the fact that
among the member states there are gainers and losers. In
particular, the balance ofcomributions into and receipts from
the budget is a critical political factor. The price of food is
another. The UK, which in pre-EEC days operated a cheap
food policy, now finds that food prices have increased consider-
ably while at the same time it has to pay heavy budgetary con-
tributions to maintain these prices?s So also have the Germans
who are heavy contributors to the EEC budget.
Criticis,~ of the CA P
The main criticisms which have been advanced against the
CAP are as follows:
ll]n rument years the UK has been receiving large r~funds ofils budgetat’}’ comribu-
lion on t he b,xsis of varlous ar~mlents (see p. 105, d seq. ).
9O
(1) The high prices generate surpluses which are expensive to
dispose of;
(2) these surpluses and the cost of disposing of them are
growing at an alazwnlng rate compared with a static level of
consumption;
(3) the CAP does not achieve income equity as between dif-
ferent farmers or different regions. Because of high prices
those who receive the highest incomes are those who pro°
duce.,most, namely, the larger farmers on the better soils;
(4) the disposal of surpluses on the world market is disruptive
of international trade; on the other hand, there are many
complaints about duty free imports of agricultural pro-
ducts;
(5) in the situation where the budget has reached the upper
limits of its existing capacity, funds for other EEC policies
cannot be made available so that the evolution of the EEC
is being retarded.
In addition to these ciriticisms, there is also the problem ofthe
proposed enlargement of the Community by the admission of
Spain and Portugal. These are relatively poor countries each of
whicll will be a net beneficiary from the CAP placing further
pressure on limited budgetary funds. The enlargement is also
likely to change the emphasis of the CAP towards greater
support for Mediterranean products -- olive oil, wine and
tomatoes -- leaving less available for the support of northern
European products -- milk, beef, sugar, butter, etc. In addition,
there is likely to be greater demand for farm structural aids since
the new members have very poor structures over wide areas.
The above criticisms and the problems associated with Com-
munity enlargement are discussed below.
Surpluses and Disposal Costs
The figures in Table 5.1 show the degree of self-sufficiency
witlfin the EEC in selected agricultural products over the period
1973/74 to 1979/80. An interesting feature of this table is the
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increase in self-sufficiency in the UK since that country joined
the Community. Cereals have gone from 68 to 83 percent, sugar
from 30 to 46 per cent, butter from 19 to 47 per cent, cheese from
61 to 70 per cent, beef and veal from 70 to 78 percent and veget-
able oils and fats from 33 to 50 per cent. Pigment, however, has
remained at the 1973/74 level. The effect of these increases
means a contraction in the UK food market for Irish produce
and a search for continental outlets which in many cases require
different quality products -- i.e., leaner meats, lighter lamb,
unsalted butter, etc. There is, of course, considerable’movement
towards continental markets already but it looks as if this must
be accelerated.
With regard to the overall EEC situation, Table 5.1 shows
that in the 6 year period the degree ofself-sufficieocy within the
nine countries has increased considerably and now quite a
number of products are in surplus or near surplus. In particular
sugar and some milk products are very much in over supply.
Wine and pigmeat are dangerously close and due to seasonality
arc in surplus at certain times of the year. Beef and veal would be
in surplus if concessionary imports under the GAT/" were in-
cluded. The same is true for cereals if imports of cereal
substitutes were included.
It is difficult to say whether or not the CAP has been entirely
responsible for the surpluses and near surpluses but the Com-
mission claims (EEC Commission, 1980) that it (the CAP)
has shielded Europe from a physical shortage of foodstuffs and
protected it from the speculative movements which sometimes
affect the world markets in raw materials. We need only think of
the dependence of Europe as regards energy, and of the vulner-
ability of supplies from overseas, in order to understand that an
entity such as Europe with a population or260 million cannot
afford to rely on others for its food supplies and has the duty to
exploit the richness of its soil.
Having said this, however, the Commission document goes on
to say that the main difficulty encountered by the CAP after 15
years of operation is the lack of sufficiently effective regulatory
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Table 5. h Degree of self-sufficiency in selected agricultural products 1973/74-1979/80(a) within the EEC
West The
Germany France Italy ),reths.B-Lur. UAr Ireland Denmark EEC 9 Greece EEC IO
Product ~’ear per cent
Total(b) 1973/74 81 169 66 30 44 68 68 102 92 80 91
Cereals 1979/80 89 173 71 28 50 83 85 108 101 102 1Ol
1973/74 98 146 67 119 208 30 105 138 91 na naSugar 1979/80 125 200 93 156 247 46 ll3 187 125 92 124
Fresh ~uit 1973/74 48 100 124 69 61 33 25 61 79 147 82
(excl. citrus) 1979/80 53 97 128 50 60 32 22 48 79 163 83
Wine 1973/74 60 98 118 0 10 O 0 0 99 na na
1979/80 45 104 137 0 3 O 0 0 105 na na
Skim Milk 1973 183 157 I 60 195 186 753 172 137 0 143
Powder 1980 223 116 0 68 226 191 1270 99 115 0 115
Butte~c) 1973 114 117 65 548 106 19 203 325 1Ol 83 98
1980 130 119 69 313 99 47 299 221 119 70 119
Cheese 1973 87 115 82 243 47 61 600 258 " 102 100 1031980 93 115 79 229 40 70 604 421 105 92 105
Beefand 1973 90 111 53 115 90 70 555 268 91 .71 96
Veal 1980 106 112 62 143 107 78 578 356 100 50 98
Pigmeat 1973 87 87 75 209 174 65 151 447 101 94 1001980 87 84 74 234 159 63 133 368 101 87 100
Veg. Oils 1973 96 63 80 13~ 66 33 15 138 77 na na
and Fa~ 1980 116 65 70 122 89 50 14 95 82 na na
(a) 3 year averages; (b) ext:inding rice; (c) including butter-oil.
So~te: The Agrindtural S~uatmn/n the ~y 19~2 Report, European Commmion, Brtmel~
mechanisms whereby the development of production is geared
to the needs of the internal and external markets. Of the
FEOGA costs which have shown rapid increases over the years
those for milk, beef and processed fruit and vegetables represent
rises in expenditure which can no longer be kept under control
as the rules stand at present. For wine the trend is for output to
rise while consumption continues to fall Similarly for cereals
and sugar, if annual variations are averaged the trend has been
for Community production to increase rather faster than
consumption.
The difficulty with regard to the milk surpluses stems from the
fact that there is no internal or external market where disposal is
possible at a reasonable price, and the scope for increasing food
aid is limited. To get rid of stocks it has proved necessary to grant
very high export refunds or subsidies for internal disposal. These
refunds were up to 70 per cent of producer prices in 1980 but
were reduced substantially in 1981 and 1982 as a result of an
increase in world prices. There was a good deal of stockpiling,
however, in 1982 and these stocks will have to be unloaded in
1983 at a very high budgetary cost.19 The position at the end of
1983 is projected to be even worse than this. In a recent
interview with M. Dempsey of the Irish Farmers’ Journal ( 16July,
1983) Commissioner Dalsager is reported as saying that by the
end of the current marketing year the EEC will have a carry-
over of 11 million tonnes of wheat against 6 million tonnes in
1982. There are nearly 3 million tonnes of sugar while total
stocks of butter now stands at 568,000 tonnes and are still rising.
The record for butter stocks was 599,000 tonnes in September
1979. The composition of FEOGA Guarantee section payments
for different products in 1981, given in Table 5.2, shows that 30
per cent of total payments went for the disposal ofmilk products,
17.5 per cent for cereals, 7 per cent for sugar, 13 per cent for beef
and veal, 5.7 percent for fruit and vegetables and 9 percent for
oils and fats. Figures from the EEC Commission for 1979 show
that the proportions in that year for milk were 43 percent and
l’~Thls cost has been allowed for in thc 1983/84 budgeL
for cereals 15 per cent with beef and veal at 12 per cent.
The trend in total Guarantee section expenditure and in that
of some of the main products since 1975 is given in Table 5.3.
This table shows that total expenditure for 1981 was down
slightly on that for 1980 although it included appropriations
required to cover the accession of Greece and the operation --
for the first time for a full year -- ofthe new sheepmeat policy.
Actually the share of gross Guarantee expenditure in the total
budget came down from 72 per cent in 1979 to 63 percent in
[981 (Table 5.5). Expenditure on milk disposal declined from
’1".8 million ECUs in 1980 to 3.3 million ECUs in 1981 but is
estimated to have risen to 4.2 million ECUs in 1982 when total
Guarantee appropriations were 13.7 million ECUs compared
with 11.1 million in 1981 (Table 5.3).
Because of the rise in the costs of surplus disposal in 1982 and
1983 the Commission, under pressure from the UK and
Germany, continues to issue dire warnings about high price
levels and their e[fi:ct on production. It also says, however, that
while prices fixed by the Community are generally higher than
world prices they are not necessarily higher than prices in other
major markets such as USA or Japan (Com. (81)608). The facts
in this regard ate that in 1981 the producer price for milk in New
Zealand was 55 per cent lower than in the Community and in
Australia 15 per cent lower. In the USA it was 15 per cent
higher, in Canada 18 per cent and in Switzerland 55 per cent
higher. For beef, producer prices were much lower in Australia
and Argentina than in the Community but they were only
slightly lower in the USA and the), were more than twice as high
in Japan. For wheat in 1980/81 the price was 30 percent higher
in the Community than in USA and 27 per cent higher than in
Canada. The price of maize was 34 per cent higher in the
Community than in the USA in that year also. j-
So-called world prices are, ofcourse, much lower than those
quoted above but world prices relate only to limited, often
marginal, quantities, and it would be .wrong to think that
European consumers could be supplied for long at low stable
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Table 5.2: FEOGA guarantee expenditure by sector 1981 (Million ECUs.)*
Intervention Total
Expoa approp,intlons
Product refwads Storage Other Total Amount %
Cereals and Rice 1,223.5 407.9 311.7 719.6 1,943.0 17.5
Milk and milk products 1,886.3 298.1 1,158.3 1,456.4 3,342.7 30.0
Oils and fats 8.4 -- -- l,O 17.0 1,025.4 9.2
Sugar 409.2 344.3 14.0 358.3 767.5 6.9
Beef and veal 825.2 393.1 218.6 611.7 1,436.9 12.9
Sheepmeat -- -- -- 191.5 191.5 1.7
Pigmeat 132.6 -- -- 22.0 154.6 1.4
Eggs and poultry 83.9 -- -- -- 83.9 0.7
Fruit and vegetables 42.8 -- -- 598.3 64 I. 1 5.7
Wine 25.8 85.7 347.9 433.6 459.4 4.1
Tobacco 5.8 --
-- 356.0 361.8 3.2
Fisheries .... 28.0 0.3
Other -- -- -- 184.5 184.5 1.7
Refunds for processed
. products " -- -- -- -- 282.4 2.5
Total agricultural
expenditure 4,643.5 1,529. I 2,050.5 5,948.9 10,902.8 97.8
MCAs .... 238.4 2.2
Total expenditure FEOGA
Guarantee Section .... 11,141.2 100
¯ 1 £CU -- IR~tD.Sg.
Source: I lth Financial Report on EAGGF (i.e., FE.OGA) for the year 1981 Corn (82) 439.
Table 5.31 FEOGA guarantee section expenditure
(’000 million ECUs)
1975 4.5 3.9 0.35 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.2
1976 5.6 4.4 0.35 2.3 0.6 0.7 0.1
1977 6.8 4.7 0.33 2.9 0.5 0.6 0.3
1978 8.7 6.4 0,41 4.0 0.6 I.I 0.5
1979 10.4 8.3 0.47 4.5 0.7 1.6 0.5
1980 11.3 9.5 0.47 4.8 1.4 1.7 0,1
1981 11.1 9.2 0.43* 3.3 1.4 1.9 0.3
19823 13.7 II.0 0,454 4,2 1.4 2.2 0.4
~Grma expenditure minus leviea including sugar It-vy.
tGrms expenditure minus production levies and storage levies.
Jlncluding Greece (appropriations).
*(Provisiofml).
Source: Green Europe 1982 European Commission, Brussels.
world prices. Hence, even though the Community is being
pressurised both from within and without to bring its prices into
line with those on the world market it cannot do this. On the
other ’hand, since world prices influence the level of export
restitutions they have an important effect on budgetary costs.
The export market is the only outlet available for additional
production over and above internal consumption and such
ptToduction will, therefore, realise no more than world prices.
However, world markets are now in a difficult state because of
the expansion of production and stocks in several important
exporting countries (e.g., USA, New Zealand, Australia) and
the slow economic growth worldwide. The Commission says
(Green Europe Newsletter Dec. 1982) that the situation serves to
underline the fact that, as Europe’s exports of agricultural
products develop in the long term, the Community needs to
ensure that its agricultural prices are brought more into line
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with those received by producers in competingcountries, or that
its agricultural producers participate more in the cost ofexports.
It serves also to emphasise the danger, of which the Commission
has given repeated warnings, of maintaining guaranteed prices
or subsidies for unlimited quantities of production not
necessarily geared to the needs of the market.
The Commission goes on to say (ibid, p. 3) that
the exceptionally high volume of production in 1982 is only the
continuation of long term trends¯ It poses even more acutely the
challenge which the Community has faced for a number of years
in the agricultural sector;, that is to re-orient the market
organisations in such a way as to bring supply and demand into
Ixtter balance and to ensure the most efficient use of the
Community’s economic and financial resources.
For these reasons the Commission pressed for, and obtained,
very moderate price increases in 1983/84; in other words, there
has been a return to the prudent price polik:ies which operated in
1979 and 1980.
~come Equity
The third of the criticisms (listed on page 91 ) which may be
directed at the CAP concerns the way in which the policies,
based as they are on price guarantees, or product subsidies work
to the advantage of the largest producers on the better soils who
already have the most favourable production structures. In a
Europe facing a long slow-down in its economic growth, voices
are being raised in protest against public money being used, for
the most part, to support the incomes of the richest farmers.
With regard to regional equity, it is claimed that the CAP has
been of greater assistance to the regions which were already rich
than it has to the least favoured areas of the Community. There
are large differences in income and productivity between the
agricultural regions of the Community; but worse still, in spite of
some closing of the gap in certain regions in Ireland and
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Northern haly, these differences have increased during tile
1970s. The richer Community regions, on account of the type of
their production (cereals, milk and sugar) receive more
substantial support than the less favoured regions which are
largely in the Mediterranean area. Special consideration must
be given to the latter area now that the Community has taken in
Greece and is about to take in Spain and Portugal.
The question of equity between fatal and non-farm families
must also be considered. Because food is a basic necessity, low
income households devote a larger part of their expenditure to it
than do high income households. Therefore, when food prices.
are kept high, proportionally more income is transferred to
farmers fi’om the poor than from the rich consumers.
Disruption of World Trade
The CAP was formulated as an internal policy and to
consider its repercussions on the rest of the world was not within
the founders’ terms of reference. Despite this, the world situation
cannot be ignored. Like other trading countries the Community
has an interest in avoiding disruption of the international
trading system. If it causes too much disruption in agricultural
trade, countervailing forces can be mounted against it on both
the agricultural and non-agricultural fronts. However, despite
the best of intentions, the sheer size of the Community’s trade
with the rest of the world inevitably implies that the CAP,
because of its system of price supports, is disruptive of world
trade. The Community is the world’s largest importer and the
second largest exporter (after the United States) ofagricu[tural
products. The high common prices established by the CAP tend
to expand production thus reducing demand from the rest of the
world. Export refunds enable the Community to sell on the
world market at low prices thereby reducing world prices.
Moreover, the variable nature of the import levy increases the
instability of world prices. Ad valorem or specific tariffs allow
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domestic prices to vary with world prices and the resulting
variations in domestic supply and demand absorb part of the
disturbances in the world market. Even a fixed import quota
allows this to happen. The variable levy permits none of these
effects. The purpose of the levy is to ensure that prices ofgoods
imported into the Community remain constant; any change in
world prices is counter-balanced by a change in the levy so that
internal prices are unchanged. Hence, the variable levy is
unique in blocking the transmission of disturbances from the
world market, allowing the latter no buffering agent, and ampli-
fying the problems there (Grant 1981).
The export refund system has created most of the opposition
to the CAP outside the Community. Australia and New
Zealand, in particular, complain of increased competition from
subsidised exports of meat to Eastern Europe, North Africa and
the Middle and Far East. Australia is also concerned about
exports of cereals and sugar. Some of these apprehensions have
also been echoed by the USA, Argentina and Brazil. There is,
thus, sustained pressure within the GATT for a modification of
the Community’s export subsidies while the Reagan Adminis-
tration has informed the EEC that the US will pursue an aggres-
sive free market policy. Other countries are adopting similar
tactics and indeed threatening countervailing action in many
areas. In these circumstances the Community may be forced to
modify the CAP in such a way as to cause the minimum disturb-
ance to non-EEC trade, in particular to reduce subsidised
exports through production quotas and to increase agricultural
imports.
Ambiguities Regarding Imports of Substitute Products
Closely allied to the question of subsidised exports is the
question of Community preference and the way in which it is
allegedly being eroded by duty free or concessionary imports.
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Community preference means that a member state should
import a product from another member state rather than from a
third country. This policy is operated.through the variable
import levy system which ensures thatprices for goods produced
in the Community are lower than those for sirnilar goods
imported from outside the EEC.
Not all agricultural products, however, are protected in this
way and it is often argued that surpluses and budgetary costs
could be reduced if greater preference were given to EEC
farmers instead of diluting that preference in various ways as is
happening now. Farm products which can be imported with
concessionary’ or zero [cries are:
(I) CAP products oz" ones v,,hich compete directly with CAP
products such as butter and lamb from New Zealand,
sugar from under-developed countries, beef from a
number of countries including USA and Yugoslavia,
maize gluten feed and soya beans.
(2) Products not covered by tile CAP but which are substitutes
for CAP products -- the best examples of these are
vegetable oils and fats wl~ich compete with butter and have
caused a steep decline in butter consuml~tion in recent
years.
(3) Imports ofcereal substitutes which are converted to animal
feeds v,,ithin the Community. These substitutes, the best
example of which is manioc from Thailand, have
increasingly displaced botl] imported cereals (maize) and
cereals produced in the Community (common wheat and
barley) and have caused switching fi’om traditional types
of fodder to these lower cost feeds, thereby increasing
animal products ah’eady in surplus, particularly milk. In
The Netherlands the cereal content of animal feed
compounds is nov,, 20 percent or less compared with 70 per
cent in pre-EEC days.
Imports to the EEC of products with concessionary or zero
tariffs and levies in 1981/82 are given in Table 5.4. The table
shows that concessional3’ imports of cereal substitutes in that
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year were about 29 million tonnes. These compare with home
production of cereals in the Community in that year of about
122 million tonnes and cereal exports of lq million tonnes on
which export refunds were paid. Concessionary imports of
butter and cheese were I 12,000 and 102,000 tonnes, respectively
compared with respective exports of these products of 600,000
and 332,000 tounes. Imports of sugar were 1,3 million tonnes,
and fats and oils, 4.5 million. Imports of beef and lamb
combined were 724,000 tonnes compared with beef exports of
about 500,000 tonnes.
Table 5.4: Imports to the EEC in 1981/82 of products with
concessionary or zero levies
Cereal Quantity Other Quantity
substitutd°t (000) tonnes prod~ts(b; (000) tonnes
Soya bean 10,460 Butter(c) l l2
Soya bean meal 8,000 Cheese(c) 102
Maize gluten 3,000 Sugar 1,300
Maize gevmcake 970 Vegetable fats
and oils 4,500
Manioc 6,500 Beef and Veal 400
Other 235 Lamb 324
Total 29,165 Total 6,738
(a) Mainly duty free except for 6 per cent customs duty on manioc (all 1981/82 data).
(b) Reduced customs duties and levies payable on these dependiag on source.
(¢) 1981 figures.
Source ofda~: Department orAgficulture and CBF.
The import of low duty feeds poses very complex problems for
the EEC. The policy is favoured by some farmers and opposed
by others. Manioc, in particular, has provided very cheap feed
for livestock in The Netherlands and West Germany, where it
can be transhipped easily from the deep sea ports at Rotterdam
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and Hamburg. It is claimed that average milk yields and hence
milk surpluses have increased substantially as a resuh of this
cheap feed policy. Farmers in grain growing countries both
within and outside the Clommunity are opposed to such a policy
as it makes it very dlJfieult to obtain good markets for gK,’ain. It
also carries implications for the budget, on the revenue side,
because imported substitutes mean lost receipts from the
variable levy oll imported cereals, and on the expenditure side,
because of the cost of disposing of cereals procluced in the
Community that are replaced by imported substitutes. These
losses are variously estimated at, around, I billion ECUs per
annum.
Another argument used against these imports is that
proximity to the deep sea ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg
gives farmers in The Netherlands and West Germany cheaper
access to imported substitutes d~an other countries have and
thus much lower production costs.
The response of the Dutch and German fanllei’s is that:
(1) intensive methods enable low-cost production which is an
objective of the CAP;
(2) cheap compound feed, particularly in The Netherlands,
reflects, not tile proximity to Rotterdam, but the compe-
tence of Dutch compound feed manufacturers and
(3) to change tile treatment of these imports would be to upset
existing trade and have cotlntervailing powers applied
against EEC industrial exports.
The Commission in its document "Reflections on the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy" ([980), says that any change in the
CAP which substantially disturbed existing trade flows would
seriously upset tile balance which has existed between the EEC
and third countries since the inauguration of the CAP. The EEC
cannot expect to have an export market for its industrial goods,
or to take advantage of tile fi’ee movement of capilal and ser-
vices, and at the same time refuse to provide an inslrument for
some movement in agricuhural produce between the EEC and
third countries. However, in the same docunlent the Commis-
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sion indicated that it would be proposing measures that would
arrest the excessive rise in imports of these substitutes and added
that it is unjustifiable to criticise the operation of the CAP while
leaving the door completely open to competing products for
political and other reasons (ibid, p. 23).
The EEC Budget
As stated in Chapter" 2, the Community modified its financial
system in 1979 and its budget income now comes from three
sources, namely:
(1) co-responsibility levies, levies on sugar production in
excess of quota and levies from imports under the CAP, 90
per cent of which go to the Community, 10 percent being
retained by member states for administrative costs;
(2) receipts from the common external tariff on imports of
non-CAP goods fi’om non-member states, 90 per cent of
which are also transmitted to the Community;
(3) a contribution from each member state not exceeding one
per cent of an imputed VAT payment worked out on a
common basis.
The last item is not handed out automatically. The
Community gets only what it needs to balance its books. In 1979
the Community used 79 percent of its possible VAT income. In
1980 it used 73 per cent because customs duties increased
exceptionally. In 1981 it was expected to use up 95 per cent but
this eventually worked out at 79 per cent because of an increase
in world prices resulting in a reduction in export refimds. The
estimate was for 92.5 per cent in 1982 (including Greece) and
the upper limit reached in 1983. The Community must now find
other income sources or curtail spending; drastic measures are
being threatened.
The proportions of the total EEC budget obtained from
different sources and spent on different items in the years 1977 to
1981 are given in Table 5.5. This table shows that in 1977 almost
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half the budget receipts came from customs duties and tarifl~ but
by 1981 this proportion had been reduced to little o:.,er one-third
as a result of substantial increases in the VATcontribution. The
latter payment made up about 54 per cent of tile budget in 198 I.
In that year import and co-responsibility levies accounted for
7. I per cent and tile sugar levy for" 2.5 percent. As regards actual
size, the budget is in fact very small when compared with
Community GDP or with the size of the budgets in the member
states. It is only about 0.5 per cent of the former and less than 3
per cent of the sum of all Community budgets.
On the expenditure side, Table 5.5 shows that Guarantee
section payments as a percentage of the total budget varied
between 70 and 74 percent between 1977 and 1980 but declined
to 63 per cent in 1981. In that year there was a substantial
increase in expenditure on regional policy and further increases
are planned. Whether these increases can be achieved is,
however, another matter.
It should be kept in mind that the CAP cost, as usually
calculated, does not take into account the fact that some of the
revenue for the budget is generated within tile policy (i.e.,
variable import and sugar levies) so that net expenditure on the
CAP is less than gross expenditure. The EEC financial report for
1979 shows that whereas gross payments fi’om the guarantee
fund were 0.6 per cent of Community GDP, net payments after
deduction of agricultural levies were only 0.48 per cent, i.e., 8.3
as against 10.4 million ECUs.
The distribution ofcontributions and receipts to the budget in
1980 by the different member states is given in Table 5.6. The
largest contributors in 1980 were West Gel’many (29.6%), UK
(20.8%), France (19.2%) and haly (12.6%). h’eland (0.9%) is the
smallest contributor except for Luxembourg. Looking at the
receipts side, we see that France (23.1%) was the largest
beneficiary, followed by West Germany (20.1%), Italy (17.9%),
Belgium (14.6%), UK (12.’1-%) and The Netherlands (11.4%).
Despite its very small contribution, Ireland received 5.7 percent
of the budgetary payments in [980.
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Table 5.5: EEC Budgetary Receipts and Expenditures 1977-1981
Amount~ latoportions
1977 1970
197~- 1980
1981 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Receipts Million ECUs Pe~ Cent
Sugar levies 232 377 460 505 464 2.4 3.0 3.2 3. I 2.5
Agricuhural imlxJrts &
Co-responsibilit y levies 1,32x3 1.686 1,70fi 1,920 1,310 13.9 13.6 11.8 9.4 7.1
Cmtoms duties and ta rilE~ 4,734 4,833 5,045 6.000 6,366 49.4 39.1 34.9 37.1 34.5
Fi~mncial contribmions 3,149 5.331 7.0dO 7,296 9,888 32.9 43.1 48.7 44.8 53.6
Other receipts 140 136 196 901 407 1.5 I,I 1.4 9.6 2.2
"lotal I~ecelpt~ 9..r~5 12.363 14.447 16.182 18.435 100.0 1~.0 100.O 100.O 100.O
PLtpenditure
FE~;A Guaramcc Secdon 7,1028,69fi 10.402 11,486 11.380
(of which ~.ICAs ~.d ACA~)(,~a) (I.023) (770) (277) (1~)
FEOGA Guidance Scclion 194 436 363 392 585
Social policy 190 359 557 769 725
Regio0al policy 400 529 69’3 723 1,947
Research: energy, induslvy.
transl~rt 9-34 294 293 379 320
I~’¢lopmetu Co-opemtlon 270 381 495 642 796
Admini~lmtlon 561 777 864 939 1.038
Repayments to n~mizcr
stated’) 630 690 767 848 969
OIher (Rcxcr~.~s, Exchang~
Rate Payments) 4 5 5 3 474
74.1 70.3 72.0 71.0 62.8
(ha) (8.2) (9.3) 0.7) (I.O)
2.0 3.5 2.5 2.4 3.2
2.0 4.5 3.9 4.8 3.9
4.2 4.2 4.8 4.5 10.6
2.4 2.4 2.0 2.3 1.7
2.8 3.1 3.4 4.0 4.3
5.9 6.3 6,0 5.8 5.6
6.6 3.6     9.3     9.2     5.3
0.O     0.0     O.O     0.0     2.6
’1~ K~Miture 9.~5 12,~3 14,447 16.182 18,434 l~.O 1~.0 I~,0 l~.O 1~.0
VAT pakl as ,% of upper
VAT limit 78.9 73.2 78.7
,~r.t: Off.fiat ,7aurtmt of tD F.a, olvas Comm~itltJ. ~arkmt issue~
(a) Rcimbut sentent of "Own Resoutrcs" collectlon costs tttgl ex~:entlilttrc on Commuaity Off’tees in re.ember states. Special payments to UK
ltt~e netted out.
Table 5.6: Contributions to and receipts from the EEC budget 1980(a) before adjustment for UK rebate
Contributions to the Receipts from the
EEC budget EEC budget .A’et
Member budgetary
State Amount Per cent Amount Per cent receipts
million ECUs % million ECUs % million ECUs
West Germany 4,523.0 29.6 2,940.2 20. I - 1,582.8
France 2,926.3 19.2 3,372.’1. 23. I +446.1
haly 1,929.3 12.6 2,610.5 17.9 +681.2
The Netherlands 1,272.6 8.3 1,667.1 I I A +394.5
Belgium 938.5 6.2 677.2 14-.6 -261.3
Luxembourg 19.6 0.1 14.5 0.1 -5.1
United Kingdom 3,167.8 20.8 1,803.2 12.4 -1,364.6
Ireland 139.3 0.9 826.5 5.7 +687.2
Denmark 3’t-6.2 2.3 680. I 4.7 +333.9
Total EEC 9 15,262.6 100.0 14,591.7 100.0 +670.9(b)
(a) The figllres for Ireland in this table differ from those in Table 4.1 in so far as they include total EEC payments and receipts and not just
proportions attributable to the CAP.
(b) Amount not paid to member states, e.g., Administration and Overseas.
Source: Court of Auditors Annual Report, Off~ial JournM of the European Communities, Series C. 31/12/’81.
When the contributions to and receipts from the budget are
balanced against one another, the last column of Table 5.6
shows that West Germany (-1,583 million) UK (-1,365
million), Belgium (-261 million) and Luxembourg (-.5.1
million) were the net contributors, all the other countries being
net receivers with Ireland and Italy being the largest in that
year.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the budgetary
contributions tend to be misleading when viewed on their own,
nevertheless, they give a good idea of the nature of the problem
and oftbe countries from which pressure for change is likely to
come. Naturally the UK and West Germany are in the forefront
of the reformers, spokesmen from these countries being
particularly vocal, not only because of the budgetary costs but
also because of the high food prices. One of the main criticisms
advanced by UK commentators is that revenue is being raised
from countries with below average income levels (the UK in
particular) to finance more affluent countries like The
Netherlands and France. The domination of agricultural
spending is seen to be behind this imbalance.
As a result of the perceived inequity in the net national
contributions the UK has argued for, and received, a number of
annual rebates since 1980 to reduce its budgetary burden. The
amounts involved were 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 billion ECUs in the
three years 1980-1982, respectively, on the assumption that the
causes of the imbalance would be removed by 1983. Since the
required reform of the CAP has not yet taken place, and the
perceived imbalances have not been removed, the payment to
the UK has been continued in 1983. The refund in that year,
however, has been reduced to about 750 million ECUs (~450
m). The rebates have altered significantly the balance between
the net contribution and beneficiaries as the orders of magni-
tudes in Table 5.7 show when compared with those in Table 5.6.
In order to put the budget criticisms in perspective, it is
necessary to say that if the truth were told, it is not the actual
magnitude oftbe EEC budget which is at issue, but rather the
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distribution ofpayments and receipts as between member states,
and the pattern of expenditure. The UK would probably not
mind spending what it sends to Brussels on its own far’reefs but it
is not enamoured with the idea ofseeing this money go to Irish,
French and Dutch farmers. Also if it had a free hand in such
spending it would probably use the money, not to raise the price
of food, but rather to keep prices down, as in pre-EEC years.
Table 5.7: JVet EEC budgetary receipts in 1980 and 1981 after
adiustment for Utf rebates
Million £ Sterling
(ForecasO
1980 1981
West Germany - 1,177
- 1,260
UK*
-203 -56
France +41 +102
Belgium + 115 + 187
Luxembourg + 135 + 164
Denmark + 174 + 157
The Netherlands +215 +81
Italy +329 +215
Ireland +372 +340
Sourca" The Economist Nov. 7 1981 p. 76 giving its source as the European Commission.
"Includes refund of~t693 m in 1980 and/~’830 m in 1981.
The EEC Commission (1980) while admitting that
expenditure on the CAP is very high in relation to other
spending states (p. 11):
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that this is so because the CAP is almost the only policy which is
really common with financial solidarity, ff the Common
Agricultural Policy occupies such an eminent place in the
budget, this is merely because the Community has lacked the
courage to introduce and pay for other common policies. Neither
the share taken hy agricuhure nor the lack ofown resources has
ever been the true reason Ibr holding back other policies.
Indeed in a more recent document (Corn (81) 300) the Com-
mission states that there can be no development of Community
activities as long as the budget remains artificially limited by the
current ceiling on its resources. It says that it will take the neces-
sary steps to overcome this constraint even though this means
the passing of separate resolutions on the VAT contribution in
the parliaments of every member state. The total cost of the
CAP, which corresponds to 0.5 pet" cent ofCommtmity GDP, is
not excessive. Re-nationalisation would cost member states
more. Every country needs an agricultural policy and it is worth
remembering that the policies pursued by the Community’s
main competitors are just as costly. USA commentators might
note this.
Finally, on the budget question, the Commission (1980)says
that what is being assailed by the critics is not so much the total
expenditure of 1 I billion ECUs by the FEOGA Guarantee sec-
tion, as the expenditure of 4.5 billion ECUs on milk products for
which the market outlook is unlikely to improve in the near
future, and the fact that the richer a fat’mer is, the more he gains
from the CAP. Similarly for the agricuhural regions. The
regions with the highest agricultural incomes are those which
incur the most expenditure. It is wrong to assess the CAP solely
in terms of budgetar3, implications. The Common Agricultural
Policy has assumed responsibility, by substitution, for expendi-
ture formerly borne by governments and there is, in fact, no
evidence that this has led to an increase in expenditure -- if
anything there has been a decrease in member states’ total
transfers of public funds to agricuhure.
Thus, the solutions to be found to the problems of the CAP
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must attempt to reconcile various constraints, whilst safe-
guarding the beneficial effects of this policy. One thing,
however, is fairly cleat’, a decrease in agricuhural expenditure is
unlikely to solve the Community’s budgetary problems.
Community Enlargement: Financial Aspects
The EEC Commission estimated the net financial
implications of the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, by
examining the effect on the budget, had these countries been
EEC members in 1978 (Bulletin ofthe EEC, Supplement 3/78).
In presenting the figures it stressed that as a result of the
difficulties of analysis and the lack of precise statistics the
exercise was surrounded by many uncertainties. Hence, the
conclusions arrived at should be treated with extreme caution.
Budget expenditures and receipts for 1978 are given in Table
5.8 on the a’ssumption that the three applicant countries were
full members in that year and that they had adopted all the
existing Community legislation. The upper section of this table
shows that under 1978 conditions (which are not typical) acces-
sion of the three applicant members would increase budgetary
expenditure fi’om about 12.4 hillion ECUs in the existing nine
states to 15.0 billion in the enlarged 12. Budgetary expenditure
of 2.6 billion ECUs would therefore be incurred on the three
new members. The lower section of the table shows that the
contribution of these members to the budget would be about 1.7
billion ECUs leaving an extra cost to the existing members’of
about 0.9 billion ECUs.
These figures do not take account of ACAs or MCAs and in
view of their nature cannot incorporate the potential dynamic
effects of the application of Community policies to the three
countries. The figures in Table 5.8 represent a static situation at
the start of the enlargement process and are, therefore
, 
likely to
be minima. Indeed, because of the structural situation obtaining
in the applicant countries, considerable sums of m.oney will have
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to be made available to them, thus reducing the amounts which
can be devoted to agricultural price supports throughout the
Community or, alternatively, increasing present contributions
so as to maintain present real support levels. Either alternative
poses serious problems for existing members and most would
wish that further enlargement be postposed for as long as pos-
sible -- at least until the present recession has ended.
Table 5.8 Estimated budgetary expenditure and receipts for an enlarged Community as
at 1978° conditions and prices
"l-brae
hem EEC 9 Gree~¢ Spain Portugal applitsntJ EEC 12
Expenditure Million ECt]
FEOGA Guarantee 8,666 4(X} 600 lEE I,IEE 9,800
FEOGA Guidance 470 100 225 75 400 870
Social fund 570 40 100 110 250 820
Regional fund 580 105 190 125 420 1,000
I0~ refund 690 2.5 65 10 I00 790
Ot her5 1,382 50 200 50 300 I ,f~t0
Total expenditure 12,358 720 1,380 490 2,600 15,000
Retelpts
Customs duties 4,833 110 370 40 520 5.350
Sugar levie~ 2,063 1 I0 300 90 500 2,560
VAT
1978 levy (0.64%) 5,330 109 392 70 570 5.900
EEC 12 rate (0,77%) 1,020 22 78 I,t 114 1,134
Other revenue 136 .... 136
Total re~ 13,382 351 1,140 214 1,704 15,000
eMCAI nnd ACA~ a~ excluded.
.e~tt~: Enhtrgcment of the Community, Eco~omlc and S*¢~toral Aspects. lkalltt£n oftht European C, ommzmitltz
Suppb~t~ 3/78.
Despite the economic problems, however, there are political
considerations to be taken into account in relation to enlarge-
ment. When the three new countries asked to be admitted to the
Community they were making a commitment which is prim-
arily a political one. Their choice constituted an act of faith in a
united Europe. The three countries have, therefore, entrusted
the Community with a political responsibility which it (the
Community) cannot refuse, except at the price of denying the
principles on which it is itself grounded. These principles are
112
enshrined in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, where the
founders of the Community "being resolved to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty [called] upon the other peoples of
Europe who share their ideals to join in their efforts". The
Heads of present EEC states re~zently solemnly proclaimed their
faith in this ideal which requires the Community to give a
positive answer to the applicant countries (Bulletin of the European
Communities Supplement, 1/78). It will be difficult, therefore, to
escape from this commitment, but, of co’urse, the negotiations
can be drawn out as was done in the case of the first enlarge-
ment. Taking everything into consideration this may be the best
course. The present situation is very difficult. The problem of
unemployment has become very serious for all: the international
monetary system is in turmoil, protectionist tendencies are
growing sharper and divergencies within the Community are a
cause of major concern.
The applicant countries will bring with them considerable
regional problems and also produce pressure on the labour
market, a situation which in the past has resulted in emigration
to the Community. Such emigration, which during a period of
full employment, facilitated growth in the Community, could
now perhaps be regarded as unwelcome. In view of this range of
difficulties, enlargement will place a serious handicap on the
Community’s momentum. On the other hand, the admission of
the two new members will bring the budgetary situation to a
head so that it will have to be solved definitely in one way or
another. Perhaps it is the [ever required to bring about enlarged
contributions from the member states and resolve the question
of the UK rebate.
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Chapter 6
Suggested Solutions to the Problems of the CAP
The problems associated with the CAP have been discussed in
some detail in the previous chapter. Taking into account these
problems the adjustments to be made to the Policy (according to
the Commission (Corn (80) 800)) must reconcile three main
objectives.
1. To maintain all positive aspects of the CAP and in partic-
ular its three main principles of
(a) unity of the market through common prices
(b) Community preference, mainly through variable levies
and
(c) financial solidarity through common FEOGA funds
2. To set up mechanisms whereby the financial consequences
of production surpluses may be held in check.
3. To concentrate financial resources on the least favoured
farms and regions.
Various suggestions have been put forward by academics and
administrators for dealing with these problems. The more
important of these are discussed in turn and their pros and cons
outlined. Finally.we discuss the proposals from the Irish point of
view and suggest the options which we think would best suit this
country.
Possible Changes in CAP
In view of the various criticisms which the CAP has
weathered since its formation there are many who feel that it
will continue to stagger from crisis to crisis in its present form
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with only minor changes being made. Furthermore, some
commentators (Josling et aL, 1981 ) feel that the 1 per cent VAT
levy will be raised if, and when, it is needed to do so. However,
three key member states, the UK, Gen’nany and France, have
stated that they will not raise the \/AT levy unless changes are
made. Unfortunately, all of these countries want different
changes and so it will be most difficult to get agreement. Let us
consider some of the suggestions which have been put forward
for reform.
Income Supports
Among the more radical proposals put forward byacademics
in a number of countries is an income support programme
financed wholly, or partially, by national governments and
running in parallel with low Community prices. Such a
proposal was not taken very seriously by the EEC Commission
up to quite recently and indeedJoslingetal., (1981)say that "ifit
does gain support it will be because the Community
mechanisms for reaching agreement have broken down. The
threat of a return to national policies is an ever-present spur to
the reaching of compromise positions". Be this as it may,
however, a decision by the French Government to provide over
5000m frs to support French farmers’ incomes in 1982 has
aroused concern in the Commission and in other member states
(Green Europe, 191, 1982).
There are fears that the income supplements which French
farmers will receive may distort competition. Also, the scale of
the assistance is causing farmers’ unions in the other member
states to cast a watchful eye at developments in France in the
hope of claiming similar treatment for their own farmers.
There have been calls for the Community institutions to
intervene but it is difficult to take any action. There are, after
all, many ways in which member states can give a helping hand
to their farmers and it would be quite wrong to think that eveR,
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measure of this kind is prohibited. Indeed, the Commission
estimates conservatively that total national expenditure by the
member states is already about double Community spending on
agriculture (ibid., p. 1). A considerable portion of this national
expenditure goes on implementing Community structural
directives under which both the Community and member states
make financial contributions. But by far the greatest share is
spend on social security for the farm population although there
are variations between countries in the scale of such expenditure
and the form which it takes. This type ofspending is hardly ever
criticised ahhough there is no doubt that it too can distort
competition. The acceptability of social security spending as
against income support is probably due to the fact that the
former is given mainly on the basis ofneed to people who cannot
attain acceptable income levels from their farms.
From the Irish viewpoint, income supplements and input
subsidies from either national or EEC sources must be
approached with great caution and must only be allowed for
very grave reasons. National payments of this kind provide an
excuse for low agricultural prices and are the thin end of the
wedge towards a return to national policies. France, which has
always been a strong CAP supporter should, therefore, be very,
careful about the introduction of such aid. It is a dangerous
precedent which could lead to the complete erosion of the CAP.
Income supplements and input subsidies paid by the EEC
would also be dangerous. They would have to come out of the
budget, would therefore be visible and of necessity would be
very small when spread over all farms, nevertheless, they would
create excuses for low prices and ultimately for national policies.
Two-tier Financing
An alternative system which has been suggested is two-tier
financing or the "price cocktail". Under this system the EEC
would bear responsibility for common prices whose
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development would be carefully controlled so as to keep within
the 1 per cent \/AT limit. Additional support, ifdesired, could
be covered by the national budget of each member state.
The Commisssion is its 1980 document (Com (80) 800) (op.
cit., p. 15) put forward numerous objections to this policy. It
says:
1. It would herald the end of free movement of agricultural
products, because the difl’erences in the level of supports in
member states would soon give rise to corrective measures at
the frontiers.
2. Any price differentiation between member states would
soon change the competitive situation at producer level and
hence at the processing and marketing stages.
3. The difference in internal prices would give rise to
differences in rates of levy on imports from non-member
countries and make it impossihle to treat these levies as own
resources.
4. The "pseudo" solution would do nothing to remedy, the
production imbalances, because the major problem of the
Common Agricultural Policy is not so much the costs, or
their distribution among member states, as the absence of
any corrective mechanism for adapting supply to demand in
accordance with a basic principle of economic rationality.
5. Finally, as soon as Community financial solidarity was
broken, through the introduction of two-tier financing, it
would rapidly become impossible to fix any common price
at all. Can one imagine Ireland accepting very high prices
for heef if it had to bear the consequences, or France backing
high prices for cereals, and so on?
The Commission goes on to say, that a lasting Community
solution to the present problems cannot be found in breaking the
chain of free trade/the harmonisation of support systems/price
unity and financial solidarity. A price cocktail would put a stop
to one of the subjects of criticism -- the unfair distribution of
burdens and benefits -- but would leave unanswered the other
problems of the CAP.
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In view of the trenchant denunciation of two-tier financing by
the Commission it cannot be considered a viable option. There
will, of course, always be some national supplementary
financing, particularly, when fa~’m incomes in a country get out
of line with other incomes. This will probably come in the form
of headage payments or structural supports but hardly in the
form of national price supplementation. In Ireland, with its
relatively large agrictdtural sector, the scope for national
supplementary financing is limited and particularly at the
present time when there are severe budgetary constraints.
Feasible Solutions
Because the balance of interest among memberstates is so
complex, radical reform tends to be rare and policies usually
evolve gradually over the yeaz’s and this is what is likely, to
happen now.
The major alternative reforms which have been proposed are:
1. Prudent prices, i.e., reducing real prices.
2. Prudent prices with income compensation for at least some
farmers in the direct form ofsocial welfare (dole) or in the
indirect form of headage or acreage payments.
3. Prudent prices with co-responsibility levies imposed on all
production.
4. Prudent prices with quotas including the introduction of a
super-levy on quantities of individual products in excess of
quota.
5. The Commission also suggests a new approach to external
trade policy and
6. an adjustment of structural policy.
It is obvious from the above that prudent prices are the most
important instrument of the Commission in CAP reform since
they appear in most of the alternatives suggested.
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Prudent Prices
Real producer prices for the EEC as a ,,..,hole (nominal prices
deflated by a price index) were relatively stable between 1970
and 1976, but since then up to 1981, as the figures in Table 6.1
show, the), declined ever), year at an average annual rate of
about 3.0 per cent. "File decline was halted in 1982 thanks to a
relatively favourable price review in that year as a result of low
production in 1981. The 1982 situation ’,’.,as, however, unusual
due to weather and other factors in 1981 and is not likely to tze
repeated. Hence, the prudent policy has been reintroduced
again for 1983.
Table 6.1: Changes in real prices received by EEC farmers
1976-1982
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981’ 1982
West Germany +4.0 -4.8 -5.3
-2.5 -2.9 -0.3 -0.3
Fi-ance +4.5 -0.6 -5.2 -3.6
-7.0 -2.0 +0.9
Italy +4.8 +2.7 -2.8 -4.6 -6.4 -6.2 +1.4
The Netherlands +3.9 -7.8
-7.7 -2.5 -2.7 +1.5 +2.9
Belgium +7.2 -10.7 -7.8
-3.2 -3.4 +1.7 +5.8
Luxembourg -0.07 -4.3 -4.1
-2.2 -1.6 -2.3 +4.3
UK +10.4
-10.3 -10.5 -2.6 -10.5 -I.I +4.0
Ireland +6.9 +7.4 +4.5 -7.1 -17.3 -I.5
-3.5
Denmark +3.7 -5.9 -4.1
-7.2 -I.I -0.,I+3.5
Eur. 9 +5.5 -2.5 -4.4 -3.4 -6. I    - 1.6 +2.3
S¯ource: +10 agritultural situation in tht Communi6,
, 
1982 and Eurostat, CPI Monlllly Bulletins
val~ous issu~5.
Prior to the 1983/84 price review, tile Commission pressed tbr
very moderate price increases (Villian 1983) and eventually tile
following rises (in EGUs) abovc the 1982/83 levels wcrc adopted
for the main North European products: cereals 3 per cent, sugar
4 pet" cent, rape seed 4 per cent, beef 5.5 per cent, pigmeat 5.5
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per cent, sheepmeat 5.5 per cent and milk 2.33 per cent. The
overall price increase for the Community as a whole in ECUs is
estimated at 4.2 per cent but when values are given in national
currencies there is considerable variation as between countries
due to the importance of different products in their production
and to Green rate adjusmaents. The average price rise for
Ireland is 8.1 per cent whereas that for Germany is only 2 per
cent. The rise in Greece is 14 per cent but that includes the
alignment in Greek prices with common prices due to accession
arrangements. Considering the recent fall in inflation in Ireland
the agricultural price increase may almost keep pace with it in
1983. However, the outlook for future years is not very
promising in this regard. The rate of FEOGA Guarantee section
expenditure is now’increasing more rapidly than potential
"Own Resources" and it looks as if the prudent price policy will
have to be continued. And even then other supplementary
policies will have to be introduced.
lncbme Supports
To compensate somewhat for the prudent price policy, the
Commission makes certain payments to member states either by
way of cattle headage payments, payments to small producers
on crops or produce, or payments under certain structural
measures. For example, at the 1983/84 price review, the
Council agreed to extend to 30 April 1984 beef headage
payments to Ireland under the Guidance section of FEOGA.
The value of this for one year is about IR.~/ million. It also
agreed to the continuation of 120 million ECUs of income
support for small milk producers in the Community. Structural
measures and special proposals are being worked out in respect
of the Mediterranean region. As these aids do not increase food
prices they appear more acceptable than price rises to countries
like the UK and Germany, but as stated above they should be
kept small and not be allowed to erode the price support system.
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Co-responsibility
The Commission states (Com(80)800) that, in the long run,
the adjustments to be made to the market organisation must be
based on the principle, that in the present state of agrlcultm’al
technology it is neither economically sound, nor financially
feasible, to guarantee price or aid levels for unlimited quantities.
Surplus production must be disposed of at low prices to third
countries and this interferes with markets in these areas as well
as being expensive for the Community. The Commission says
that producers must be made more aware of market realities
than they have been in the past. To this end production targets
in terms of volume must be set for every sector" at Community
level. Once these are reached producers would be required to
contribute to surplus disposal or the intervention guarantee
could be reduced. This is known as the principle of co-responsi-
bility.
At the time this report was written, the Commission was of the
opinion that co-responsibility would maintain all the essential
features of the CAP except absolute open-endedness. It stated
that it should be a permanent feature and not.just for" a given
marketing year and should be varied according to product. Also
all the co-responsibility need not be paid for by producers. It
should be shared in proportions to be defined between the Com-
munity and producers, with producers presumably paying the
major portion.
The concept of producer co-responsihi[ity is not new. It has
heen part of the CAP since its initiation. The first sugar regula-
tion which came into operation in 1968 provided for a levy on
Quota B sugar, that is, production above a basic Quota A level
and below an upper ceiling at which all support ceased. The
levy was imposed on sugar manufacturers and beet producers to
recoup the cost of disposing of surplus Quota B sugar, but
recently it has been extended to Quota A sugar as well. The
current levy is 29.5 per cent of the intervention price on Quota B
sugar (18,200 tonnes iu Ireland) and 2 per cent of the inter-
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vention price on Quota A sugar (182,000 tonnes in Ireland).
Co-responsibility at the rate of 1.5 per cent of the target price
on all production was introduced for milk at the 1977/78 price
review, after abortive attempts at its introduction by the Com-
mission in the three previous years. This levy has remained in
operation since September 1977. Currently it is at the rate of 2
per cent of the target price on sales in general including liquid
milk, but reduced to 1.5 per cent on the first 60,000 kg per pro-
ducer in the disadvantaged areas. In 1979, when the EEC
budget was under considerable strain, the Commission decided
that the uniform levy on all milk was insufficient and it recom-
mended to the Council of Ministers a supplementary or super-
levy to fund the disposal of additional milk beyond a certain
basic quantity for the Community as a whole. Each farm or
creamery was to be given a quota and the super-levy at a rate of
something in the region of 50p per gallon was to be charged on
all production in excess of quota. This meant that production
over and above quota would be ahnost worthless.
The recommendation for a super-levy came before the
Council of Ministers at the 1980/81 annual price review but was
not agreed. The recommendation was that it be introduced the
following year if production in 1980 grew by more than 1.5 per
cent over the 1979 level. As things turned out world prices
increased in 1980 and 1981 and it became possible to balance
the budget without recourse to the milk super-levy. However,
the Commission emphaslsed that it would recommend the
super-levy or some other severe action if deliveries of milk in
1982 rose more than 0.5 per cent above the [981 level. Since
deliveries did, in fact, exceed this threshold in 1982, intervention
prices have been curtailed in 1983 and the Commission has pro-
posed that the super-levy be imposed in the 1983/84 budget.
There was also an agreement to introduce co-responsibility for
cereals in 1983/84 if production exceeded a certain level. The
aim here was to reduce real intervention prices and this has in
fact happened, since the nominal increase has been kept at 3 per
cent. It seems that co-responsibility has now become a basic
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feature of the CAP but up to this it has tended to be applied asa
reduction in intervention prices rather than as a levy on produc-
tion.
Though co-responsibility, no matter how applied, means in
effect a reduction in farm prices, nevertheless, when applied as a
tax on production it has advantages for the budget over a price
reduction system. Suppose producer prices are reduced by the
same amount under a price reduction and a co-responsibility
system, (i.e., the reduction in prices being equivalent to the
increase in the co-responslbility levy per unit). Producer
incomes are reduced by the same amount under both these
regimes but consumers and the budget are affected differently.
Under the co-responslbility regime, consumer prices remain at
the original high level whi~e atl of the levy goes towards surplus
disposal and hence budget relie£ Under the reduced price
system, consumers get cheaper food but there is not as much
relief for the budget as tinder the levy system, If, for example, the
levy is 5 per cent, this proportion of the value ofall production
goes towards budget relief. If, however, prices are reduced by 5
per cent the budget relief is only 5 per cent of the value of
exports, the remainder of the reduction going towards lowering
consumer food costs.
In the long run, producers are better off with uniform co-
responsibility levies than with reduced prices. With co-responsi-
bility the strain on the budget is eased, and the producer can
bargain for higher prices hoping that these can be extracted
without too much trouble fi’om a very large number of con-
sumers. With reduced prices consumers gain while the budget
continues to be under stress and demands continue for I~urther
price reductions to ease the budget. In the ultimate analysis, of
course, the decision to introduce co-responsibility or reduce
prices is a political one. Countries like the UK, with small agri-
cultural sectors, tend to favour lower food prices whereas
countries like Ireland, with relatively large agricultural sectors
and high food exports, favour high agricultural prices since a
large, proportion of the high prices arc paid by consumers in
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other countries. However, since the countries with the smallest
agricultural sectors tend to be the biggest contributors to the
EEC budget their views are most likely to prevail; hence the
movement towards the prudent price approach.
Quotas and Other Measures
Co-responsibility is only one way of controlling budgetary
expenditure. The Community’s financial responsibility might
be limited to a pre-determined maximum volume (quantum)
sold to processors or into intervention as is the case with sugar.
This is, in effect, a quota system although in the past the Com-
mission has stated that it does not favour quotas saying that they
are too difficult to administer, too inflexible and would freeze
production at the farm level (Com(80)10, p. 74). It has also
stated that the introduction of co-responsibility does not remove
the need for other specific rfieasures, in particular measures to
lessen the rigidity introduced by the intervention system and to
give more impetus to market forces. There should be more rigid
quality criteria for the admission of products to intervention,
periods when intervention is prohibited during the year and
minimum qualifying standards for the full intervention price.
Some of these criteria have already been introduced for beef, as
for example, the type of animal purchased and the time of the
year when certain beef cuts are allowed into intervention.
The Commission has stressed that the adoption of this pack-
age of measures would allow the principles of the CAP to be pre-
served and would permit the price adjustments that are indis-
pensable to the long-term safeguarding of the farmers’ incomes.
However, on matters of price adjustment, it has stated that
attention will have to be paid to the existence of positive
monetary compensatory amounts (internal prices higher than
the Community level, in, for example, West Germany, The
Netherlands and the UK), the maintenance ofwhich overa long
period leads to an increase in agricultural production.
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At the time of the introduction of the EMS, it wasagreed that
any new MCAs would be phased out over a two-year period.
This, however, has not happened (though some reduction was
obtained at the 1983/84 review) and so those countries with tbe
positive MCAs continue to pay higher prices to their farmers.
There is a definite conflict here between the support of farmers’
incomes, on the one hand, and the problem of generating
surpluses, on the other. This problenl is difficuh to resolve but
the aim should be to try and obtain a uniform policy between
member states. All MCAs should, if possible, be phased out
gradually and a common price system introduced.
External Policy
Action to improve the market organisation must also cover
exports and imports. The Community is still the largest
importer of agricultural products and has done its part in
importing from cotintries heavily dependent on their agri-
cuhural exports, even in the case of products where there have
been difficulties on the Community’s own market. The Com-
mission says that the Community will honour its obligations in
this regard, many of which have been contracted in multilateral
agreements, for the stabilisation of world agricultural markets.
At the same time, when new restraints must be imposed,
particnlarly on the volume of certain kinds of livestock produc-
tion, there must bc more vigilance over the import of duty fi’ee
feeding stuffs or similar products (see "Fable 5.’1- for imports of
cereal substitutes in 1981/82). The means of implementing this
must be geared to the rnarkets concerned and to the situation of
the supplying countries. A voluntary export restraint (VER) has
recently been negotiated with Thailand to curb EEC imports of
manioc but it will almost certainly be impossible to reach a
similar agreement about soya bean imports from the US. The
Commission favours a lowering of Community grain prices to as
to make internal feeds competitive with imports. This ,..,,ill be
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difficult to achieve even though there is a commitment to intro-
duce co-responsibility for cereals if production increases too
much: The reduction in grain prices would have to be substan-
tial and it would be resisted strongly hy Community grain
producers. There must, of course, be a balance between the
price of animal products and cereal prices but such a balance
has already been determined at the negotiating table and it will
be difficult to alter it.
Exports, which have increased rapidly in recent years, also
play an important role, both welcome and unwelcome, in the
Community’s external policy. If, however, the Community is to
remain open to the rest of the world there must be a balance
between exports and imports. If it must import agricuhura[ pro-
duce it must also have the means to conduct an export policy.
To date exporting has been done on a rather ad hoc basis.
Surpluses have been sold when the cost ofstorage became exces-
sive and there has been no co-ordinated export policy. The
Commission says that, for tile future, the CAP must be provided
with instruments similar to those enjoyed by major agricultural
exporting countries, (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)
in particular, the ability to conclude long-term agreements,
(Com(81)300). The idea of long-term agreements, though
favoured by the Commission, has little proslzect of success. In a
world of over-supply, importers will be very reluctant to enter
into such agreements. We feel, therefore, that ad hoc exporting
will have to continue.
Structural Policy
The Commission has constantly stated that socio-economic
policy is an indispensable component of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy. It is largely by means of it that the Community
can take account of the special characteristics of farming
imposed by the structural and natural disparities between the
different agricultural regions.
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The Council has recently decided to intensify structural
action in mountain, hill and less favoured areas and it has also
taken the initial steps to implement the Commission’s proposal
to devote as many available resources as possible to developing
the least favoured areas by co-ordinated action through Com-
munity and national means. A special package has been intro-
duced for the West of Ireland and similar programmes are pro-
posed for Northern Ireland, certain areas of Northern Italy, the
French overseas departments, the outer Hebrides, the Lozere
and South Eastern Belgium. Other programmes are being con-
sidered.
Programmes of this kind are important in their own right, and
in so far as they also redistribute funds to major budgetary con-
tributors such as the UK and ~,’Vest Germany, they lessen the
grounds for criticism of the CAP in these countries. Unfor-
tunately, the amount available for such programmes is small
and becomes even smaller under conditions of low world prices
when there is heavy expenditure on surplus disposal. We are,
thus, thrown back continually on the need to reduce surpluses
and to rationalise, to the greatest extent possible, the operation
of the Guarantee section of FEOGA.
Effects of Different Options on the lr~h Economy: The Buckwell et
a I., Study
Several attempts have been made to quantify the effects of
suggested CAP changes at both Community and individual
country levels; see, for example, Josling and Pearson (1982),
Buckwell et al., (1982) and Sheehy (1982/83). As the last two
studies are of most interest to Irish readers we quote from their
findings I~low.
The Buckwell et al., study used computer simulation tech-
niques based on 1980 data to study the effect of Four possible
reforms of the CAP: (1) a continuation of 1980 nominal prices
into 1981 (a fall in real prices of’t-.3 per cent), (2) price equaiisa-
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tion through the elimination of MCAs (a price fall of 2.9 per
cent), (3) Community self-sumciency brought about by an
instant reduction in real prices of 13.5 per cent, and (4) a com-
pletely free market causing a price fall of 31.9 per cent.
It was shown that under Options (l), (3) and (4) the gains by
consumers and taxpayers would outweight the losses by pro-
ducers -- resulting in a net gain -- in West Germany, France,
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the UK and the Community as a
whole. However, in Ireland, The Netherlands and Denmark the
opposite would be the case: producers would lose more than
consumers and taxpayers would gain.
Under Option (2), price equalisation, there would be no
change in producer incomes in countries with no MCA’s
(France, Ireland, Italy and Denmark) and a reduction in farmer
income in countries with positive MCA’s (West Germany, The
Netherlands, Belgium and the UK). However, losses to pro-
ducers, where incurred, would be outweighed by gains to con-
sumers and taxpayers.
At face value, these results suggest that for the Community as
a whole, any of the options considered would be superior to the
present system. However, the political acceptability of any of
the proposals would be likely to depend more on their distribu-
tional effects (as between producers, consumers and taxpayers)
than on their overall, net effect. The Buckwell study examines
these distributional issues and finds that the per capita losses
borne by producers are much greater than the per capita gains
made by consumers and taxpayers. For example, the prudent
price package (Option 1) in the EEC as a whole would benefit
consumers and taxpayers by 46 EUA per head, but would cost
each producer 365 EUA.
At the other end of the scale, a free market situation costing
producers an average of 2,793 EUAs would only increase con-
sumer and taxpayer income by 321 EUAs per head. These
results go a long way towards explaining the resistance which
has been observed towards many of the policies simulated in the
analysis. The price reducing policies, in particular, while reduc-
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ing farm incomes considerably would give very little extra
average income to consumers and taxpayers.
The S&ehy Study
In the Sheehy study, four alternative policies were examined,
namely:
1. No restraint -- this illustrates the benefits to Ireland and
the damage to the EEC budget of allowing unrestricted
production at 1982 constant real prices. It is generally
believed by the various commentators that real prices, in
the foreseeable future, will not increase above the 1982
level and are more than likely to decline.
2. A policy of reducing real prices sufficiently to stabilise the
EEC budgetary cost of agricultural supports at not more
than 20 per cent above the 1982 level. The 20 per cent
expansion in the budget was justified on the grounds that
real revenue from VAT would grow as real Community
expenditure grows over time.
3. A policy of raising the level of a uniform co-responsibility
levy imposed on a regime of constant real prices so as to
stabilise the budgetary cost as in (2) above and
4. a regime of quotas selected to maintain the 1982 budgetary
situation as in (2) and (3) above. The quotas would apply
to all CAP products so as to prevent switching from one
product to another and thus building up surpluses where
there are none at present. Within this regime real prices
and co-responsibility levies would remain at 1982 levels.
The impact of each of the policies chosen depends on
certain circumstances namely:
(a) The strength of world markets which were taken at
two levels, a high price level corresponding to
markets between 1980 and 1982 which required
export refunds of 50 per cent offarm gate prices and a
lower level corresponding to pre-1980 world prices
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which required export refunds of 60 per cent of farm
gate prices for current quantities and much higher
levels for exports in excess of current levels.
(b) It was assumed that if real prices were held constant
over time, EEC and Irish production would grow at 2
per cent per annum due to technological and struc-
tural change while consumption was assumed to
grow at 0.5 per cent per annum.
It was also assumed that a l per cent increase in
EEC exports would cause a 0.5 per cent decrease in
world prices, hence the high cost mentioned at (a)
above of disposing of extra exports.
(c) The degree of supply and demand response to prices
and levies. As there is no agreement among econo-
mists concerning the supply responses, upper and
lower bounds of 0.6 and 0.3 were taken. For demand
the price elasticity used was -0.25.
All the above assumptions are crucial to the exercise. But even
if some are not agreed the analysis is not entirely invalidated. It
gives orders of magnitude, heretofore not available, which are of
great importance for policy makers.
A na lysis
The examination of options was carried out using conven-
tional welfare economic analysis. For Ireland, the producer, the
consumer and the nation were the three interests monitored.
Changes in welfare were measured as changes in consumer and
producer surplus, the latter being similar in concept to value
added.
In addition, an off-farm linkage implication was estimated by
assuming that a £1 volume change in farm output makes a 40p
value added contribution off-farm in the input and processing
industries. This value added was assumed to be independent of
price change (but not of volume change consequent on price
change).
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In carry out the analysis the EEC budgetary situation in 1982
was first established. The net budget as defined (i.e., the cost of
price supports less co-responsibility levies) was shown to be
12.55 billion ECUs. This was a crucial figure, as aH the regimes
examined were related to it in some way. The "no restraint"
option showed how the budget would increase ifpresent policies
were continued white the other options were designed so as to
ensure that the budget would not increase by more than 20 per
cent of its 1982 value.
Results
"No Restraint" Regime
Under this regime and assuming favourable world markets,
budget requirements for subsidising agricultural exports would
grow from 12.550 billion ECUs in 1982 to 21.802 billion ECUs
in 1990, an increase in real terms of almost 74 per cent. When
weak world markets are assumed the position is much worse.
The export subsidy stands at 73.8 percent of the fan’n gate value
and the budget requirement grows to 32.850 billion ECUs or 2.6
times the 1982 level
Most people would agree that both these results would be
utterly unacceptabLe to EEC governments. There is, therefore,
no point in considering an unrestricted policy for the coming
years. It may be possible to increase "Own Resources" some-
what in the future but not by the amounts needed fora policyof
"no restraint". It seems, therefore, that whether we like it or not
some other regime will have to be adopted. The implications of
the other policies examined are given in Table 6.2.
Price Approach
Table 6.2 shows that if EEC budgetary expenditure is to be
contained within 120 per cent ofthe 1982 figure through a price
policy, real prices would have to decline by between 9 to 17 per
cent depending on the state of world markets and taking the
lower supply response as the more likely one. Under a price
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Table 6.2: Estimated changes in certain entities in 1990 as between a policy of no restraint and alternative
option~
Change from no restraint option
Policy and assumptions in 1990 (£ million)
Levies as % change 1990/82 in Off-farm
Policy % of toud Real Output Consumption Producer Coruumer value Budget Nationt~
option revenue pri~es volume volume ~urplus surplus added drop welfare
(I) (2) (3) (4) (a) (b) {c) (d) (e)
Strong Worm Markets
Price drop 0.89 91.1 114.0 106.3
-213 +79 -27 +41 -120
Levy 4.65 100 115.9 104.0 -92 0 -l I +41 -62
Quotas 0.89 100 107.0 104.0
-29 0 -86 +41 -74
Weak World Markets
Price drop 0.89 83.2 113.3 108.4 -398 +150 -50 +109 - -109
Levy 9.62 100 114.1 104.0 -211 0 -26 +109 -128
Quotas 0.89 100 103.0 104.0 -57 0 -119 +109 -67
i-o
*Low supply relationxhlps axsumcd
1"National Welfare () = (a) + (b) + (c) - (d)
Source: Shc’chy, op cir.
reduction policy and assuming strong world markets, producer
surplus in real terms in 1990 would be IRff213 million less than it
,.,ould be under a policy of "no restraint." If, however, we
assume weak world markets in 1990 the decline in producer
surplus in that year would be IR£398 mifliqn by comparison
with the "no restraint" policy.
Because of the decline in producer surplus, off-farm value
added would also decline by IRL"27m or IR£50m, in strong and
weak markets, respectively. Irish budget payments would also
fall, but as a result of the reduction in food prices the consumer
surplus would increase. The overall change in national welfare
obtained by summing the changes in producer surplus, con-
sumer surplus and off-farm value-added, and deducting budget
changes, was a fall of IR£120m for the strong world market
situation and a fall of IR£189m for the weak market situation.
On the whole, therefore, under the assumptions used, the
solution of the EEC budgetary problem by a price reduction
policy would involve major losses for Irish farmers, particularly
on weak world markets. If the supply response to price changes
was greater than that assumed, the situation would not be so
bad, because in such circumstances smaller price reductions
would be required to reduce surpluses. As might be expected, a
price policy would not be quite so drastic for the nation as a
whole as it would be for producers. Consumers and taxpayers
would benefit from the reduced food prices and so offset some-
what the farm losses.
The Levy Approach
As with the price approach the extent to which co-responsi-
bility levies must be raised to keep the budgetary situation con-
stant depends on the assumptions about supply elasticities and
levels of world prices. Demand response does not arise since con-
sumer prices are not influenced by the levies. Assuming a supply
of elasticity of 0.3, the figures in Table 6.2 show that by 1990 levy
payments would reach the level of 5-10 percent of the value of
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output, depending on world markets, with real prices remaining
at 1982 levels. This rate of levy would reduce producers’ surplus
by between IR£92 and IR.~C211 miilion below the no restraint
level. These declines are about half of those estimated for the
price option. Consumer surplus would be unchanged under this
option but off-farm value added would fall by between IR£11
and IR.~6 million and Irish budget payments would decline by
from IR£41-IR£109 million, the same as under the price
regime. National welfare would decline from the "no restraint"
levels by IR£62 million under the strong world price assumption
and by IR£128 million under the weak assumption. On the basis
of these figures the levy approach is a much better option for
Ireland than a prudent price policy. What is likely to happen, of
course, is a combination of both options but in these circum-
stances Irish negotiators should press strongly for higher levies to
provide budgetaD, scope for increased prices.
Quota Approach
Under a quota policy, producer surplus would decline by
much less than under the price or levy strategies. The extent of
the decline would depend on the supply response and the state of
world markets. The lower supply response leads to a fall in pro-
ducer surplus of£29m under strong world markets and £57m
under weak markets. As with the ievy regime there would be no
change in consumer surplus. Off-farm value added would be
reduced as would budgetary contributions. The effect on
national welfare would be a reduction of IR£74m from the "no
restraint" situation under the strong world market assumption
and of IR£67m under the weak world market scenario.
As stated above, producers would lose less under a quota
situation than under any of the other regimes but on strong
world markets (and with a low supply response) the overall
national welfare would be best served by a levy regime -- a loss
of IR£62m for the levy option as against IR£74m for quotas. On
weak markets on the other hand the quota option is much
superior to the other two from an overall national welfare point
of view.
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Comments on the Different Options
Naturally the preferable policy for Ireland would be the "no
restraint" option. Such a policy would enable expansion to con-
tinue but it would also greatly increase the EEC budget under
all the assumptions analysed. Sheehy says that "... most people
in Ireland still seem to believe that this policy will materialise
but this is wishful thinking. It is utterly in conflict with budget
reality and is not feasible."
The second option of falling real prices is cleaHy not an
acceptable option and if that policy were to be introduced, and
continued, the demands by farmers for national aids throughout
the Community could not be resisted. This we fear would spell
the end of the CAP.
The remaining policies of co-responsibility levies and quotas
appear to be time most feasible alternatives. Let us look first at the
quota option. If this were to work, quotas would have to operate
at the individual producer level, and while the), could be made
saleable to avoid fi’eezing the individual farmer’s production,
they would still entail a degree of regimentation which many
farmers would resist. Time degree of resistance, however, might
depend on the alternatives facing farmers. Sheehy says, that
"... with the attractive option of no restraint ruled out and
faced with time options of falling real prices or rising levies the),
might change their minds regarding quotas." Indeed, many of
the good farmers who have ahnost reached their full potential
may press for a quota system. It is an attractive option for them
but will be very difficuh for the government to accept. This is
explained below.
The 1983 Commission Proposals
Since these studies were carried out, the EEC budget has
come under considerable strain and is expected to be exhausted
by the end of 1983. An increase in the VAT levy will therefore be
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necessary in 1984 but several countries particularly the UK and
West Germany have absolutely refused to increase the levy
unless something drastic is done about surpluses. As a result the
Commission has now put forward a new set of proposals.
The main proposals of interest to Ireland are:
1. To control the imbalances in the milk sector through the
introduction of a supplementary levy analogous to that
already suggested by the Commission in past years. A
quota would be established for each dairy (milk plant)
based on deliveries in 1981. Alt deliveries in excess of the
quota would be subject to a supplementary levy calculated
in such a way as to cover the full cost ofdisposa] of the addi-
tional milk -- about 70p per gallon.
2. The introduction of a special levy on milk from intensive
farms, for example, those which deliver more than 15,000
kg per hectare of forage.
3. To suspend intervention for skim milk powder from 1
October to 31 March. During this period the aids for feed-
ing powder to animals should be sufficient to maintain sta-
bility of the market.
4. The elimination of the special subsidy for butter consump-
tion; there is little evidence of any additional butter
consumed despite the very high cost of this subsidy.
5. Further regulations in regard to the import of cereal sub-
situtes wiJl be introduced. A levy on Community-produced
cereals may also have to be applied to cover cost ofsurplus
disposal.
6. For beef, further restrictions on intervention purchasing is
suggested. The non-renewal of the calf premium is also
proposed but the suckler cow premium is to be continued
at its present level. The variable premium in operation in
the UK is to be terminated. The present import conces-
sions for beef from certain countries are to be examined
and modified to suit circumstances as they arise.
7. For sheepmeat, it is recommended that the premium
system should be modified, without radically changing the
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market system, and there should be a limitation on the
variable premium as applied in the UK. The possibility of
a reduction in imports from third countries (Nev¢ Zealand)
is to be examined in conjunction with the introduction of a
minimum import price.
8. If the Community introduces a supplementar3, levy on
milk and, thus, an internal check on butter, it must intro-
duce a non-discriminatory internal tax on the consump-
tion of oils and fats other than butter, irrespective oforigin.
It is proposed that such a tax would yield £600 million
ECUs per annum.
9. Any monetary compensatory amount introduced after the
new regulations come into force should be eliminated in
three steps: one-third on the introduction of the new mone-
tary compensatory amount; one-third at the beginning of
the next marketing year and one-third a year later. Exist-
ing MCAs would be dismantied by altering the green rate
in two identical steps at the beginning of the two following
marketing years and, finally
10. the Commission will carry out its obligations under the
Treaty of Rome to ensure the free flow of trade between
member states and will continue to examine closely a[I new
and existing national aids to ensure that they are in accord-
ance with the Treaty.
Most of these proposals have already been discussed but a
statement by An Foras Talfintais (The Agricultural Institute) of
the 19 August 1983 dealing with the effect on Ireland of the
super-levy is worthy of mention.
The statement says, that if implemented at the level men-
tioned, this proposal would freeze production on existing farms
at 1981 levels which were considerably below current 1983
production. Hence, in addition to a loss in current revenue on
many farms, technical change related to scale would be seriously
impeded. Quotas favour farms and regions that are already fully
developed, while developing farmers or disadvantaged regions
would be seriously affected. At processing level there would be
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less incentive to introduce new products or win larger market
shares from other processors.
In addition to these effects, the system would be particularly
severe on both the Irish dairy industry and the national
economy for the following reasons.
1. The contribution of the dair), sector to GNP is over five
times more important in Ireland than the Community
average and almost eight times more important than in the
UK and West Germany. It is also more imporant than in
France, The Netherlands and Denmark.
2. "[’he sector is unquestionably the dynamic component of
the aricultural economy in Ireland. Over the past 30 years
the milk enterprise has expanded at an annual average rate
of over 5 per cent as against less than 3 per cent for agri-
culture as a whole.
3. Curbing milk output would, in the short to medium term,
curtail expansion in the beef sector and increase the cost of
calves to this sector.
4. In 1981 Ireland accounted for less than 5 per cent of Com-
munity (9) deliveries and the Community average yield
.
pet" cow was some 26 per cent greater than in h’eland.
Some of the actual figures are:
Deliveries (million tonnes): h’eland, 4.5; UK, 15.4; The
Netherlands, l l.8; France, 25.0; West Germany, 23.0;
EEC 9, 95.7.
Yield per cow (kg): Ireland, 3,314; UK, 4,803; The
Netherlands, 5,156; France, 3,761; West Germany, 4,545;
EEC 9, 4,181.
Generally speaking, higher yields rather than larger herds
have accounted for most of the increase in Community
production but Ireland is exceptional in this regard. By
Community standards Irish specialised dairy fal’ms are
aver’age sized, grass-based and low cost businesses. The
high yields per cow on the Continent are due to heavy meal
feeding as a result of favourable milk feed price ratios
brought about to some extent by centra[ised locations and
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ready access to duty fi’ee and concessionary feed imports.
For example, in 1982 the ratio of the price of 100 kgs of milk
to that of 100 kgs of feed was 1.04 in West Germany and
1.16 in The Netherlands compared with 0.82 in France
and 0.81 in Ireland. As a result, meal fed per cow is over
three times as high in The Netherlands as in Ireland. Also
as a result of positive MCAs, milk prices in West Germany,
¯ The Netherlands and the UK are currently (August, 1983)
9.5p, 6p and 7p per gallon, respectively, higher than if
green and central exhange rates were equa[ised. These
favourable conditions provide a continuing incentive for
higher yields in the countries concerned.
The An Foras Talfintais document concludes by saying that
there is general agreement that the European Community is
facing a most severe financial crisis, and the growing imbalances
between supply and demand in the case of farm products cannot
be defended indefinitely. What is being argued, however, is that
certain of the anomalies which have clearly exacerbated market
imbalances should be eliminated before artificial constraints on
production are considered. The combined effects of imported
low-cost feeds and high-priced milk, aided by the positive
MCAs, together with high levels of national aids have provided
farmers in certain member states, with a significant incentive to
expand milk production. These factors have directly aggravated
existing regional income disparities in the Community and
distorted the concept of equal opportunities for producers across
the Community.
What is particularly serious for Ireland is that the proposed
supplementary levy would strike at the single most dynamic and
significant element in the agricultural economy, but also one
which currently has a strong momentum of expansion. Serious
adjustment problems would be encountered especially on small
dairy farms striving to increase incomes and living standards.
Finally, the estimated impact of the policies implied in the
Commission proposals would in the absence of compensatory
measures and regardless of their longer-term implications for
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the industry, negatively affect farm incomes in Ireland by 10 to
15 per cent in 1984.
We agree entirely with these statements but we are also aware
that it will not be easy to do much quickly about the various
anomalies which have arisen. Some concessions will therefore
have to be made. However, our negotiators should argue for
special conditions for Ireland because of our high dependence
on agriculture, particularly dairying, our low level of develop-
ment and our difficult peripheral location. We should also use
our veto powers to obtain a higher threshold than the 1981 level
which was exceptionally low in this country. If we could obtain
special quota levels such as our fishery negotiators obtained
under the Hague Agreement in 1975 the super-levy idea would
probably be better than any of the alternatives. Finally, if we
cannot obtain special conditions for Ireland we should press
strongly for a muhi-tiered pricing system. Under such a system
the larger producers (who are creating the surpluses) rather
than the smaller ones would be pena[ised.
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